100TH CONGRESS
2d Session

SENATE

REPORT
100-312

NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND MINORITY VIEWS

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

APRIL 1, 1988.—Ordered to be printed

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Mr. NUNN, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the following

REPORT

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ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND MINORITY VIEWS

When the leaders of the Western democracies gathered in Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, they shared a common view on the course of developments in Europe since the end of the Second World War. The basic principles upon which NATO was founded derived from a common recognition that:

—the Soviet Union's military threat to the West was genuine and would, for the foreseeable future, likely remain constant;

—U.S. security was inextricably linked to the preservation of freedom, economic prosperity, and democratic values in Western Europe and a return to American isolationism was not feasible; and

—collective security in the form of a formal alliance with an integrated military command offered the best prospect for deterring war and denying the Soviet Union its political objectives in Europe.

In the view of the Committee, the basic premises which led the Western democracies to establish NATO remain valid today. Nonetheless, four decades after NATO was formed, the Alliance continues to be plagued by serious doubts about the collective willingness of its members to fully implement NATO's Flexible Response strategy.

CONTEXT OF THE COMMITTEE'S INQUIRY

At the beginning of the 1st Session of the 100th Congress, the Committee undertook a major initiative to enhance the formulation and articulation of U.S. national security strategy and its mili-

tary strategy component. This initiative resulted from concerns about the inadequate quality of American strategymaking and the longstanding absence of a clear, coherent, and consistent strategy. The Treaty signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, eliminating U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF) provided the Committee with the opportunity to focus its efforts on strategy and capabilities for NATO defense.

On the eve of the Washington summit at which the INF Treaty was signed, the Majority Leader and the Chairmen of the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence agreed that these three Committees would work together on the Senate's review of the Treaty and that each Committee would provide a report to the Senate within its specific areas of expertise on the Treaty and its ramifications.

The Armed Services Committee's objective has been to establish a broad strategic framework in which the INF Treaty and other critical NATO defense issues could be comprehensively examined. The Committee focused specifically on the requirements for maintaining and strengthening NATO's deterrent posture in the environment brought about by the attainment of an INF Treaty. This review considered NATO strategy, the military balance in Europe, conventional force improvements, Alliance resource policies, conventional arms control policy, and theater nuclear weapons modernization. The Armed Services Committee also coordinated with the Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees on specific issues related to details of the Treaty and verification.

As part of its inquiry, the Armed Services Committee conducted 29 hearings on "NATO Defense and the INF Treaty." The Committee's witnesses included the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and such distinguished outside experts as Dr. James Schlesinger, Dr. Harold Brown, Dr. Henry Kissinger, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. A complete list of the hearings and witnesses is presented in Appendix A of this report.

After examining the broad issues of NATO defense, the Committee turned its attention to the Treaty itself and devoted substantial effort to establishing an authoritative baseline as to its meaning. The Committee comprehensively reviewed possible ambiguities in the Treaty text and identified an extensive list of questions concerning necessary clarifications. In four days of hearings with Ambassador Glitman, the Chief Negotiator on INF, and his negotiating team, the Committee went through the Treaty on an article-by-article basis and elicited detailed answers to these questions. These sessions included a day-long hearing with Ambassador Glitman on questions related to the negotiating history. In various sections of this report, reference is made to the documents from the negotiating history provided to the Senate by the Administration. It is important to note that the INF Treaty material presented to the Senate by the Department of State consists of a disjointed collection of cables and memoranda of uneven quality. The Senate has not been provided with an official negotiating record. There is no transcript of the proceedings. The material provided to the Senate

does not even include a set of documents that compiles all papers shared between the parties.

A brief summary of the INF Treaty is presented in Appendix B.

At the request of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee, former Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter provided their views to the Committee on the INF Treaty. These letters are included in Appendix C.

The Committee conducted three days of markup meetings on this report, discussing in detail various options for dealing with issues that arose during the hearings. The Committee has incorporated a series of recommendations in this report.

ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE HEARINGS IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS

On February 9, 1988, the Chairman received a letter from Secretary of State George Shultz which bore directly on the ground rules under which the Committee conducted its hearings. In the letter, Secretary Schultz provided three important assurances with regard to the Senate's constitutional role in providing advice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty:

> All INF testimony of Executive Branch witnesses, within their authorized scope, is authoritative. We will inform the relevant Committee of any instance in which a witness' testimony is not authoritative in any respect.
>
> Administration testimony and materials for the record can be regarded as authoritative, as described above, without the need for the Senate to incorporate them in its Resolution of Ratification.
>
> The Reagan Administration will in no way depart from the INF Treaty as we are presenting it to the Senate.

The Secretary's letter enabled the Committee to proceed with detailed testimony on the Treaty with the understanding that all Executive Branch testimony and submissions for the record received by the Committee are authoritative representations of the mutual understandings of the Parties and can be relied upon by the Senate in providing its advice and consent to the Treaty, and that the Treaty the Senate is being asked to approve is in fact the same Treaty that will be respected by the Executive Branch in the future. Although there is disagreement on the Committee, a majority of the Members believe that subsequent letters from the Counsel to the President cast doubt on that understanding. If the matter is not satisfactorily resolved, Members of the Committee may find it necessary to offer appropriate measures during consideration of the Treaty by the Senate, including understandings or amendments to the Treaty.

The Committee provided the Administration with the transcripts of the testimony of all Executive Branch witnesses. All material provided by the Executive Branch for the hearings has been subject to review by the Administration. Except to the extent that certain witnesses advised the Committee that their testimony was not authoritative as to a particular matter, the Administration has not informed the Committee that any Executive Branch testimony or material "is not authoritative in any respect." All Administration testimony and materials submitted for the record have been re-

garded by the Committee as significant, and will form an essential element of the body of evidence before the Senate as it determines whether to give its consent to the proposed Treaty.

NATO MILITARY STRATEGY

The broader context in which the INF Treaty must be considered is principally shaped by two interrelated factors: first, the military strategy that NATO has established for maintaining deterrence and providing defense and second, the capabilities of the Alliance to implement that strategy.

Reacting to the diminished credibility—in an era of strategic nuclear parity—of its previous strategy of "massive retaliation," NATO adopted the military strategy of Flexible Response, including Forward Defense, in 1967. Flexible Response sought to deter any possible aggression by developing and maintaining a full range of military options, incorporated in NATO's triad of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear responses. Although committed to a high confidence, initial conventional defense, NATO's strategy explicitly envisions possible escalation to the first use of theater nuclear or strategic nuclear weapons, or both, in the event a Warsaw Pact attack cannot be contained by non-nuclear means.

The Forward Defense component of the strategy means defending West German and other NATO territory as far forward as possible, with the aim of yielding minimum territory during a conflict. Forward Defense is dictated by NATO's limited geographic depth and by the fact that the core of the Alliance in Central Europe is the most exposed to the Warsaw Pact military threat.

Failed implementation

Although more than two decades have passed since Flexible Response was adopted, the Alliance has failed to implement that strategy effectively, especially because the conventional leg of NATO's triad remains inadequate. Recent Soviet technological advances and continuing conventional force structure increases have compounded NATO's conventional problems. Despite its readily apparent deficiencies in conventional forces, the Alliance has not made significant progress toward the goal of a high confidence, initial conventional defense. As a result, the nuclear threshold remains dangerously low. Moreover, NATO must also worry whether it could sustain an effective conventional defense long enough to permit political authorities to make a determined and deliberate decision to move to a nuclear response.

The second leg of the NATO triad, theater nuclear weapons, has traditionally suffered from limited public and official support. Although Alliance solidarity permitted the INF deployments, the consensus between parties in a number of NATO countries on modernizing theater nuclear forces again appears to be eroding. Only at the strategic nuclear level has the Alliance maintained an adequate force, but Flexible Response sought to move NATO away from an overdependence on strategic nuclear retaliation.

Forward Defense also suffers from ineffective implementation. Beyond failing to improve conventional capabilities enough, NATO has not corrected force maldeployments, strengthened weak corps

sectors, or provided for in-place and readily executable terrain barriers. As Admiral Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Committee:

> If for some reason war breaks out, maintaining a successful forward defense will be questionable. Our analysis argues strongly that Soviet conventional ground forces will be extremely difficult to contain.

Although Flexible Response remains conceptually sound, the critical gap between the goals of the strategy and the capabilities available to achieve them undermines the utility of the strategy and poses substantial dangers for the Alliance. Military strategists view a strategy with a substantial gap between goals and capabilities as a precept for disaster. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the eminent British strategist, noted that "strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and coordination of the ends and means." NATO strategy does not measure up to this yardstick. Currently, NATO has valid goals and sound strategic concepts, but it has failed to develop sufficient capabilities to complete the strategy equation. Should deterrence fail, there are considerable risks that the Alliance's warfighting capabilities may prove inadequate to execute its strategy. The challenge before the Alliance is to provide capabilities to match its goals.

Reasons for failure

How is it that NATO—whose member states collectively outspend Warsaw Pact countries on defense and have roughly three times the Gross National Product—has been unable to provide sufficient capabilities to implement its military strategy? In part, the answer can be found in an unwillingness to correct current inefficient and national-oriented resource policies. NATO directs a large portion of its defense expenditures into national systems that are often duplicative, non-standardized, and in many cases not even interoperable with other allied systems. During the Committee's hearings, General Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, noted that "while the Warsaw Pact has a great deal of commonality of equipment, NATO has six different main battle tanks, firing four different kinds of ammunition. In the field of communications, NATO has six different systems, none of which are designed to talk to each other."

In part, the answer also reflects NATO's reliance on the American nuclear umbrella and divergent views on equitable sharing of the burdens and risks of common defense which have resulted in an excessive reliance on the early resort to nuclear weapons. Fears of the devastation of a prolonged conventional conflict have fostered risk avoidance policies that preclude developing the conventional capabilities required by Flexible Response. Despite its conceptual elegance, Flexible Response will not be more effectively implemented until a basic agreement on the appropriate risks and responsibilities of each NATO member state is reached.

One fundamental observation about NATO strategy deserves special attention. Notwithstanding the critical need for conventional force improvements, the security of the NATO Alliance will rely on modern and credible nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

NATO should make this fact absolutely clear to the publics of member nations.

NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE

The second factor that shapes the broader context in which the INF Treaty must be considered is the comparative capabilities of NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces.

The Committee appreciates the difficulty of assessing the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance. Just making judgments on the basis of criteria that can be quantified is complex enough. Comparing the capabilities of the two alliances in other more intangible areas is even more challenging. Efforts to assess the balance are further plagued by the failure of NATO and the United States to effectively develop such comparisons, particularly in unclassified form. Nonetheless, through a combination of analytic methods, a rough estimate of the military balance can be reached.

An assessment of the military balance is property characterized in terms of the comparative capabilities of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances to achieve their objectives. Those objectives obviously differ. The strategy, doctrine, and force deployments of the Warsaw Pact continue to emphasize offensive operations designed to cause the collapse of NATO's defenses. On the other hand, the NATO Alliance remains defensive in nature, with an ultimate warfighting objective of restoring the status quo ante. This difference in objectives between the two alliances imposes different demands on their military forces. The success which the forces would likely have in carrying out those different demands essentially determines the military balance in Europe.

Conventional balance

The imbalance in NATO-Warsaw Pact capabilities is most apparent and most dangerous at the level of conventional forces. NATO has improved its conventional defenses in recent years, but not as fast as the Warsaw Pact has improved its warfighting capabilities. As General Galvin told the Committee: "* * * since 1973, the size of the Soviet military machine facing NATO has grown almost 50 percent, while NATO forces grew little more than 10 percent." Admiral Crowe warned of "an increasingly negative conventional balance, and adverse trends in many of the major weapon categories." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed particular concern over the low level of sustainability items and munitions for NATO's conventional defense, declaring: "This trend has, in turn, lowered the nuclear threshold and raised the risk of general escalation."

Perhaps most omnious, the Warsaw Pact has improved its ability to conduct a short-warning, massed armor attack. NATO is especially vulnerable to such an attack, particularly against the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). There, the strongest forces of the Warsaw Pact (Soviet and East German tank armies in East Germany) are arrayed opposite the weakest sector of NATO's forward defense. The Belgian and Dutch corps that form much of NORTHAG retain most of their personnel and equipment in their home territories. In the event of war, over 60 percent of the Belgian forces

and over 85 percent of the Dutch forces must move from their peacetime locations in Belgium and the Netherlands to their defensive positions in West Germany. Moreover, except for one brigade, the three divisions of the U.S. Third Corps, which would reinforce these thin forces in NORTHAG, are stationed in the United States.

NATO deficiencies

One of NATO's continuing deficiencies is conventional firepower. Dr. Phillip Karber, a well-respected defense analyst, noted in testimony before the Committee that during the past 10 years, the Soviets have added more than 1,000 artillery tubes, 900 tanks and 1,500 armored personnel carriers in Central Europe. The 10-year net increase in Soviet and other Warsaw Pact conventional weapon systems in the Central Region exceeds the total inventory of such systems in the five and one-third U.S. Army divisions forward deployed in West Germany today.

A second NATO deficiency is sustainability, especially in munitions stocks. Warsaw Pact forces deployed against the Central Region of NATO have more than three million metric tons of ammunition. This ammunition, together with stocks of fuel and supplies, is sufficient to support military operations for 60 to 90 days. In contrast, NATO forces suffer deplorable shortfalls and mismatches of munitions. NATO is far short of its 30-day munitions objective. In shortest supply are "smart" or sophisticated munitions. Moreover, the munitions stocks that NATO has accumulated are unevenly distributed between Army Groups and among national corps. As a result of these problems, the collapse of NATO's conventional defense and escalation to nuclear war could be caused not by a defeat of Alliance forces on the battlefield, but by exhaustion of their conventional munitions.

The ability of NATO to reinforce Central Europe is crucial to its success on the battlefield, particularly in light of firepower and munitions shortfalls. The principal source of reinforcements would be the United States, which has pledged to have in Europe a total of 10 divisions and more than 1,500 tactical aircraft within 10 days. Despite recent improvements in airlift, sealift, and prepositioning of equipment, this commitment cannot be met today. Although the tactical aircraft could rapidly deploy to Europe, their survival is highly questionable in the absence of enough hardened shelters, petroleum storage, and maintenance facilities to service and protect them.

In sum, compared to the Warsaw Pact, NATO suffers from inferior firepower; low levels of sustainability, especially in munitions; inadequate reinforcement rates; and peacetime maldeployment of its forces. NATO's posture is further weakened by the Warsaw Pact's chemical warfighting superiority, which is addressed in a following section.

NATO advantages

Although its conventional deficiencies make it questionable as to whether NATO will be able to mount a successful conventional defense, the Alliance enjoys advantages over the Warsaw Pact in certain important areas. The overall quality of personnel in NATO's military forces is superior to that of Warsaw Pact personnel. Better

training, morale, and leadership should help to mitigate the Alliance's disadvantages.

Another NATO advantage lies in the greater reliability of its member states. The offensive objectives of the Warsaw Pact, together with the coercive nature of relations between the Soviet Union and its partners, cause some uncertainty about the depth of commitment of the East European allies to an offensive operation into Western Europe. Although this difference between the two alliances can be exaggerated and cannot necessarily be relied upon, it represents an important advantage that NATO should attempt to exploit.

A final factor in comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact military capabilities is the quality of major weapons systems. This technological balance is difficult to ascertain. Historically, NATO has relied on the superior quality of its weapons to compensate for its quantitative deficiencies. However, the high cost and prolonged period of time entailed in developing and fielding these sophisticated systems have raised questions about the margin of this qualitative advantage. In addition, the qualitative advantage itself has been eroded by Warsaw Pact progress in certain military technologies.

Assessment

There is considerable risk that NATO forces could be defeated quickly by conventional means. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci has argued that "in the event of war in Europe, NATO would face the difficult choice of early escalation to the use of nuclear weapons or suffering a conventional defeat in Europe's critical Central Region." The former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Bernard Rogers, USA (Retired), has repeatedly pointed out that NATO's conventional weaknesses would force its political authorities to confront this choice between nuclear escalation and conventional defeat in a matter of "days, not weeks" after the outbreak of hostilities.

Such judgments, however, need to be put into perspective. The outcome of a conventional war depends on many unknowns such as the relative performance of competing weapon systems, weather, warning time, and quality of personnel. NATO may have doubts about its capabilities. However, the Warsaw Pact may also have legitimate concerns about the ability to execute its strategy. This strategy calls for attempting to avoid escalation to nuclear weapons by obtaining a quick conventional victory, before the reliability of East European nations is fully tested and before the Soviets might become involved in a 2-front war (i.e., the simultaneous engagement of its large forces near the Chinese border).

Despite these uncertainties on the Warsaw Pact side, NATO cannot afford to assume that the Pact will always be deterred from aggression. NATO must focus on capabilities, not intentions. Major improvements in NATO's conventional capability are required.

Chemical balance

In 1969, the United States declared a unilateral moratorium on the production of chemical weapons. During the period from 1969 to 1987, when the United States produced no new chemical agents

and allowed its existing chemical stockpile to deteriorate, the Soviet Union undertook an extensive buildup of its chemical warfighting capabilities and may now be developing a chemical-biological warfare capability. In doctrine and in practice, modern chemical weapons and protective systems are an integral component of Soviet conventional warfighting systems.

In contrast, although progress has been made since the late 1970's, the U.S. armed forces are far from possessing the weapons delivery capability, equipment and training necessary for fully integrated conventional and chemical warfighting capabilities. Furthermore, the Department of Defense has stated that only 10 percent of the existing chemical stockpile has immediate military utility.

After several years of debate, Congress authorized the production of new binary chemical weapons in the Fiscal Year 1986 Defense Authorization Act. The first binary chemical weapon, the 155mm artillery shell, was certified for production on September 30, 1987. The other binary weapon slated to enter the U.S. arsenal is the deep-strike, persistent-agent, Bigeye chemical bomb, which is not scheduled to achieve full-scale production until 1990. Under existing plans, neither the 155mm shell nor the Bigeye will be deployed in Europe in peacetime. The American and German Governments have agreed that all existing unitary chemical weapons will be removed from Germany by 1992.

Unless the negotiations in Geneva result in a ban on chemical weapons, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact will continue for some years to possess a chemical warfighting capability superior to that of the United States and NATO.

Theater nuclear balance

The United States initially enjoyed a substantial lead in virtually all areas of theater nuclear weapons, but that lead was eroded by the Soviet Union over time as it developed and deployed comparable weapons systems.

Since 1979, there has been a dramatic increase in Soviet theater nuclear systems. Dr. Phillip Karber noted in testimony to the Committee that in 1979, "* * * the Soviets had no nuclear artillery deployed forward. We had it; they did not * * * Today they have more nuclear artillery in central Europe * * * than we do. Since 1979 the Soviets have doubled the quantity and range/payload of their in-theater, in-central-Europe nuclear-capable aircraft, so they have roughly twice the number that we do for certified nuclear missions." During this same period of time, NATO has made decisions that have resulted in the retirement of over 2,400 older nuclear weapons from the theater.

NATO has moved, over the past quarter century, from a position of overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons based in the theater to one of inferiority in those weapons now categorized as "theater nuclear."

ASSESSMENT OF THE INF TREATY

In broad terms, the Committee believes the INF Treaty can make a modest but useful contribution to NATO security. There are a number of positive features of the Treaty, particularly:

—disproportionate Soviet reductions—a precedent which could prove useful in the negotiation of a significant conventional arms reductions agreement;

—on-site inspection on an unprecedented scale; and

—cooperative measures for enhancing verification through national technical means.

At the political level, the Treaty is a triumph for Allied cohesion and coordination. It is also a tribute to the governments in the basing countries which displayed resolve in implementing INF deployments in the face of widespread domestic opposition and skillful Soviet propaganda.

In addition, the Treaty reflects the fruits of continuity in the United States between two successive administrations—one Democratic under President Carter, the other Republican under President Reagan—which, with bipartisan support in Congress, stood steadfastly behind NATO's "dual track" approach.

Military significance

Nonetheless, unless this Treaty is coupled with a stabilizing and verifiable START agreement, its military significance is, at best, marginal. Every target currently targeted by Soviet shorter-range and intermediate-range systems can be assigned to other Soviet nuclear systems. Such retargeting can be accomplished by strategic systems such as ICBMs, most of which have been tested at INF ranges, and the Yankee-class submarines which have now been redeployed from U.S. coasts to European waters, and intermediate-range systems not covered under the Treaty, such as air-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs). Alternately, the Soviets could legally develop and deploy a "new type" ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM) replacement for the SS–20 provided that missile were tested the first time at a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers, even if it were tested on every subsequent occasion at INF ranges.

Verification and compliance

The Committee received testimony that the Treaty was effectively verifiable, which was described as high confidence that a militarily significant violation would be detected. Such considerations are central to whether this Treaty is in U.S. national security interests, and the Committee accepts this assessment. At the same time, the Committee would object strongly if this proper focus on militarily significant violations were interpreted as a lack of concern over violations that failed to meet this criteria. The Committee wishes to make it clear that violations of this Treaty should not be tolerated, irrespective of their military significance.

During Committee hearings, many Members expressed concern over the record of the Soviet Union's non-compliance with its arms control commitments and the lack of measures taken either to bring the Soviets into compliance or to respond to non-compliance,

proportionally or otherwise. Accordingly, the Committee recommends the development of an effective compliance policy as a high priority.

The Committee also supports an expansion of the annual compliance report to include an assessment of the risks posed by the Soviet non-compliance to U.S. national security interests; the measures the United States is taking to bring the Soviets into compliance, as appropriate; and actions necessary to compensate for non-compliance.

In view of the record of Soviet non-compliance with their arms control commitments and the proliferation of systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction among Third World nations, the Committee reaffirms its support for the vigorous exploration of Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) options. Such an initiative, if proven feasible and effective, would provide a safeguard against Soviet use of covertly retained missiles prohibited by the Treaty, as well as providing defense against remaining Soviet short-range ballistic missiles or missiles launched by third parties and protection against accidental missile launches.

The Committee also would support, in separate legislation, an annual report by the President that would set forth a comprehensive arms control strategy; a net assessment of military balance trends, including the effects of arms control; and a description of allied consultations on the security implications of arms control agreements.

Committee recommendation

On balance, the Committee believes that the positive features of the Treaty outweigh its weaknesses. Moreover, the Committee is convinced, as were the vast majority of witnesses who appeared before the Committee, that were the Senate to reject this Treaty, the adverse political repercussions in Europe and elsewhere would be very significant.

The Armed Services Committee recommends that the INF Treaty be ratified, subject to certain recommendations and possible understandings. These recommendations and possible understandings are outlined in the section which follows.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDINGS ON TREATY ISSUES

1. Article XIV

Article XIV provides: "The Parties shall comply with the Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions." During the Committee's hearings, questions were raised as to whether this provision could be interpreted by the Soviet Union as prohibiting current and future U.S. assistance to our allies on weapons programs not limited under the Treaty on the grounds that such assistance would circumvent the express prohibitions in the Treaty.

The Article-by-Article Analysis transmitted by the President with the Treaty states that Article XIV "does not impose any additional obligation on the Parties, nor does it broaden the interpretation of other obligations in the Treaty." The Analysis adds that

this Article merely "reflects the duty of each Party under customary international law to comply with the Treaty."

At the Committee's hearing on February 23, 1988, Ambassador Glitman made the following points in the course of a lengthy description of the negotiating history of Article XIV:

> The Soviets sought * * * to insert into the treaty language which they hoped could serve as either a brake on United States-NATO cooperation or at least as a basis for public accusations that we were not in compliance with the treaty. We resisted that effort. Our success can be measured by comparing the position of the sides during the negotiations with the final result. * * *
>
> [A] look at the relevant articles in SALT II is in order since these form the basis for the Soviet position. Article XII of SALT II states "In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this treaty, each party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this treaty through any other state or states or in any other manner". * * *
>
> Article XIII of the SALT [II] Treaty states "Each party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this treaty."
>
> [T]he language of SALT II Article XII is totally absent from Article XIV of the INF Treaty. Thus, it cannot be argued that what was covered by Article XII of SALT II, noncircumvention through any state or states or in any other manner, * * * is covered by Article XIV of the INF Treaty, which is more closely allied to Article XIII of the SALT II Treaty. * * *

Ambassador Glitman made the following observations about the specific Soviet proposals that were rejected:

> [W]e firmly resisted the Soviet approach, and in time, the Soviets dropped the specific prohibitions against transfer of * * * components and related technical documentation. However, they continued to demand general noncircumvention language close to Article XII of SALT II and language parallel with Article XIII of SALT II.
>
> We continued to oppose the noncircumvention language but suggested that if the Soviets dropped that language as well as language they were seeking in another article calling for follow-on negotiations * * * we could accept language which is essentially a restatement of the pacta sunt servanda principle of international law, language similar to Article XIII of SALT II.
>
> * * * * * *
>
> In the end, the Soviets agreed to drop all reference to noncircumvention or to other states, and effectively to drop everything that was part of the original Article XII of SALT II * * *
>
> * * * * * *
>
> What is left in Article XIV is a restatement of international law. It says that we must comply with the treaty

and not assume any new obligations or undertakings that conflict with the provisions. This is well known language. Similar language appears not only in Article XIII of SALT II, but also in Article X of the ABM Treaty and Article VII of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Ambassador Glitman's testimony demonstrated that the Soviets sought to insert language into the Treaty which they hoped would restrict U.S.-NATO cooperation, but the U.S. successfully resisted this effort, and the U.S. view was agreed to by the Parties.

Ambassador Glitman's testimony made it clear that questions as to the types of assistance prohibited under the Treaty must be addressed under the specific prohibitions in the Treaty, not by reference to Article XIV. For example, Articles IV–VI prohibit production or possession of specified INF missiles.

The effect of the Treaty, as Ambassador Glitman has noted, is that: "We cannot produce or possess and thus transfer missiles that fall within the range bands of the Treaty that meet [the Treaty's] criteria." Where there is no limitation in the Treaty on an activity by a Party, however, the Treaty does not prohibit a Party from undertaking that activity in the form of assistance to a third country. Ambassador Glitman illustrated this point with examples of assistance that would not be prohibited by Treaty, such as; production or transfer of lesser components, technology, or blueprints; actions contemplated by the Montebello accord (e.g., follow-on Lance, air-launched systems, and new nuclear artillery); sharing of guidance systems; U.S.-British cooperation in the Trident submarine-launched ballistic system project; and similar existing and future arrangements.

With respect to components of a treaty-limited item, Ambassador Glitman noted: "[T]he Treaty speaks for itself. We can provide components, because that was one of the things they [the Soviets] sought to prohibit." He also noted, however, that transfer of a "whole * * * system piece by piece" would not be permitted.

Recommendation

In light of the explicit assurances contained in the Article-by-Article Analysis and the extensive testimony on this issue by Ambassador Glitman and other Executive Branch officials, which were consistent with the negotiating materials provided to the Senate, the Committee does not believe it is necessary to adopt a condition on the Resolution of Ratification on the meaning and effect of Article XIV.

However, the Committee wishes to state unequivocally its understanding that Article XIV does not in any way constitute a noncircumvention provision, nor does it impose any obligations on the Parties that are not expressed elsewhere in the Treaty. Questions as to the types of assistance prohibited under the Treaty must be addressed under the specific prohibitions in the Treaty, not by reference to Article XIV. The Treaty prohibits the Parties from producing or transferring a missile, missile stage, or launcher for a treaty-limited cruise missile or ballistic missile. It does not prohibit the production or transfer of lesser components or other items, such as guidance elements, technology, or blueprints. However, it

would prohibit providing another country with every component piece by piece, thereby effectively amounting to the transfer of a whole missile, missile stage, or launcher.

2. Conventionally-armed GLCM's

Late in the INF negotiations, the United States reversed its position and agreed to ban conventionally-armed ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) of INF range. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and the other members of the American Enterprise Institute's (AEI) Task Force on INF, among others, recommended that the Treaty be amended to permit such systems.

At the Committee's February 4 hearing, Mr. Perle declared that "the single most serious defect in the Treaty" is the provision (Article II, Paragraph 2) that has the effect of banning conventional GLCMs of INF range. Mr. Perle contended that banning conventional GLCMs "will prevent the United States from deploying weapons that could strengthen greatly our deterrent forces and our conventional capability." Moreover, he maintained that allowing such systems would not make the Treaty less verifiable since he believes the provisions in the agreement permitting unarmed drones and RPVs and defining GLCM range result in the Treaty provisions on GLCMs being already "nearly impossible" to verify. Mr. Perle also stated that this would not be seen by the Soviets as a "killer" amendment and "would, after a suitable interval of plaintive propaganda, be accepted by them."

During the February 25 hearing, Ambassador Nitze provided the following summary explanation for the President's decision:

> Given we have protected ourselves on the air and sea variants, and we had no current requirements for a conventionally-armed INF GLCM, we then had to weigh the potential benefits of protecting this option against the verification difficulties inherent in distinguishing between nuclear and conventionally-armed GLCMs. The U.S. Government had been unable to develop, and the Soviet Union had not put forth, a regime to verify effectively the differences between the two types. Thus, rather than permit Soviet conventionally-armed GLCMs, all the while having to assume for military planning purposes that each Soviet GLCM was capable of delivering nuclear weapons, the President decided to ban all INF GLCMs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Committee that a major consideration in their decision to support the ban was the military advantages accruing to the Soviets were they to be afforded the right to deploy conventionally-armed GLCMs of INF range, not only for conventional but also chemical missions. In addition, the JCS emphasized the military potential of alternatives available to the United States to achieve the same target coverage and damage, including ALCMs and SLCMs.

With regard to the verification aspects of this issue, Executive Branch witnesses, including representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stressed the difficulties that would be introduced if an infrastructure remained for Soviet conventional GLCM operations.

These witnesses also cited the intrusiveness, cost, and problematic effectiveness of the verification schemes that would have to be considered if conventional GLCMs were allowed. The witnesses disputed the contention that national technical means of verification could not distinguish between armed and unarmed cruise missiles, pointing to differences in testing patterns and the infrastructures associated with deployments of these types of systems.

Recommendation

The Committee recognizes the validity of the concerns expressed during its hearings over the prohibition of a potentially promising option for implementing NATO's follow-on forces (FOFA) and deep strike doctrines. Advanced technology is the Alliance's trump card, and highly-accurate, unmanned, long-range, stand-off weapons represent a particularly attractive means for redressing the conventional imbalance in Europe.

At the same time, the Committee regards the proposal to permit conventional GLCMs as a two-edged sword, since it would provide the Soviet Union with a readily exploitable option for increasing its conventional and chemical threat to vital NATO facilities in Western Europe. In addition, the Committee recognizes the magnitude of the verification problem that would be created were the Soviets to deploy conventional GLCMs of INF range. The Committee concludes that the verification question was a principle factor in the Administration's willingness to ban conventional GLCMs.

The negotiating records provided to the Senate indicated that the Soviet Union's opposition to allowing conventionally-armed GLCMs was consistent and forceful. Neither the negotiating records provided to the Senate nor the Administration's testimony on this point provides grounds for concluding that amending the Treaty in this manner would not prompt a protracted and, at best, difficult renegotiation of the agreement.

In the final analysis, the Committee does not believe that an amendment to permit conventional GLCMs of INF range is advisable. However, banning the deployment of such systems makes it essential that START not foreclose U.S. options for conventional ALCMs and SLCMs, including systems of these types for INF ranges. The Committee urges the Administration not to permit the GLCM decision to set a precedent that could adversely affect U.S. national security interests with regard to conventional ALCMs and SLCMs.

3. Futuristic weapons systems

During the Committee hearings, serious concerns were raised that the Treaty is not clear in its application to future types of weapons, such as an unmanned hypersonic boost-glide vehicle.

Article II defines "ballistic missile" as "a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path." The term "cruise missile" is defined as "an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path." Both GLBM and GLCM are further defined as a "weapon-delivery vehicle."

Despite repeated questioning by the Committee, the Administration would not answer the specific question of whether a boost-glide vehicle should be categorized as a cruise missile or a ballistic missile. Ambassador Glitman testified that that judgment could not be made without knowing the specific features of the system: "I have to know what that vehicle you have mentioned is, and I do not." Ambassador Glitman also stated, however, that if a boost-glide vehicle or any other system meets the four criteria established for inclusion in the Treaty (range, weapons delivery, ground-launched, and ballistic or cruise), then "it will be covered by the Treaty."

However, a more fundamental, and potentially serious, issue arose during the hearings as to the meaning of the words "weapon-delivery" in Article II. The Article-by-Article Analysis defines this term as "those types of ground-launched cruise missiles that have been . . . flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof." This suggests that GLBMs or GLCMs which destroyed their targets through other, perhaps more futuristic or exotic, means would not be covered. If this reading is correct, then, the Treaty would appear to allow GLBMs or GLCMs that destroyed targets through such means as lasers, particle-beam generators, microwave pulse generators or perhaps even direct impact (kinetic kill).

During the hearings, however, there were indications that the Administration may be interpreting this language more broadly than the explanation in the Article-by-Article Analysis to include future weapons types such as those listed above (i.e., anything that can destroy a target). The Committee has not, however, received final authoritative testimony on this point. The Administration has informed the Committee that it is endeavoring to come up with an answer to this question but is not yet in a position to do so.

Recommendation

The Committee believes this is a critical issue. Most of the attention on the INF Treaty has focused on the elimination of existing systems over the next three years. However, the Committee believes it is important that the Senate recognize that the Treaty is also establishing a permanent ban on certain types of weapons—nuclear and conventional. For this reason, the Senate must insist that the Treaty be very clear in defining which types of future weapons of INF range will and will not be allowed.

The Committee recommends that the Senate insist that the Administration tell it authoritatively (1) what they think the definition of "weapon delivery" is and (2) whether this definition was clearly agreed to by the Soviet Union.

If the Administration cannot demonstrate to the Senate's satisfaction, before the final floor vote on advice and consent, that the United States and the Soviet Union reached a clear understanding on this question, then the Committee recommends the adoption of an appropriate understanding to provide a clear statement of the U.S. position on the scope of the phrase "weapon-delivery." If the Administration should report to the Senate that there is no common understanding between the U.S. and Soviet negotiators on this question, the Senate should, before propounding an under-

standing on this issue, receive the views of the Administration on how to define "flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery."

4. SS–25/SS–20 second stage correlation

Article VI, Paragraph 2 reads:

> Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does *not* produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, *but not* interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. (emphasis added)

During the Committee hearings, concern was raised as to whether this provision contains a double negative which would permit the Soviets to produce an ICBM that had one stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of the SS–20 and another stage that was outwardly similar to and interchangeable with another stage of the SS–20. Since a stage that was outwardly similar to and interchangeable with an SS–20 stage would for all intents and purposes be an SS–20 stage, the issue is whether the prefatory language in this provision (which reads "[n]otwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article") in combination with the drafting error would allow the Soviets to retain SS–20 stages despite the provisions in the Treaty requiring their complete elimination.

The Article-by-Article Analysis states that this provision was necessary because of the "outward physical similarity between the first stage of the SS–25 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the first stage of the SS–20." It states that "the effect of Paragraph 2 is to make clear that the Treaty does not prohibit the Soviets from continuing to produce the SS–25 ICBM, which is not limited by this Treaty, on the basis that it has a first stage outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, the first stage of the SS–20."

Under the Treaty, the United States has a reciprocal right with regard to one stage of a non-INF U.S. missile (either an ICBM or a short-range nuclear force (SNF) missile) being outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, the Pershing II missile system, should it choose to exercise that right.

During the Committee hearings, Ambassador Glitman testified that the United States was not "seeking to capture" the SS–25s and "concluded that we could provide an exception for the SS–25." He further testified that this paragraph permits the Soviets to build a first stage of the SS–25 which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, the first stage of the SS–20 stage. He insisted, however, that the provision would not allow the Soviets to build both a first and a second stage of the SS–25 that are outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, the first and second stages of the SS–20.

Notwithstanding Ambassador Glitman's testimony as to the intent of the Parties and the effect of the Treaty, Members expressed the view that the provision was, at best, awkwardly written, and, at worst, contained a double negative that, in combination with the exemption stated in the prefatory clause, would allow production not only of a first SS–25 stage that was outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, the first stage of the SS–20, but also a second stage of the SS–25 that could be outwardly similar to and interchangeable with the second stage of the SS–20.

Recommendation

The Committee carefully weighed the testimony of Ambassador Glitman, the description contained in the Article-by-Article Analysis, and pertinent documents from the negotiating history. The Committee concluded that there was a meeting of the minds between the United States and Soviet negotiators that each Party has the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by the Treaty if that missile uses one, but only one, stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. Thus, if a Party chooses to produce a non-INF GLBM with one such stage, it may not produce any other stage that is outwardly similar to any other stage of an INF missile.

This means that the Soviets may continue producing the SS–25 first stage provided that it is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, the first stage of the SS–20. If these stages are interchangeable, that would be a violation. However, if they elect this option (as they have indicated they will), the second stage of the SS–25 cannot be outwardly similar to the second stage of the SS–20, even if it is not interchangeable.

Although the Committee believes that the United States and the Soviet Union share a common understanding of the meaning and effect of this provision, it firmly believes that the drafting of this provision is technically flawed and should be clarified. Accordingly, the Committee urges the President to clarify with the Soviet Union the meaning of this provision. This could be accomplished, for example, by an exchange of letters.

The Committee further urges the President to reach this clarification prior to final Senate action on the Treaty. If such clarification is not reached, the Committee may have to recommend that an understanding be added to the Resolution of Ratification to clarify this provision.

5. Definition of range of INF missiles

During the hearings, concern was expressed that the Soviets could develop and deploy a "new type" GLBM to replace the SS–20s if the missile were tested the first time at a range in excess of 5500 km, even if every other test were at INF ranges. The Committee considered whether the Treaty should be changed to deal with this problem.

During its hearings, Ambassador Glitman testified that a new type GLBM that had been tested once at a range above 5500 kilometers could be deployed without violating the Treaty, even if all

subsequent tests were conducted at INF ranges. The Committee was subsequently informed that conflicting testimony may have been presented by another Executive Branch witness before another committee. The Committee sought clarification of this conflict and received a letter, dated March 25, from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, which explained that:

> The range capability of a GLBM is "considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested." Thus once a missile has demonstrated in a test that it has a strategic range capability, it must be considered to be a strategic system. However, if the test to strategic range was with a configuration (booster stages, post boost vehicle, RVs) that is unlike that used for remaining tests of the system at INF ranges, the configuration tested to INF ranges would be considered a new missile in the INF range and prohibited by the Treaty. On the other hand, a GLBM tested to ICBM ranges and then tested to INF ranges in the same configuration clearly would not be limited by the Treaty.

However, concerns were raised in the Committee: (1) as to whether the letter related directly to the testimony in question; (2) the authoritativeness of the letter; and (3) the substantive basis for the apparent contention in the letter that a change in the number of reentry vehicles (RVs) on a missile can make it a "new type." The Committee is seeking further clarification on this issue.

The United States proposed 5500 km as the upper limit for the definition of intermediate range missiles very early in the negotiations. It was accepted immediately by the Soviets and, according to the United States' negotiators, never became an issue between the Parties. The negotiators have assured the Committee that it was well-understood by both Parties that any missile tested only once over 5500 km was not an INF range missile and not subject to the Treaty.

In response to a question as to why the Treaty adopted this definitional approach, Ambassador Glitman testified that the Parties decided that if a missile could "go a strategic range we are going to count it as a strategic missile" and not subject to this Treaty. Ambassador Glitman also maintained that "the political impact of that missile changes, because it is no longer a unique INF missile 'aimed' at Europe or Asia. It is now a missile which is capable of reaching the United States."

The opportunities for circumventing the Treaty's INF range also include the option permitted the Soviets under the Treaty to retarget existing or new ICBM systems to strike targets in Europe and Asia that had previously been targeted by the SS–20's. Because they could legally test them extensively at INF ranges, the Soviets could have a high degree of confidence in the military utility of these missiles.

Any ICBMs that were given INF targets could, however, detract somewhat from the total Soviet inventory of weapons assigned against the United States. This trade-off would, of course, be more limiting on the Soviets in the context of a START agreement, depending upon the terms of such an agreement. As Ambassador

Glitman testified, the military effectiveness of the INF Treaty "would be greatly enhanced by a follow-on START Treaty."

In addressing this issue, the Committee considered recommending amendment of the Treaty to specify that a missile which had been tested on one or more occasions at INF ranges would only be exempted if the number of tests conducted at ranges over 5500 km exceeded a certain percentage of the system's total flight test program (e.g., 50 percent).

If consistently applied, however, such a rule would have the disadvantageous effect of creating a circumvention problem involving missiles of less than INF ranges. One of the advantages of the current range definition approach taken in the Treaty is that if the Soviets were to test an SNF missile on even one occasion at a range above 500 kilometers, it would no longer be considered an SNF system but rather an INF system. All SNF missiles of that type would then be banned under the Treaty. If the Treaty were amended to specify that INF range would be determined by a percentage of testing rule as discussed above, then the Soviets could conduct extensive testing of SNF missiles at INF range and not have them count as INF missiles, provided the testing at INF ranges was less than that percentage of all tests of this missile type.

Recommendation

The Committee carefully reviewed the pros and cons of recommending changes to the Treaty's definitional approach in this area. The Committee determined that this approach was not inadvertent and that both Parties understand that if first tested over 5500 km, the missile would be exempted from coverage under the Treaty. This underscores the need for achieving a stabilizing and verifiable START accord.

The Committee saw some appeal to amending the Treaty to restrict INF circumvention options using strategic systems. However, such amendments have liabilities of their own and would require renegotiation with the Soviets. On balance, therefore, the Committee decided not to recommend a change in these provisions of the Treaty.

However, the Committee remains concerned about the issues discussed above with regard to the letter from Assistant Secretary Fox. Unless satisfactorily resolved, the Committee may need to recommend an appropriate measure during consideration of the Treaty by the full Senate.

6. GLCM range definition

During the hearings, several witnesses criticized as ineffective the definition of cruise missile range contained in Paragraph 4 of Article VII ("the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion"). Concern was expressed over the U.S. decision not to insist on its original proposal for defining GLCM range.

The language of Article VII, Paragraph 4 was carried over from Article II, Paragraph 8 of the SALT II Treaty. However, the Carter Administration's Article-by-Article Analysis of the SALT II Treaty

noted that during the negotiations the United States proposed, and the Soviet Union rejected, clarifying language dealing with cruise missiles which had been tested without exhausting their fuel. This language would have provided that in those cases in which the cruise missile flying a standard profile had not exhausted its fuel, the Parties would assume that the remaining fuel would be used by continuing to fly at the same altitude and speed at which the cruise missile was flying in the last segment of flight. As in the case of SALT II, the INF Treaty does not contain clarifying language of this nature.

However, even if the Parties had clarified the meaning of these words during the INF negotiations, a GLCM that had been confirmed with 100 percent confidence not to have been tested above the 500 kilometer INF range threshold could still be given an INF range capability at any time by exchanging the existing warhead for a lighter warhead. The Party could not, however, test the missile with the lighter warhead at INF ranges without violating the Treaty.

Recommendation

The Committee reluctantly recommends that the Senate accept the GLCM range definition currently contained in the Treaty. The Committee is deeply disappointed that the Administration did not succeed in getting the Soviets to accept the more effective U.S. definition. This unfortunate reality, however, underscores that an amendment by the Senate would require an uncertain and likely protracted renegotiation with the Soviet Union.

Despite the weaknesses of the GLCM range definition, it is the position of the Administration that the definition will provide the United States with a basis for challenging suspected violations of the GLCM range limitation. Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the U.S. intelligence community assign high priority to monitoring Soviet cruise missile tests and that the Executive Branch react forcefully, through the Special Verification Commission or other appropriate diplomatic channels, if presented with indications of possible Soviet efforts to circumvent this restriction.

In addition, the Committee recommends that should the United States and the Soviet Union reach an understanding in the START negotiations on a more effective definition of cruise missile range, agreement should be sought on incorporating the definition retroactively into the INF Treaty in the form of an amendment or protocol, subject to Senate consent.

7. West German Pershing 1A missiles

During its hearings, the Committee examined whether there are any grounds under which the Soviet Union could reasonable argue that the INF Treaty limits the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) Pershing 1A missiles.

The Treaty does not mention the FRG P-1As. However, Paragraph 9, Section II of the Protocol on Elimination states: "During the last fifteen days, a Party shall withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation and eliminate them

during the same timeframe in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section."

The Article-by-Article Analysis contains the following:

> On August 26, 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would dismantle its Pershing 1A missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the Parties to the Treaty.

In testimony before the Committee, Ambassador Glitman stated:

> When the program of cooperation ends, those front ends which belong to us become subject to the treaty. That is what this paragraph is saying. We are obliged to eliminate them as we would any other front end. What happens to the rest of that missile is up to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The negotiating records provided to the Senate did not reveal statements inconsistent with the Treaty text, the Article-by-Article Analysis, or the testimony of Ambassador Glitman.

Recommendation

In light of the assurances communicated to the Senate through the Article-by-Article Analysis and Ambassador Glitman's testimony, the Committee sees no need to adopt an understanding clarifying this issue.

8. Nondestruction of warheads

The INF Treaty does not require the elimination of the nuclear warhead devices and guidance elements associated with INF missiles. As a result, the Treaty permits the nuclear warhead devices associated with INF missiles to be modified and redeployed on other weapons. During the hearings, concerns were raised as to whether the Treaty should have required the elimination of these nuclear devices.

The Article-by-Article Analysis provides the following explanation for not requiring the elimination of nuclear warhead devices and guidance elements:

> Nuclear warhead devices and guidance elements are not required to be eliminated because destroying them would be meaningless unless the manufacture of new such items was also prohibited. Also, since warheads are small, verifying compliance with such a prohibition would be extremely difficult. Furthermore, the retention of the fissionable material from the warheads conserves resources necessary to U.S. national security.

During the hearings, the Administration testified that in order to verify the destruction of nuclear warhead devices, both sides would have to share extremely sensitive and highly classified information

about the technology of the physics package contained in the warhead.

Recommendation

The Committee recommends that the Treaty provisions dealing with the disposition of nuclear warhead devices associated with INF missiles not be changed.

9. Retention of SS–20 chassis

This issue concerns whether there is an unequal and/or unverifiable aspect of the elimination provisions for certain intermediate-range missile launchers. Under the Treaty, the procedures for eliminating SS–20 launchers will allow the Soviets to retain these vehicles for other purposes, such as transporting or laying pipes. The Treaty procedures for eliminating Pershing II launchers will effectively render the trailer containing the missile erector-launcher unusable for any purpose, although the United States can retain the truck which pulls the trailer.

The Treaty requires each Party to cut the erector-launcher mechanisms for both the Pershing II and the SS–20 into two pieces, thereby rendering that part of the launcher inoperable. In the case of the Pershing II, the erector-launcher is an integral part of a trailer which is towed by a M.A.N. truck. This trailer, including the erector-launcher, will be cut in half between the front and the rear axles. However, the U.S. can unhook the M.A.N. truck (which is a vehicle common to U.S. and allied forces) and use it for other purposes.

Because the design of the SS–20 launcher does not involve a detachable truck and a separate trailer but rather constitutes a single, integrated unit, the Soviets argued that they would receive unequal treatment under the Treaty if the U.S. were allowed to retain the M.A.N. truck while the entire SS–20 launcher had to be eliminated. The solution incorporated in the Treaty is to require the Soviets to remove and cut in half the erector-launcher which is bolted to the back of the chassis, remove the mounting bolts, and cut off the last .78 meters of the chassis, which contains the leveling supports for the launcher and the mechanism for elevating the erector-launcher.

During the February 23 hearing, Mr. Bartek, who headed the U.S. working group on the Protocol on Elimination, explained the effect of these procedures:

> It was clear to us that by so doing, cutting as much of that trailer off as we could, we would eliminate this vehicle as a launcher because it could not accommodate either the erector launcher mechanism or a missile. It would therefore be too short to accommodate a missile and would forever lack the structural integrity to accommodate this erector launcher mechanism and an erect missile. It could not be welded back or fastened back in any way that would provide you the structural integrity to accommodate that launcher, erector launcher mechanism and an erect missile. It was a completely recriprocal arrangement under which we drive our truck away, they drive their

truck away. The launchers, however, of both sides are eliminated.

During the hearings, concern was expressed that since these modified SS–20 chassis will be allowed to move freely throughout the Soviet Union (perhaps with large pipes overhanging the rear end of the vehicle), the United States might not be able to determine with confidence if a particular vehicle was in fact a prohibited SS–20 launcher. The AEI Report recommended, inter alia, that the Treaty "be amended to provide for cutting chassis for such missiles into equal segments (not at assemble points) as is required for other systems."

This issue is further complicated because the Soviets could declare that some launchers listed on the November 1987 data exchange had been "eliminated" after the Treaty was signed but before it goes into effect and would therefore not be included in the updated data exchange required 30 days after the Treaty enters into force. Concern was raised that the Soviets could move these launchers away from declared INF areas thus preventing on-site inspection, and we would have no guarantee that the elimination procedures had been carried out. Another hypothetical cheating scenario involves a calculated Soviet decision to covertly maintain SS–20 launchers which were never declared in the MOU and operate them disguised as modified SS–20 launcher pipelayers.

Recommendation

An amendment along the lines of that suggested in the AEI report would make it virtually impossible for the Soviets to convert "eliminated" SS–20 launchers back into operational SS–20 launchers and it would preclude the possibility of SS–20 launchers roaming in the field in the guise of pipelaying vehicles. Nonetheless, such an amendment, if successfully renegotiated with the Soviet Union, would not prevent them from covertly stockpiling intact SS–20 launchers which had either been falsely declared to have been eliminated during the period between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force or never declared in the first place.

The Committee recognizes that the SS–20 launcher elimination procedure specified in the Treaty complicates the monitoring tasks confronting the United States. However, with or without such an amendment, the effectiveness of the Treaty's verification regime will still depend in the final analysis upon a Soviet calculation that prohibited systems would not be militarily viable due to the ban on flight testing, and/or that the political risks of detected cheating outweigh the military benefits of covertly conducting prohibited activities. Accordingly, the Committee does not recommend an amendment to the SS–20 launcher elimination procedures contained in the Protocol.

10. SS–20 elimination launches

Article X, Paragraph 5 of the Treaty gives each Party the right to eliminate by launching, during the first six months of the Treaty, up to 100 intermediate-range missiles. The Soviets insisted upon this right, citing concerns about possible damage to the envi-

ronment were the Treaty to require all the missiles to be burned during the three year elimination period.

During the Committee hearings, a concern was raised about whether or not the Soviets might be able to gather sufficient reliability data using these launches to have confidence that a covert force would remain reliable, and therefore militarily significant.

If the Soviets were able to achieve confidence in a covert SS–20 force in this manner, the argument that the Soviets would have little incentive to cheat because of the ban on flight testing becomes less valid. Furthermore, it is argued that flight tests of the SS–25 will provide the Soviets some data relevent to the SS–20 because the first stages of the two missiles are nearly identical. Thus, if the Soviets can achieve a reasonable degree of confidence in the reliability of the SS–20 through elimination launches for the first six months after the Treaty enters into force, and if this time can be extended by surrogate testing through the SS–25, then a covert force becomes more attractive to the Soviets and their incentive to cheat will be higher.

In response to a question submitted during the Committee hearings, the Administration replied:

> It is our judgment, given that launch to destroy (LTD) is limited to 100 missiles in the first six months and the fact that the Soviets have had over 10 years to train and can continue to do so right up to elimination, that these six months of LTD would not contribute significantly to the reliability of a covert force.

The Committee also took note of Section III of the Protocol on Elimination, which includes a number of limitations on either Party's ability to use elimination launches for other purposes, including testing missile reliability. For example, the section provides, "Neither Party shall transmit or recover data from missiles being eliminated by means of launching except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes." The section also provides that the elimination launches "shall be subject to on-site inspection."

Recommendation

The Committee does not believe it is necessary to recommend any changes to the provisions in the Treaty pertaining to elimination launches.

11. Amendments to the protocols

Amendments to the INF Treaty generally require the advice and consent of the Senate, but certain changes may be made in the Protocols without the Senate's consent. At the Committee's hearings, questions were raised as to what types of changes could be made without the approval of the Senate.

Once the Treaty enters into force, amendments to the Treaty can be made only with the consent of the Senate (Articles XVI and XVII). However, the Protocols permit changes without a treaty amendment on "such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness" of the Protocols. The Article-by-Article

Analysis describes such modifications to the Protocols as "technical changes."

At the Committee's hearing on February 23, 1988, Ambassador Glitman assured the Committee that the procedure for such technical changes applies only to the Protocols and cannot be used to alter any other provision of the Treaty.

With respect to changes in the Protocols, he was asked to describe the difference between a "technical" change (i.e., one that can be accomplished without the Senate's consent) and other changes to the Protocols (which require an amendment to the Protocols and the Senate's consent). He responded: "The question is [whether] you have changed a substantive obligation under the Treaty, and such a change under the Treaty would clearly require an amendment." He added: "We are going to have to work with the * * * the Congress to ensure in the future that if there are changes, Congress will know that they are on their way and that they are either technical or a major obligational change." He confirmed that changes made without the consent of the Senate would be reported to Congress under the Case Act.

Ambassador Glitman assured the Committee that, with the exception of "technical" modifications to the Protocols, the Executive Branch, without the approval of the Senate, cannot modify the Protocols or adopt a meaning for any provision of the Treaty in a manner that is contrary to or inconsistent with the meaning of the Treaty as presented to the Senate.

Recommendation

In light of Ambassador Glitman's assurances to the Committee and the statements in the Article-by-Article Analysis, the Committee sees no need to recommend an understanding to the Resolution of Ratification clarifying protocol amendment procedures.

12. Force Majeure

Under Section X of the Inspection Protocol, "[a]n inspection shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure,* it cannot be carried out." During the Committee's hearings, a question was raised as to the meaning and effect of this provision.

The Inspection Protocol has specific limits on the number and timing of inspections. Under the Protocol, the option to cancel an inspection rests only with the inspecting party. The *force majeure* provision is designed to account for circumstances when cancellation is required by circumstances beyond the control of the parties.

The Article-by-Article Analysis states that the term *"force majeure"* means a " 'superior or irresistible force' outside the control of the Parties that could not be avoided by the exercise of due care." In response to a question from the Committee as to the meaning of this term under international law, the Administration set forth the same definition contained in the Analysis, and gave as an example "a condition that would exist if, for example, a flood or earthquake blocked an inspection."

Ambassador Glitman, in testimony before the Committee, confirmed that no condition other than a "superior or irresistible force" (i.e., acts of God) would provide grounds for an Inspecting

Party to cancel an inspection. The Administration also advised the Committee that "were it to appear that the Soviets were willfully delaying or obstructing our inspection access, we would pursue such a matter vigorously in the Special Verification Commission and any appropriate channels."

Recommendation

The Committee believes that by defining the term *"force majeure"* in terms of its accepted meaning under international law, the Parties will be able to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and accusations of noncompliance that may surface when there is a cancellation of an inspection. Based upon the Administration's submissions to the Committee, there is no need to adopt a condition on the Resolution of Ratification on the meaning and effect of the term *"force majeure."*

13. Destroying SS–20's in their canisters

Section II, para 10, of the Elimination Protocol allows the Soviet Union to eliminate the SS–20 by "explosive demolition of the missile in its launch canister or by burning missile stages." Concern was raised during the Committee hearings as to whether the Soviets would be able to eliminate a complete missile system inside its launch canister, unseen by U.S. inspectors.

In no other provision of the Treaty is a Party allowed to destroy a missile inside a launch canister. However, a provision does exist in Section II, paragraph 6, of the Elimination Protocol which states:

> Immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the Party receiving the pertinent notification required by paragraph 5(c) of Article IX of the Treaty shall confirm and record the type and number of items of missile systems, listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, which are to be eliminated. *If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, this shall include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters.* (emphasis added)

The first sentence of the above paragraph from the Elimination Protocol applies to all systems listed in paragraph 10, Section II of the Protocol. Since the SS–20 will remain sealed in its launch canister, U.S. inspectors will be unable to confirm and record the missile being eliminated unless the inspecting party invokes its right to examine the interior of the launch canister as provided for in Section II, paragraph 6, of the Elimination Protocol. The second sentence is designed to address the problem of confirming the contents of an SS–20 launch canister if it is deemed necessary.

While the elimination procedure identified for the SS–20 in Section II, paragraph 10 was not the preferred choice of U.S. negotiators, the right to inspect inside a canister before an SS–20 is eliminated will probably provide some deterrent value to Soviet noncompliance with this elimination right. However, the provision in Section II, paragraph 6, that requires an inspector from a Party to "confirm and record the type and number of items of missile sys-

tems" being eliminated will not be adequate in the case of the SS–20 unless we invoke our right to under Section II, paragraph 6 of the Elimination Protocol to inspect the inside of the canister.

No provision is made in this Section of the Treaty for exterior equipment to confirm that the contents of the SS–20 canister contains a missile. This is of particular importance since a complete SS–20 missile will never be destroyed outside of a canister according to the terms of the Elimination Protocol. Consequently, a requirement that our inspectors examine all of the SS–20 launch canisters may deter cheating while increasing our confidence to verify the identity of the missile scheduled for elimination.

Recommendation

The Committee strongly recommends that the Administration require U.S. inspectors to inspect the interior of all SS–20 canisters so that they can "confirm and record the type and number of items of missiles systems" being eliminated since it cannot be done by external observation of the launch canister.

14. Suspect-site inspections

The negotiating records provided to the Senate reveal that the term "suspect-site inspections" was used to describe various types of inspection regimes. In some cases, the term meant "anywhere anytime" inspections. In other cases, the term meant inspections of facilities not identified in an MOU but which could produce military related equipment, for example, systems prohibited by the terms of the INF Treaty. As other times, the phrase is used to describe monitoring activities not associated with the two types of inspections listed above. In the final version of the INF Treaty, Article XI provides for on-site inspections rights but no provision exists for short-notice, on-site suspect site inspections.

While the issue of suspect site inspection was discussed thoroughly during the course of the negotiations on the Treaty, the provision was apparently dropped late in the negotiations. Some arms control experts argue, however, that a START Treaty should have a true suspect site provision such as a "short-notice challenge" or "anywhere anytime" inspection procedure. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence stated in its report on the INF Treaty that monitoring and verifying compliance will be much more difficult under a START agreement. Moreover, according to the Intelligence Committee report, INF verification provisions are a useful precedent but not adequate for START.

During the Committee's hearings on the INF Treaty, many witnesses and Committee members also expressed the sentiment that while the verification provisions of the Treaty were a useful and unprecedented achievement in the history of the arms control process, they would not be adequate for monitoring a START Treaty. Consequently, the concern surfaced within the Committee over the possibility of no short-notice, anywhere-anytime, suspect-site inspections for START.

Recommendation

Noting the increased difficulty of monitoring a potential START agreement as opposed to the INF Treaty, the Committee recommends that the Administration examine seriously the question of whether short-notice, suspect-site inspections should be included as a verification feature of a START Treaty. The Committee endorses, and urges U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Geneva to follow through on, the statement on START verification principles in the U.S./Soviet communique of the December 1987 Washington Summit, which reads:

> As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues: * * * The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

15. Monitoring the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant

Section IX, paragraph 14(c), of the Inspection Protocol states that the inspecting Party shall have the right "* * * to image the contents of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage." The negotiating record is not entirely clear on what is meant by the term "image." It is assumed that x-raying would be an allowed inspection right.

Other than x-raying, the term "image" is not expanded upon in the Treaty text, article-by-article analysis, or negotiating records provided to the Senate. Moreover, even in some of these documents—for example, the negotiating records—our rights with respect to x-raying are not clearly defined.

The Committee expressed an interest in seeking clarification as to the type of equipment and procedures that will be used to implement this right under the Inspection Protocol. In response to a written question submitted by the Committee, the Administration stated:

> "The non-damaging image producing equipment" referred to in paragraph 6 [of Section IX] is essentially a large fixed imaging machine that will be used pursuant to paragraph 14(c) of Section IX to "image the contents of any launch canister" exiting the portals to Votkinsk that is declared to contain a missile as large or larger than or as heavy or heavier than an SS-20.

The Committee also understands that these technical issues and procedures are currently under discussion between the two Parties. We also understand that the agency involved in these talks is the On-Site Inspections Agency (OSIA).

Recommendation

The Committee recommended that it receive a report on the status of on-going OSIA talks between the two Parties. Specifically, the Committee asked for a report on the disposition of Section IX, paragraph 14(c), of the Inspection Protocol, on the procedures and technology that will be used to "image" launch canisters and ship-

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ping containers declared to contain a missile or missile stage covered by the terms of the Treaty. The Committee also asked for an assessment of our confidence with respect to the ability of the imaging equipment to accurately assess and discriminate the Treaty-related items enclosed in launch canisters and shipping containers.

In response to this request, the OSIA has agreed to supply the Committee a report on the status of the on-going talks regarding this issue.

NATO IN THE POST-INF ENVIRONMENT

Whether history judges the INF Treaty to have made a positive or a negative contribution to the defense of Europe will depend ultimately on which road the Alliance chooses to travel at this critical juncture. One NATO road leads backward down a slippery slope to European denuclearization, American disengagement, and Soviet domination. The other NATO road leads forward to the solid ground of solidarity, stability, and security.

The "slippery slope road" is marked with several warning signals:

—a growing nuclear allergy in the West, while NATO continues to rely on early use of nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack;

—changing public attitudes in Western Europe toward the United States and the Soviet Union, due in large part to an aggressive propaganda campaign by a vigorous Soviet leadership;

—U.S. and European fiscal and budget realities;

—NATO's reluctance to think boldly in the area of conventional arms control; and

—a continuing failure of political will in getting the most out of the Alliance's collective defense resources.

If these warnings are viewed as trends that need to be reversed rather than as milestones on a one-way road to the Alliance's ultimate demise, NATO can persevere. The roadmap to firm, level ground requires a multi-track approach.

The first track requires NATO to assign the highest priority to eliminating its critical conventional warfighting deficiencies—what have been termed "automatic escalators"—and to vigorously implement such programs as the Balanced Technology Initiative (BTI), NATO Cooperative Research and Development, side-by-side testing which could lead to joint weapons procurement, and the conventional initiatives described as the NATO Defense Program.

The second track involves bold and innovative conventional arms control proposals, including a radical new approach to Confidence-Building Measures. With new thinking on both sides, the ability to ascertain possible Warsaw Pact war preparations could be significantly increased, and its options for a surprise attack could be reduced significantly. Innovative schemes for on-site access to militarily significant nodes in the Warsaw Pact's mobilization infrastructure—such as airfields, railroad yards, and even headquarters—should be the focus of this thinking. Pilot projects on verification could also be explored in parallel with negotiations on actual reductions and, if they are agreed upon, be split off and implement-

ed in advance of any agreement on reductions, which may take years.

A third track involves reaffirming the commitment to NATO theater nuclear modernization. This is a continuing process, stemming from NATO's 1983 Montebello decision to reduce the European nuclear stockpile while taking steps to ensure that the remaining nuclear weapons are responsive, survivable and effective. Modernization programs, which enjoyed a high priority for NATO before the INF Treaty, are no less important for the post-INF period. In pursuing needed theater nuclear modernization programs, the Alliance must not undermine conventional capability, nor give the impression that a "nuclear quick fix" is the answer to NATO's conventional deficiencies. The goal is to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, not to lower it.

The fourth track supports the other three through a vigorous education program by political leaders to gain and maintain the support of NATO publics for modern and effective conventional and theater nuclear forces and for a comprehensive arms control strategy. Such support will require frank assessments of the conventional and nuclear balance, and clear explanations of NATO's military needs and arms control rationale.

In summary, the INF Treaty, while succeeding in the removal of a number of nuclear weapons in the middle of NATO's deterrent spectrum, leaves a serious imbalance in conventional and theater nuclear forces on one side of this spectrum, and a strategic balance that is in rough parity on the other side. If the INF Treaty is to prove beneficial to the security of the Alliance over the long run, NATO's challenges are clear:

—NATO must press forward with the kind of approach outlined above for establishing a stable, non-threatening balance of conventional forces in Europe;

—NATO must pay careful attention to the battlefield nuclear weapons area. The modernization of remaining battlefield and theater nuclear forces is a necessity, and must proceed in consultation with our allies;

—efforts to achieve a stabilizing and effectively verifiable START agreement must be continued; and

—lastly, future NATO summits must address a serious work-program designed to confront the hard realities of NATO's current military deficiencies.

The Alliance was certainly within its rights to celebrate the signing of the INF Treaty, but NATO's challenges remain formidable. What is needed now is to capitalize on the cohesion and solidarity that led to the INF Treaty in facing the imposing challenges that will confront the Alliance in the post-INF environment.

COMMITTEE ACTION

There is set forth below the Committee vote on March 28, 1988 on its report to the Senate entitled "NATO Defense and the INF Treaty." Passed on a roll call vote, 18–2, as follows:

In favor: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Gramm, and McCain.

Opposed: Senators Humphrey and Symms.

Other roll call votes which were considered during the course of the Committee deliberations are as follows:

1. Motion: To determine whether the Members agree with including the following sentence on page 3 of the report: "Although there is disagreement on the Committee, a majority of the Members believe that subsequent letters from the Counsel to the President cast doubt on that understanding."

Vote: Passed on a roll call vote, 12–7.

In favor: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, and Cohen.

Opposed: Senators Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Quayle, Wilson, Gramm, and McCain.

2. Motion: To amend page 3 of the NATO/INF report under the heading entitled, "Role of the Committee Hearings in the Ratification Process", to delete the word "treaty-making" and insert the phrase "providing advice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty", making the sentence then read, "In the letter, Secretary Shultz provided three important assurances with regard to the Senate's constitutional role in providing advice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty." In addition, the motion would leave unchanged the proposed language under the same heading appearing on page 3 of the report.

Vote: Passed on a roll call vote, 19–0.

In favor: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Gramm, and McCain.

Opposed: None.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. KENNEDY

I welcome the INF Treaty as a significant achievement in its own right, and also as a harbinger of more far-reaching agreements still to come. I join in the Committee's support for the Treaty, and I am submitting these additional views in order to deal briefly with one aspect of the Treaty that became a matter of public controversy—the lack of any provision requiring the verifiable dismantlement of the nuclear warheads associated with the missile systems to be eliminated.

According to Defense Secretary Carlucci's testimony, "this was basically done at our behest." While lack of an agreement on strategic arms is sufficient to explain the omission of provisions mandating elimination of INF missile warheads, the Administration's attempts to justify this omission may have created a record which could prejudice attainment of their stated goal—genuine deep reductions in nuclear warhead stockpiles. While not endorsing the Administration's conclusions on these matters, the Committee Report likewise makes no attempt to dispute them.

The United States is permitted to remove nuclear warheads from their missiles prior to the beginning of elimination procedures for these missiles under the Treaty, and the Soviet Union is entitled to do the same for the nuclear warheads carried by its intermediate and shorter-range missiles.

From a technical perspective, each side will be able under certain conditions to adapt these warheads to existing or new delivery systems. In many cases, the adaptation to the new system can be accomplished rapidly.

Defense Department officials have announced that the United States may reuse its INF warheads in a new generation of nuclear weapons to be based in Europe. This could be accomplished without dismantling the warheads and without recycling the plutonium and highly enriched uranium into newly manufactured weapons. Contrary to the impression created by some Administration witnesses, there is no technical basis for believing that the Soviet Union could not do the same thing.

Serious doubts were also raised about the Administration's contention that verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement necessarily involves exposing the secrets of U.S. warhead design to Soviet inspectors and potential espionage. There has been little, if any, systematic exploration of this question within the administration. Independent studies by outside nuclear weapons experts have concluded that it is possible to allow each side to verify the destruction of the other's nuclear warheads without revealing nuclear design secrets.

The Senate received testimony stating that the dismantling of nuclear warheads would be pointless in light of our alleged inability to prevent the Soviet Union from making new fissile material.

Even without agreements to cease production or recycling of fissile materials for weapons, verifiable dismantlement of warheads that are eliminated under an agreement could still serve a useful purpose by limiting the immediate breakout potential of the parties.

The pessimism regarding our ability to implement broader controls is unwarranted. In 1982 the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to enter into an agreement (first proposed by the Johnson Administration in 1965) to end the production of additional fissile material for nuclear weapons, but the present Administration has ignored this opportunity.

Such a "fissile cutoff" agreement could conceivably save both nations tens of billions of dollars invested in reconstruction and replacement of aging special nuclear materials production facilities. It would also boost confidence in the long term stability of a nuclear reductions regime by providing valuable insurance against massive "breakout' of either offensive or defensive nuclear forces.

Far from being the politically obscure and technically unachievable proposal painted by Administration witnesses, the "fissile cutoff" also represents a long-deferred and immediately attainable step toward equalizing the rights and obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-weapon states under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Full-scale participation in the IAEA's safeguards by the United States and the Soviet Union would expand and strengthen the IAEA's capabilities to guard against nuclear weapons proliferation, and would increase the pressures on nuclear "threshold" states that continue to cite the "discriminatory" character of the safeguards as an excuse for not joining the Treaty.

Given the auspicious circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the INF Treaty, and the lack of a broader agreement setting forth a firm schedule of strategic weapons reductions, the omission of a requirement to dismantle INF missile warheads is not a serious flaw. But the same cannot be said of the Administration's various explanations for this omission. I believe that an agreement achieving the verifiable dismantlement of nuclear warheads, accompanied by a cutoff in the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons, should be on the START arms control agenda and I urge the Administration to reconsider its objections to this promising aspect of arms control.

EDWARD M. KENNEDY.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. GLENN

While the Committee has properly focused its attention on the impact of the INF Treaty on NATO defense, I have several concerns about the implications of the INF Treaty on the START process.

It is important to remember that while this agreement will bring about the destruction of an entire class of nuclear delivery vehicles, both sides will be permitted to retain the fissile material and the guidance elements of their weapons. I would have serious reservations about supporting a START agreement that requires the destruction of strategic delivery vehicles, but does not require the elimination of the fissile material contained in the warheads of those same strategic delivery vehicles.

The proposed START agreement would bring about a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms. Such a sizable strategic force reduction would result in the dismantling of several thousand nuclear warhead devices which would yield many metric tons of nuclear explosive materials—plutonium, highly enriched uranium, and tritium—which are the key ingredients in making a nuclear weapon. This fissile material would remain readily available for reuse in making new warheads. I believe this deficiency should be addressed as we negotiate more militarily significant reductions in our strategic offensive forces.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the INF Treaty is its unprecedented on-site inspection provisions. Verification of a START agreement will require an even more vigorous verification regime and would likely include short-notice, suspect-site inspections. I believe that the INF Treaty precedent in on-site inspection presents an ideal opportunity for the superpowers to take even greater steps in the arms control process by exploring the possibility of a verifiable ban on the production of weapons grade fissile material. This would force the "mining" of the existing stockpile and effectively limit the number of new weapons produced.

I believe this approach warrants serious consideration and the Administration should examine whether a verifiable ban on the production of weapons-grade fissile material is feasible and should be included in the context of any superpower agreement to reduce strategic weapons.

I also have serious reservations about the possible deployment of strategic defenses while we are seeking to make significant reductions in the number of strategic delivery systems in the START negotiations.

For some time, the Senate has been mired in a dispute with the Administration regarding the interpretation of the ABM Treaty and the proper role of the Senate in the treaty ratification process. This confrontation has tended to obscure the more important ques-

tion of whether the ABM Treaty is in our national security interest.

In my view, the Administration to date has failed to put forward a persuasive argument that the deployment of strategic defenses would enhance rather than diminish our national security. The logical response to a deployed strategic defense system is for the other side to increase its strategic offensive forces to overwhelm the opponent's defense. By banning large-scale, nationwide defenses, the ABM Treaty concedes the inability of such defenses to effectively cope with offensive countermeasures and prevents a costly and dangerous arms race in anti-ballistic weapons and an offensive arms race to overcome such weapons. Therefore, I believe it would be contradictory and destabilizing to reduce our strategic offensive forces while seeking to undermine or abrogate the ABM Treaty to pursue the deployment of strategic defense.

JOHN GLENN.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. WIRTH

We find ourselves in one of those rare historical situations when circumstances converge to permit significant progress in arms control and reductions. The economies of the East are failing. Increasingly, the Soviets and their allies recognize the need to redirect resources from defense to domestic priorities. Soviet political scientists and military leaders are debating the need to maintain large offensively-organized armies in Eastern Europe as they wrestle with the needs of their domestic economy. Although it is premature to conclude that this talk of "reasonable sufficiency" will pave the way to serious conventional arms reduction proposals by the Soviets, the debate bears close watching.

However, conventional arms control and reduction talks, when they begin, will probably move slowly. Rapid movement in the talks or dramatic breakthroughs leading to the mutual redeployment or reduction of forces facing each other along the East-West border appear unlikely. There is, however, an area that offers promise for immediate progress: confidence- and security-building measures. The Committee's formal report to the Foreign Relations Committee on the INF Treaty recognizes the promise of such measures, identifying them collectively as components of the "second track" of the "roadmap" to NATO strength in the report's section on "NATO in the Post-INF Environment."

Within the context of the new round of talks anticipated to begin later this year under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), we should press for an expansion of the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) agreed to at Stockholm in 1986 and the intrusive verification measures contained in the INF Treaty.

The provisions of the Stockholm Agreement, which permit each side to observe and inspect military operations of the other side, are viewed with great promise in Europe. They are little recognized or understood in the United States. There are many areas where the existing agreements can be expanded. We should seek to increase the number of inspections permitted annually, and we should consider expanding the scope of activities subject to inspection and observation. For example, all military operations including amphibious exercises, movements of aviation units, and naval maneuvers should be brought under the provisions of the Stockholm Agreement.

Building on the intrusive inspection regime of the INF Treaty, we should seek to establish on-site monitoring facilities at the entrances to major rail yards, ammunition and fuel storage depots, and international transshipment points. Such a system would provide signatories with indications of increased activities in and around these locations which could signal mobilization or deployment and trigger a demand for physical inspection.

Another confidence-building area which we should pursue immediately is the exchange of NATO and Warsaw Pact officers for the purposes of discussing strategy and doctrine and breaking down barriers to better understanding between the competing alliances. An ultimate goal of such an exchange program would be the achievement of a mutual shift from offensive to defensive postures by the alliances. Like CSBMs, this concept has received some attention in Europe, but as yet has not been the focus of much analysis in the United States. It is apparent that changes in U.S. doctrine—such as moving from active defense to AirLand Battle—are a matter of grave concern to the Soviets and their allies. Warsaw Pact military officers I met in Poland saw AirLand and NATO's Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine as offensive in nature and intimidating. Both sides proclaim themselves to be defensive alliances, yet each is forward deployed and perceives the other to be offensively postured.

It is important that NATO and the Warsaw Pact work to understand each other's strategy, that they work to develop and agree upon a regime of indicators which would discriminate routine activity from pre-mobilization and mobilization activities, and that we use CSBMs to verify these indicators. Ultimately we can use the exchange of information on strategy and doctrine as an avenue to reduce border tension.

A beginning along this path toward meetings between senior NATO and Warsaw Pact officers has already begun. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov's recent meeting will be followed by an exchange of visits between Admiral William J. Crowe and his Soviet counterpart Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. We should seek to make these meetings routine. Furthermore, they should be conducted at all levels of both nations' defense establishments. Senior U.S. and NATO commanders should meet regularly with their Soviet and Warsaw Pact counterparts; commanders and staff of intermediate units should also exchange visits, as should faculties of our major war colleges. All of these measures would reduce tension and the possibility for misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the other side's activities.

Exchanges between NATO and Warsaw Pact officers and an expanded regimen of CSBMs need not wait for tangible reductions or redeployment of conventional forces. The independent establishment and use of CSBMs can, in fact, facilitate progress toward arms reduction agreements and serve as a basis for the verification regime for those reductions when they occur. These CSBMs, or "operational arms control" measures (to be differentiated from "structural arms control" measures which actually eliminate weapons or forces), can create the climate for eventual progress on that more difficult front even as they reduce tensions and the possibility of accidental hostilities. They are deserving of immediate and intensive attention by the United States and NATO.

TIMOTHY E. WIRTH.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. SHELBY

I would like to express my appreciation to the Chairman for holding what I believe to be a most comprehensive set of hearings on NATO defense and the INF Treaty. Working in a bipartisan spirit, the Committee examined all aspects of the Treaty.

After participating in twenty-nine Committee hearings and three days of markup meetings on this report, I have come to the conclusion that the political implications of non-ratification of the Treaty would be more harmful to the NATO Alliance than any real or perceived negative military or political conseqences of ratification. Non-ratification could shatter NATO unity, fuel fires of European denuclearization and push West Germany toward neutrality. For this reason, I voted to support the Committee's findings.

However, I take issue with the Committee assessment that the positive features of the Treaty outweight its weaknesses.

Administration witnesses have been quick to identify the major advantages of the Treaty. (1) The Soviets will dismantle four times as many weapons systems as will the United States; (2) The Treaty results in a breakthrough in on-site inspections; (3) NATO's dual-track decision to deploy INF systems has been validated, thus helping to disarm modernization critics within NATO; and (4) We have increased dialogue at the highest levels between the United States and Soviet Union, thereby raising the nuclear threshold.

Now, let me review some of the disadvantages of the INF accord. As the report points out, "Every target currently targeted by Soviet shorter-range and intermediate-range systems can be assigned to other Soviet nuclear systems." Thus, the nuclear threat to NATO and the United States will not be diminished.

Once the Treaty takes effect the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) will have less flexibility in potential courses of action available to implement the NATO strategy of Flexible Response.

An integral component of this flexibility, the eventually deployment of a conventionally armed ground launched cruise missile, has been captured by this pact.

Testimony before this committee has spotlighted the glaring conventional force imbalance which exists between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. By eliminating Pershing IIs and GLCM, one more incentive for the Soviets to address this imbalance in a meaningful fashion has been lost. Worse, we may have left our allies naked to the threat of Soviet nuclear or conventional force blackmail, or even made Europe "safe" for conventional war. Furthermore, the political capital expended in the initial deployment of INF systems within NATO makes the likelihood of further nuclear weapon modernization doubtful, certainly in the near term.

Finally, the impact of this treaty on futuristic weapons systems is uncertain because this was never discussed with the Soviets. Sometime in the future we may find ourselves in the same "broad

vs. narrow interpretation" argument we see today with the ABM Treaty.

Had this treaty been negotiated after the conventional arms imbalance had been addressed, it would be a better treaty. Had this treaty been negotiated after our strategic vulnerability had been addressed, it would be a better treaty. Had this treaty been negotiated after the ambiguities surrounding the ABM Treaty had been clarified, it would be a better treaty. And because it has addressed issues and systems out of sequence in the arms control process, the resultant effect may be negative.

Further, I would even go so far as to state that after much deliberation, I can only conclude that this Administration's approach to the arms control process is flawed. The Senate has not even completed its debate on the INF Treaty, yet the Administration is already trumpeting its next move—a May summit in Moscow to perhaps sign a START Treaty which will cut strategic arsenals in half.

Today, arms control seems to have taken on a life of its own. Instead of being a tool, arms control now appears to be the engine driving the foreign policy train. Such haste can lead to careless omissions and imprecise treaty language. Such haste allows the Soviets to pick and choose when an agreement will be reached, its subject matter, and its priority.

Moreover, without painful attention to the calculus involved, proportional reductions in our forces may well increase the probability that the Soviets could, in the first strike, eliminate not only our ground based strategic weapons, but also our command and control systems.

The giant Soviet SS–18 ICBM force alone has more megatonage than the entire U.S. strategic missile force. The SS–18 carries 10 warheads, yet there are estimates it can carry from as many as 14 or more than 20. This scenario gives the Soviets the capability to blanket each hardened target in the United States with three or more SS–18 warheads, thus leaving the entire remainder of their force in reserve.

For any START Treaty to be effective, it must reduce the odds that U.S. land-based systems could be destroyed in a first strike. Any strategic arms treaty that does not eliminate the Soviet advantage in heavy ICBMs, such as the SS–18, probably should not be signed. National security is too important to be held hostage to unrealistic time schedules, established in the pursuit of a legacy.

We have before us what seems to be a golden opportunity. The goals of increased stability and reduced risk of war are just and honorable—yet the azimuth we seem to be taking frankly concerns me. I would be much more comfortable if I knew that whoever is steering the ship understood the relationships among the various pieces of the arms control puzzle.

RICHARD C. SHELBY.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MESSRS. WARNER, THURMOND, GRAMM, AND McCAIN

The strategy of flexible response has deterred conflict in Europe for over forty years. This strategy depends on a modern and effective "NATO Triad" of forces—conventional, theater nuclear and strategic. The Committee's report emphasizes the conventional aspects of the NATO Triad, since this component of the strategy has presented and continues to present the greatest challenge. We support that emphasis. However, it is important to reemphasize a point also made in the report: "Notwithstanding the critical need for conventional force improvements, the security of the NATO Alliance will rely on modern and credible nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future." In line with this observation, we believe it is appropriate to expand and complement the discussion contained in the report on two related issues: the theater nuclear balance, and the modernization of theater nuclear systems.

Theater Nuclear Balance

Soviet military doctrine emphasizes the importance of nuclear weapons in theater operations. While Soviet military writings have increasingly discussed the possibility of limiting the early stages of theater operations to conventional weapons, the Warsaw Pact consistently exercises and trains for the employment of nuclear weapons during some period of the war. Moreover, the intelligence community has not identified any significant slowing trend in the production of Soviet strategic and theater nuclear delivery systems despite assertions in some Soviet military writings of a decreased emphasis in theater nuclear operations.

The Committee report noted that since 1979, the Soviet Union has engaged in a "dramatic increase" in theater nuclear systems. A quantitative, and in many cases, qualitative disparity exists today in favor of the Warsaw Pact in all categories of theater nuclear capability.

The Warsaw Pact, for example, possesses three classes of short-range, ground-launched ballistic missiles below 500 km that are permitted by the INF Treaty. NATO has a single short-range system called Lance. As a result, Warsaw Pact missiles have a greater flexibility in terms of range and warhead yields than NATO systems. The longest range Warsaw Pact system, the Scud-B, can cover effectively targets at 300 km range, which would include most targets in the continental Western theater. NATO has no similar ground-launched systems capable of deep-strike missions in the Warsaw Pact rear.

Beginning in 1977, the Warsaw Pact began modernizing its short range systems such as the SS–21, and is continously deploying upgrades. The SS–21 is a very accurate short range system in the 80

to 100 kilometer range. The Lance, NATO's closest counterpart to the SS–21, was first deployed in 1972, and has a range of 115 km. In the aggregate, the Warsaw Pact possesses a four to one advantage over NATO in ground-launched nuclear capable systems. This figure does not include reloads of which the Soviets are thought to have a large number, particularly in SS–21 and Scud–B systems.

The Warsaw Pact has also initiated a modernization program in dual-capable artillery and mortars. For example, the Warsaw Pact recently increased the range and accuracy of its towed and self-propelled 152mm and 203mm tube artillery to cover targets in the 28 to 30 kilometer range. The Warsaw Pact currently enjoys a 1.5:1 advantage in the number of nuclear capable artillery tubes. Although at present it is estimated that rough parity exists in the number of artillery fired nuclear projectiles (AFAPs) available in the European theater, 80 percent of NATO AFAPs have not been modernized. In addition, the Warsaw Pact has deployed modern, self-propelled nuclear-capable mortars. NATO has no similar mortar system.

In the area of nuclear-capable aircraft, the Warsaw Pact has a two-to-one advantage in fighter-attack aircraft and theater bombers. While NATO is thought to have a margin of qualitative superiority in these systems, the Warsaw Pact has continued to close this gap with an uninterrupted modernization program. In particular, the Warsaw Pact has increased significantly its deep-strike air capability as well as escort fighters for missions in NATO's rear areas. In terms of range and payload, the Warsaw Pact has increased its in-theater nuclear capable aircraft by a factor of two. Overall, the Soviets have substantially altered the nuclear-capable air delivery balance in the Western European theater and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

In sum, since the 1960s the quantitative and to some extent the qualitative theater nuclear balance has shifted clearly in the Warsaw Pact's favor. NATO theater systems have not kept pace with Soviet modernization programs and their effectiveness has eroded since they were first deployed in the early 1970s. NATO does not have to match Warsaw Pact forces on a one for one basis. However, without a modern, credible, and survivable theater nuclear posture, Flexible Response (including Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA)) will not be a stabilizing deterrent to a Soviet attack.

Three essential factors, among others, contribute to the requirement for a credible NATO theater nuclear posture. First, NATO needs survivable nuclear weapons to deter Warsaw Pact first use. While Soviet declaratory policy is not to use nuclear weapons first, vulnerable weapons may encourage Warsaw Pact first use in order to eliminate the threat of NATO nuclear employment—both at the outset of the conflict or as the war progresses. Second, nuclear weapons require the Warsaw Pact to disperse their forces. The Warsaw Pact must not have the luxury of concentrating its military forces to enhance the effectiveness of a conventional attack. A dispersed Warsaw Pact attack force will, for example, contribute to the success of the FOFA component of NATO flexible response. Third, in conjunction with a credible conventional force posture, a survivable Theater Nuclear Force allows political leaders in NATO the time to implement fully the nuclear release decision-making

process. This would relieve pressures to "use or lose" these nuclear systems, and thus contribute to the goal of raising the nuclear threshold.

Theater Nuclear Modernization

Theater nuclear systems, like any other modern weapons, require a continuing process of upgrading to prevent the erosion of their effectiveness. In the absence of modernization, such erosion would eventually lead to structural disarmament that would be unilateral given the Soviet modernization efforts described above. Nuclear weapons also have additional modernization imperatives associated with their safety and security. Much of the emphasis of nuclear stockpile modernization in recent years has been associated with making nuclear weapons safer if exposed to fire, crash, or other hazards, and with making them more secure against unauthorized tampering or use.

In October of 1983, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group Ministers, consistent with a policy to hold the number of nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal to the minimum necessary for deterrence, agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 warheads, bringing to 2400 the total number of warheads to be removed from Europe since 1979. At the same time, the Ministers, recognized that "for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective . . ." The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) was charged with the task of identifying both older systems to be retired, and the priorities for modernization.

In the interim, 2400 older warheads, including atomic demolition munitions, have been retired, and SACEUR has identified his modernization priorities. These priorities include ongoing programs, such as the modernization of dual capable aircraft and their nuclear bombs, along with survivability enhancements in support of these aircraft, and the modernization of artillery fired atomic projectiles (AFAPs). SACEUR has also identified the development of a follow-on to Lance and a Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM) as modernization priorities. None of these improvements would involve increases in our nuclear forces in Europe since they would be replacements for older systems.

Admiral Crowe, the Chairman of the JCS testified during the INF hearings that: "Currently, the JCS are insistent on continuing the nuclear modernization efforts launched by the 1983 Montebello decisions and currently in progress."

Two of these modernization initiatives identified by SACEUR and supported by the Joint Chiefs are currently affected by legislative restrictions. The replacement of aging AFAPs is constrained by a ceiling of 925 modern AFAPs. If not eventually lifted, this will mean that a portion of the AFAPs inventory will be less effective, and will not incorporate improved safety and security measures. A second legislative restriction currently restricts the Army's Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) to a conventional role. Studies are permitted to examine ATACMs as a candidate nuclear system to replace the Lance system, but should ATACMs be selected, further

development of the option would require the removal of the restriction.

The Committee has been informed that the NATO Nuclear Planning Group is reviewing how NATO's nuclear force posture might best be readjusted in light of the security situation following implementation of an INF agreement. The Committee has also received detailed information on the status of the programs affected by Congressional restraints, and has been informed in testimony by Admiral Crowe that "the Chiefs will be proposing a relaxation of legislative restrictions on the number of Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles.

We would agree with Secretary of Defense Carlucci's report to the Congress "Support of NATO Strategy in the 1980's" (in compliance with Public Law 100–180) in which it is stated that: "The Secretary of Defense is prepared to ensure a high-priority for all aspects of the NATO Montebello modernization framework, as development programs mature and consulations with our allies proceed." We would invite the Department of Defense to keep the Committee closely apprised of the status of programs and allied consultations, and will look favorably upon relaxation of existing constraints on theater nuclear modernization at the appropriate time.

Indeed, as the highly regarded Dr. Karber testified to the Committee during the INF hearings: ". . . we do not have the option of deferring, in my opinion, the modernization. It is not a luxury that it was in 1979 or 1981 or 1982. If we want to stay in the nuclear deterrent game, deterring their first use of battlefield nuclear weapons, modernization is a necessity."

JOHN W. WARNER.
STROM THURMOND.
PHIL GRAMM.
JOHN MCCAIN.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. QUAYLE

After INF: The Tasks Before Us

Although most of the debate over the INF Treaty has focused on how effective the Treaty will be in the next 3 years in eliminating existing INF missiles, what deserves at least as much attention is what its impact will be for the long-haul, through the year 2000 and beyond. Here three questions loom large:

First, will NATO properly guage and address the key negative military impacts of eliminating conventional and nuclear ground launched INF-range missiles?

Second, will we unilaterally interpret the Treaty to cover futuristic weapons that we ought not to?

Third, will we identify and safeguard against the Treaty's inherent verification weaknesses?

If the answer to these questions is yes, the INF agreement will surely serve to improve our security. If not, the agreement will only compound existing difficulties.

What follows is an examination of each of these issues and an explanation of what NATO, the United States, and the U.S. Senate should do to assure that the answers to these questions are affimative.

With regard to NATO addressing the military impact of eliminating conventional and nuclear ground launched INF-range missiles, it is imperative that the Senate Armed Services Committee demand a specific listing of programs to be included in Secretary Carlucci's new NATO Defense Program and an explanation of how this program could be managed to leverage greater cooperation and burden sharing with our European NATO allies.

In addition, the Senate should give thorough consideration to the Treaty's ban on conventional long-range ground-launched missiles. As will be explained below, agreeing to ban these weapons was a major mistake. If at all possible, this mistake should be corrected before the protocols of ratification are finalized.

As for interpreting the Treaty to ban futuristics, the Administration should make clear what is clearly evident—that no such ban can be found either in the Treaty itself or its negotiating record and that our presumption is that such weapons are permissable since at no time prior to the Treaty's signing was any such ban considered either within or outside our government.

Finally, specific unilateral and alliance-wide safeguards should be instituted to cope with the Treaty's inherent verification weaknesses. Certainly, our confidence that we can detect Soviet cheating on the Treaty's range limitations, its prohibition against arming unarmed missiles or producing or maintaining a covert INF missile force will be less than we've had with any previous treaty.

As the Committee report rightly notes, every effort should be made to develop and deploy extended air defenses against remaining Warsaw Pact tactical cruise and ballistic missiles and to safeguard against possible Soviet cheating. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has already validated a requirement for such defenses and a joint-service funded effort is clearly called for.

In addition to this effort, which must involve our NATO allies, the United States must have proportionate responses that it can make unilaterally to Soviet cheating. Maintaining a substantial conventional and nuclear air and sea-launched cruise missile production surge capability should be supported to afford such a response without having to violate the Treaty. Other options should also be considered.

To get a firm grasp of what we need to be prepared for after INF, though, we must first understand what challenges removal of our INF missiles will present.

NATO Without INF: What's the Problem?

NATO's strategy of Flexible Response, which has guided the Alliance's policies for more than two decades, rests on three basic pillars:

1. NATO's *forward defenses* consisting of conventional air, sea, and ground forces geared to contain an initial conventional assualt by the Warsaw Pact.
2. NATO's capability of *deliberate escalation* with tactical and theater nuclear weapons and longer-range deep strike conventional weaponry to block or slow any Pact breakthroughs of NATO's forward defenses and to deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons.
3. NATO's capability of a *general nuclear response* with theater and/or strategic nuclear weapons to deter any expanded Warsaw Pact aggression with the credible threat to initiate a nuclear strike against Soviet territory.

Clearly, it's the last pillar that is most directly affected by the elimination of NATO's INF missiles. NATO still has air and sea launched cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs) and dual-capable aircraft with the potential of delivering nuclear weapons deep into Warsaw Pact territory. Yet, the aircraft operate from a small number of bases that are increasingly vulnerable to nonnuclear missile and air attacks. Moreover, they face ever more formidable Pact air defenses.

As for ALCMs and SLCMs, these too may lack the survivability of ground-launched missiles. ALCMs, after all, are no more survivable than the planes they are launched from. As for ships carrying SLCMs, these may not be in position when war breaks out and may be too valuable to send in close to shore where they are more likely to be sunk. Sea and air platforms, moreover, are almost certain to be occupied with many more pressing air defense and sea control missions in the early days of the war and will be unavailable for deep interdiction missions.

As for U.S. nuclear forces deployed outside Europe, the Soviets as well as our allies have every reason to doubt that these forces would actually be invoked in a European conflict, particularly if the Soviets were pursuing ostensibly limited objectives in such a

conflict. Nor is it clear that NATO's shorter-range battlefield nuclear weapons would actually be fired in order to block a breakthrough by the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces.

Here again, the capabilities to be surrendered by NATO under the INF Treaty loom large. The ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing-2 ballistic missiles scheduled to be scrapped under the Treaty were intended not only for the deterrent mission of threatening targets in the Soviet Union proper, but also as a modernization effort to replace existing, and obsolescing, NATO nuclear forces, particularly dual-capable artillery and Lance missile batteries. The key weakness of these existing systems inheres in their limited range: none of them can fire much beyond 50 miles, and most are limited to ranges of 25 miles or less. Necessarily deployed near the potential battlefront, they are vulnerable to being overrun by a Warsaw Pact conventional thrust. If the weapons are fired, they will be targeted against Warsaw Pact units operating within NATO territory—a prospect that militates against the order for their use.

This brings us back to the first pillar of NATO's Flexible Response strategy: direct, forward defense against a conventional assault by the Warsaw Pact. This is the key mission for NATO's conventional forces, but that mission is sensitively dependent upon the two other (nuclear) pillars of the Flexible Response strategy.

First, it is the capable—therefore credible—threat by NATO of nuclear escalation that prevents the Warsaw Pact from concentrating its conventional ground forces with maximum effect preparatory to an attack. The Soviets understand only too well that if they should mass Pact conventional forces in order to muster a favorable force-ratio vis-a-vis NATO defenses, they thereby create a lucrative target for NATO's nuclear strikes. By the same token, to the extent that NATO's nuclear strike options are weakened and/or discredited, the Soviets have commensurately greater freedom—and incentive—to mass their conventional forces for assault, as they did so successfully in World War II.

This proposition holds true even if the Soviets were to undertake some reductions in Pact conventional capabilities in the direction of an "approximate balance." It is an historical axiom that he who can concentrate his forces commands the offensive advantage. In 1940, the Germans were able to prevail against (numerically nearly equal) French-British forces and despite superior French armor and extensively prepared French defenses.

The 1940 experience is illuminating, particularly with respect to reinforcements. The Soviet Union has the advantage of relying on interior lines of communications to reinforce its attacking armies in Europe. By contrast, NATO must look to U.S. reinforcements crossing a submarine-infested Atlantic Ocean toward imperilled ports-of-embarkation and airfields. Meanwhile, the Soviets would be able to move two divisions a day to Western Europe over seven or more rail-lines through Eastern Europe.

Even NATO's concept of Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA), which has been generally endorsed by the Alliance, is predicated on the assumption of a NATO nuclear threat credible enough to force a Warsaw Pact attack to proceed in waves or echelons. The aim of FOFA is to delay or disrupt the movement of these echelons to the

battlefront, thus preventing the Soviets from capitalizing on initial successes against NATO's forward defenses. If the credibility of NATO's nuclear-strike options were removed, so would be the credibility of the FOFA concept.

Finally, in the absence of modernized NATO nuclear forces effective and survivable enough to convey credibly the threat of deliberate nuclear escalation, NATO could not deter the offensive employment of nuclear weapons, preemptively or not, by the Warsaw Pact, thus further sealing the fate of NATO's conventional forces.

This analysis suggests the three basis vectors of the NATO Defense Initiative, which were incorporated in Secretary Carlucci's NATO Defense Program announced this February. First, NATO must raise the credibility of its nuclear forces, not by increasing their number but by modernizing the remaining ones. Second NATO must strengthen its forward conventional forces by protecting its air assets against Pact air and missile attacks, and by giving its ground forces greater battle-depth and resilience through improved and longer-range conventional battlefield fire-support. Third, NATO must base Flexible Response more on conventional missiles of various ranges than on nuclear weapons.

The Imperative of Nuclear Modernization

A modernized nuclear arsenal is indispensable to the continued viability of NATO's strategy of Flexible Response. This modernization calls for at least four avenues of effort.

First, NATO's existing nuclear artillery, consisting in the main of 8-inch and 155-mm tubes, needs to be replenished with shells of increased accuracy. Recent advances in electrothermal technology promise severalfold increases in range over those of presently deployed systems. This would enable NATO to remove the tubes to positions less vulnerable than those currently deployed. Given the extended range, NATO's nuclear artillery will also be able to concentrate its fire more freely and easily, thereby also reducing, in the aggregate, the demands on increases in the current inventory.

Second, NATO needs to develop and deploy a longer-range follow-on to the now obsolete Lance ground-launched nuclear missile system. This replacement should be tailored to the very edge of the INF Treaty's range limits—500 kilometers. The system should also be made dual-capable for conventional as well as nuclear combat.

Third, NATO needs to render its existing inventory of dual-capable aircraft more survivable on the ground and against Warsaw Pact air defenses.

Finally, and in the context of the previous imperative, NATO needs to replace its stock of nuclear gravity-bombs with air-to-surface standoff missiles, permitting dual-capable aircraft to deliver their weapons without having to challenge the Warsaw Pact's dense air defenses.

These modernization efforts, along with a reallocation of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to NATO missions, will help to sustain the necessary integrity of NATO's nuclear deterrent. Still, the Alliance must finally weigh the optimal value of its nuclear deterrent in the face of Soviet strategic and theater nuclear arsenals. It must con-

front a changed situation from the 1950s and 1960s, when the Alliance could rely with reasonable confidence on nuclear weapons in deterring, and in the ultimate contingency fending against, a Soviet conventional attack without the large risk of thereby triggering a nuclear conflagration.

NATO's nuclear weapons still play an essential role. They can, and must, deter a preemptive Soviet nuclear strike. They can, and must, "couple" the defense of NATO Europe to the risk of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Most important, they can, and must, limit the Warsaw Pact's freedom to mass its forces for the breakthrough offensive.

NATO's nuclear forces can, and must, continue to perform these roles and missions, and they must be modernized within the constraints of the INF Treaty in order to do so in adequate fashion. Yet, even under the best of assumptions, in the unfolding strategic environment they can no longer substitute for NATO conventional forces—in deterrent effect, let alone in warfighting capabilities.

Strengthening NATO's Forward Defenses

Strengthening NATO's conventional forward defenses entails at least three categories of effort. First, NATO must improve its passive ground defenses in order to be able to absorb the shock of an initial Pact assault. Work that is now underway to develop pre-prepared terrain enhancements and barriers must continue. This can help to slow and to channel initial Pact armor attacks.

Second, NATO must deploy weapons systems that can rapidly and precisely place minefields deep into the battlefield to block further Soviet armor advances and then mass firepower in order to keep them blocked. By at least doubling or tripling the ranges of such fire units, NATO will be able commensurately to expand the depth in which its forward defense units are deployed. This will increase the resilience of NATO's forward defenses by giving them more room to maneuver and to counterattack.

The weapons in question would include munitions compatible with systems such as the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), which is now being deployed; Army Tactical Missiles (ATACMs) currently under production; Joint Tactical Missiles (JTACMs) that will soon be available; shorter-range Modular Stand-Off Weapons; a NATO cooperative cruise missile that could soon go into production; dual-capable aircraft; "smart" extended-range artillery shells; and the like.

Third, NATO must extend the defense of its air assets which ultimately are dedicated to supporting NATO's operations on the ground. Currently NATO airfields' air-defense batteries and air control centers are highly vulnerable to nonnuclear Pact air forces and tactical missiles such as the SCUD and the SS–21. If this vulnerability is allowed to grow, NATO will confront the dire prospect of losing control of the air, and thereby the tenability of any conventional defense of Europe.

In the near term NATO must address this concern with improved passive air defenses such as hardening and decoys to protect both aircraft and surrounding air defense units. It also must up-

grade existing Patriot and Hawk air-defense batteries and begin work in earnest on low-cost anti-tactical missile defenses.

In the longer term, NATO will have to deploy an extended air defense system capable of coping not only with low-flying cruise missiles, but with tactical ballistic missiles as well. It must also consider how it might reduce its reliance on aircraft by assigning unmanned systems for certain air defense and air interdiction missions.

Deploying a Flexible Conventional Response

NATO's direct or forward defense, of course, will only be as good as its back-up. As was noted before, NATO's current plan is to block any persistent Soviet penetration of NATO's forward defenses with the threat of deliberate nuclear escalation, a threat that is no longer very credible. The answer is not to build more nuclear weapons, but rather to develop a truly flexible conventional response posture that will allow NATO forces to block a Soviet attack without destroying the territory they endeavor to defend.

More specifically, NATO must deploy nonnuclear cruise missiles launched from the air, sea and land to strike deep against Pact airfields, air defense units, command and control bunkers, train-transloading points, nuclear depots, and military transport choke-points such as tunnels, bridges and railroad lines. The focus here would not be on moving targets, such as armor, but on the fixed assets that the Pact's mobile formations depend upon.

The cruise missiles needed for these missions would carry chemical warheads, electronic jammers, anti-radiation homing devices, scatterable mines, earth-penetrating warheads, fuel-air explosives, anti-armor munitions, air-base "runway-busters" and improved conventional payloads. They would have ranges of at least 100 km and reach beyond 1,000 km. They would include weapons systems such as the longer-range Modular Stand-Off Weapon, existing and improved conventional Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM-Cs), conventional air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM-Cs), anti-radiation missiles such as Tacit Rainbow, remotely piloted drones for surveillance and anti-radar missions (RPVs), and a dual-capable follow-on to the Lance surface-to-surface missile.

To ensure that these missiles arrive on target on time in the right number, NATO would also have to develop and adapt its command, control, communication and intelligence network to coordinate such strikes.

It also will be critical that ground-launched missiles be included in the mix. As experts such as Richard Perle, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and Albert Wohlsetter have noted, eliminating our option to deploy conventionally armed GLCMs and GLBMs in INF ranges was a mistake.

Many arguments have been offered to defend that decision but, as noted before, ground-launched missiles afford key survivability advantages over air and sea-launched missiles. This is particularly true in the case of ground-based missiles that are vertically launched from forested areas. Also, unlike SLCMs or ALCMs, ground-launched missiles can be procured in large numbers for quick, multiple refires from the same launcher.

In short, there is little question that NATO would be better off with these weapons than without them even if the Soviets were allowed to have them as well. Certainly, it is difficult to see how Soviet acquisition of these weapons could make matters much worse than they already are since under the INF Agreement the Soviets are free to target most of NATO's key military assets, which unfortunately lie within 500 kilometers of the InterGerman Border anyway. Moreover, the Soviets already have a vast stable of tactical ballistic missiles, more than enough to suppress NATO's far less robust air defenses particularly if they were to focus these missile attacks to establish a few critical air corridors. Once such corridors were established, Soviet bombers could proceed with relative safety to targets much deeper than 500 kilometers.

NATO, unfortunately, cannot attempt such a strategy since Soviet air defenses are much more robust and deployed in much greater depth. Indeed, that is why unmanned ground-launched missiles are so much more important to NATO than they are to the Pact. It's not NATO but the Pact, after all, that will strike first, and go after NATO's airfields. And it is NATO's defense, not the Pact's, that will turn on what assets survive such an attack. If we have enough fire power left over to strike back and stall a Pact follow-on air and ground offensive, we can prevail. If we don't, we can't.

This is why, prior to our signing INF, General Galvin, our SHAPE commander, was seriously considering the need for a conventional ground-launched missile with a range beyond 500 kilometers. It's also why European NATO is anxious to procure ground-launched air-defense killing cruise missiles with a range capability beyond 500 kilometers, why our military has funded work on other ground launched RPVs with ranges in excess of 300 miles and why Galvin is anxious to procure a ground-launched follow-on to Lance with the maximum permissible range.

Certainly, it would be a mistake to curb development or deployments of ground-launched missile deployments that have ranges below 500 kilometers. It's also clear that, if at all possible, the concession we made to ban conventional ground-launched missiles between 500 and 5500 kilometers should be corrected before the treaty's ratification protocols are finalized.

As Richard Perle noted in testimony before the Committee, allowing conventionally armed ground-launched missiles presents no more verification difficulties than those already associated with the Treaty's allowance for unarmed ground-launched cruise missiles beyond 500 kilometers. Given that this concession to Soviet demands was made primarily to eliminate possible verification concerns the Senate might have, it is altogether fitting that Senate consider reversing this error.

As for the NATO Defense Program (NDP), whose three basic thrusts are described above, the Senate Armed Services Committee should ask the Secretary of Defense to specify what program elements will be a part of the NDP. By late summer an initial analysis should be available on the relative merits of the NDP programs identified by the Competitive Strategy Task Force Report on NATO. This analysis will help establish a model by which to judge recommended operational command changes or new additional

weapons deployments, including emerging and futuristic technologies. Any specific program or budgeting recommendation should receive the consideration and support of the Committee.

This, then, brings us to the second major question: Will we unilaterally interpret the Treaty to cover futuristic weapons that we ought not to?

What Futuristic Missiles, if Any, Are Banned by INF?

Futuristic INF missiles were not explicitly discussed either in the Treaty or the negotiating record. In fact, the Treaty's missile definitions (Article I and II of the INF Agreement) were lifted nearly verbatim from the SALT II Agreement, whose own negotiating record emphasized that these missile definitions did not include futuristic weaponry.

Nonetheless, it is argued that ground-based futuristic offensive INF-range weaponry may be covered by the Treaty. Resolving this dispute will first require that our own government determine if futuristic offensive weaponry is covered. If the answer is yes, we will then have to get the Soviets to agree to our understanding of what is specifically covered.

There are several dangers inherent to this exercise. First, by opening up this question, we may well end up binding the U.S. unilaterally to an interpretation not agreed to by the Soviets. Second, if we do contend futuristics are covered, we will surrender technological options where we hold an inherent lead and these concessions will set a precedent for air or sea-launched missiles in START.

Finally, in the case of directed energy weapons, target designators, or jammers that might be carried by cruise missiles, we may well have to reach an agreement with the Soviets to what power levels would be permissable to assure that target designators and jammers were not banned. Such an agreement, however, would fly directly in the face of our efforts in our Defense and Space talks with the Soviets not to try to ban "Space Strike Weaponry" by trying to define permissable power levels for space-based sensors or weapons.

In short, going beyond a narrow, conventional understanding of what is banned by the Treaty's fairly narrow definitions runs the risk of jeopardizing support for futuristic technologies where we have a competitive advantage and of poisoning both START and our Defense and Space talks with limitation efforts that will be contrary to our national interests.

To understand what missile types the INF agreement might cover in the future, you need to answer two questions:

I. What is a cruise or ballistic missile of INF range?

Is it limited to a missile that either has "a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path" or is "an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path" (Article II definitions)? Or might it also include weaponry such as:

—*Electro Thermally Propelled Artillery* that could have a range in excess of 500 kilometers and has a ballistic trajectory over

most of its flight path but is not a "guided rocket" like a missile (i.e., guided throughout its flight path, not just its terminal end game and propelled or boosted with its own motor)?

—*Hypersonic Boost Glide Vehicles* (HSBGV) in INF Ranges which are boosted like ballistic missiles but do not have a ballistic trajectory over most of their flight path and yet are unlike cruise missiles in that they are not self-propelled and rely on centrifical lift as much as aerodynamic lift to sustain their flight?

—*Remotely Piloted Vehicles* (RPVs)—(e.g., BRAVE 3000, Pioneer, Tacit Rainbow) that do not fly directly to their preordained targets as cruise missiles do, but instead loiter (zig-zag) to find a target of opportunity and do not fly 500 KMs as the crow flys?

II. What is a missile "deployed for weapons delivery"?

Is it limited, as the Administration's article by article analysis states, to chemical, conventional or nuclear armed missiles that either carry a warhead or a simulation of a warhead? Or might it also extend to such weapons as:

—*A cruise missile that carried no warhead but instead homed in on its target and killed it kinetically,* i.e., by collision, (e.g., Tacit Rainbow)?

—*A cruise missile that carries a laser target designator* or a Forward Looking CO2 laser (CMAG) designed to find or designate targets for destruction by other weapons? (e.g., Canadair CL-227 Sentinel, Aquila, etc.).

—*A cruise missile that carried a directed energy weapon that could burn or blind its target (e.g., a laser)?* (The U.S. has already experimented with laser weapons mounted on planes, and used optic blinding lasers on planes during the Vietnam War. Making such platforms unmanned and flying them from the ground would make them ground-launched cruise missiles).

—*A cruise missile that carried a microwave or other type jammer that would jam but not destroy C^3I or radar antenna?*

—*A cruise missile that carried a microwave emitter or other type of directed energy emitter that would overload and damage C^3I or radar circuit?*

Clearly, these are not issues that we want to open up for negotiation and resolution with the Soviets who would want to slow our efforts in these advanced fields and who have demonstrated an ability to work ambiguities to their advantage when it comes to advanced weaponry limits.

To avoid such negotiations, the U.S. should be as candid as possible. The Treaty does not mention futuristics and the negotiating record is silent because we never considered banning such weaponry. Certainly, this is confirmed from my own conversations with top-level people at the Defense Department who were responsible for these matters in 1987. It also is confirmed by the Administration's own article-by-article analysis on this issue. More important, it is confirmed by common sense and our own national interest.

This, then, brings us to the last issue: Will we identify and safeguard against the Treaty's inherent verification weaknesses?

SAFEGUARDING INF

The key verification weaknesses inherent to the Treaty are all discussed in the Majority report. The problem, however, is what we are prepared to do if the Soviets take advantage of these weaknesses. It is one thing to argue that the Soviets are unlikely to take advantage of certain treaty ambiguities or to insist that our own negotiators believe the record is clear to them. It is another to try to deal with the Soviets once violations or possible violations occur.

The key problem with this Treaty is that on may counts—missile range, covert production or covert forces, missile type violations, etc.—we will have no clear signals to help us know if the Soviets are violating the agreement or not. It is this ambiguity, more than any other, that the Senate must come to terms with by supporting at least two specific sorts of safeguards.

The first sort, supporting speedy implementation of the JCS requirement for tactical missile defenses, should proceed immediately. The Army does not want to pay for all of this effort, but funding can and should be had from each of the services so that the Army can proceed alone and in cooperation with our NATO allies. Such defenses will allow NATO to defend itself without having to make a conscious decision to mobilize or disperse its forces. It also will reduce Soviet incentives to cheat on the margin and force them instead to cheat in a fashion that might give us much more warning over a longer period of time or breakout.

The second sort of safeguard would be one that the U.S. could take unilaterally such as keeping a surge production capability on line for ALCMs and SLCMs. If we suspected a Soviet violation, we could deploy more of these missiles either in conventional or nuclear modes unilaterally and do so without violating the Treaty itself.

Both sorts of safeguards are needed if we are serious about maintaining the peace after the INF agreement is law. Certainly, too much is at risk for us not to do the minimum necessary to safeguard our future.

DAN QUAYLE.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. WILSON

Secretary of State Shultz in a February 9, 1988, letter to Chairman Nunn stated that representations by Administration spokesmen during hearings on the INF Treaty would be "authoritative" and could be relied upon by the Senate without the necessity of incorporating those representations in the Resolution of Ratification.

While the need to have provided the Senate with these assurances is regrettable, it is easy to understand why such assurances were sought in light of the discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of several Nixon Administration spokesmen during the Senate ratification proceedings surrounding the ABM Treaty in 1972, which were the subject of lengthy Senate debate during the last session. However the Reagan Administration had no difficulty in making these assurances with respect to the INF Treaty because the Reagan Administration has also provided the Senate with the negotiating record of the INF Treaty. This provides the Senate with the opportunity to review and consult the negotiating record at the same time it is hearing Administration representations as to the meaning of the INF Treaty, and has permitted identification of apparent inconsistencies in Administration representations and the negotiating history. By being able to identify such apparent inconsistencies during the ratification process, the Senate has been placed in the position, for the first time, of being able to ask for and obtain clarification of a number of issues which might otherwise have remained ambiguous.

Regrettably, the same ability to compare the negotiating record of the ABM Treaty with representations of the Nixon Administration's spokesmen during the 1972 ratification process was not afforded to Senators because the ABM Treaty negotiating record was not provided to the Senate by the Nixon Administration. Had the Senate in 1972 had available to it the negotiating record, the discrepancies and inconsistency in the testimony of several Nixon Administration spokesmen would have been readily apparent to anyone making a comparison. That is, of course, the critical distinction between the situation in 1972 and that at present. Senators then never discovered the discrepancies in the testimony because they never looked at the negotiating record. Indeed, no Senator had ever looked at the ABM Treaty negotiating record until this Administration made it available to the Senate during the 99th Congress.

It is for that reason, having made a studied comparison and having thereby discovered that the Soviet negotiators never did agree to the "narrow interpretation" (banning development and testing of certain ABM defenses) despite the most strenuous efforts of U.S. negotiators to persuade them to do so, that I am constrained to insist upon the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, which in fact the Soviets insisted upon as the legally cor-

rect interpretation in 1972. To do otherwise would be to ignore the ABM Treaty negotiating record and assert that restrictions on development and testing of certain ABM systems by the United States is to be imposed on us unilaterally while, as a matter of international law, the Soviets are not so bound. The Soviets' obligations can be defined only by a clear and unambiguous meeting of the minds. The United States can of course unilaterally impose constaints upon ourselves by domestic law which go beyond any constraints imposed on the Soviets by the Treaty. And it would seem from the negotiating record that is just what some of the U.S. negotiators in 1972 sought to do in the testimony they gave during the process of ratification of the ABM Treaty; however they did not do so consistently or clearly.

By contrast, Administration testimony on the INF Treaty has to be clearly and consistently reconciled with the negotiating record of the Treaty—and Senators can ensure such consistency by comparing the testimony with the negotiating record, as we have, in fact, done in many instances.

The Committee relied on the negotiating record in our review of the ABM Treaty and in establishing the meaning of the Treaty in those cases where the Treaty text itself is unclear. By referring to the negotiating record, the Committee has been able to better understand the rationale for and the meaning of key provisions of the INF Treaty upon which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed and to which both parties will be bound under international law. In those few instances where there appears to be some ambiguity between the negotiating record and Administration explanation, we were able to recommend methods to codify in domestic law our understanding of the obligations which both the United States and the Soviet Union assumed.

The precedent established in providing the negotiating record to Senators before ratification is a good one.

This precedent, having been established in the ratification of the INF Treaty, should be followed in the ratification process of any future arms control agreements.

PETE WILSON.

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF MR. McCAIN

I fully subscribe to the additional views expressed on the theater nuclear balance and related modernization programs. I also believe that the following discussion of the conventional balance and overall trends in the overall nuclear balance complements the report.

The Conventional Balance

The United States cannot rely on rhetoric about conventional force improvements, low cost or cost free improvements, or revisions in how we assess the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance to deal with the military risks that will still exist if it abolishes its INF forces. The most critical problem NATO faces is not to agree on new force requirements, but rather to correct the past mortgages in terms of problems in total strength, readiness, deployment, sustaining capability, and equipment modernization that have built up over a period of decades.

As long as one ignores the current trends in the balance, it is possible to point to many individual areas where various efforts to correct NATO's inferiority in conventional forces have produced some important force improvements. The overall trends in force strength, however, have been anything but reassuring. In examining the equipment actually in the key active combat units and reserve forces in the Central Region—the NATO forces in Belgium, the FRG, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and the Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Poland—work by Phillip Karber reveals the following trends:

—In 1967, NATO and the Warsaw Pact had near parity in active army manpower. Both sides had approximately 800,000 men. In 1987, NATO still had about 780,000 men, but the Warsaw Pact had nearly one million.

—In 1967, NATO had about 5,500 medium tanks and the Warsaw Pact had about 12,500. In 1977, NATO had about 5,600 medium tanks and the Warsaw Pact had about 16,000. In 1987, NATO had about 6,500 tanks, but the Warsaw Pact had 16,900. The Warsaw Pact has not only increased its lead in tank strength, the USSR has converted most of its older tanks to the use of laser ranger finders, and many to the use of active armor. Given the Israeli experience with similarly upgraded Soviet T-62 tanks and the U.S. M-60 series, this gives at least Soviet forces something close to qualitative parity with the average tank deployed in NATO.

—The Warsaw Pact has acquired a massive advantage in infantry fighting vehicles. In 1967, NATO had about 11,500 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and the Warsaw Pact had about 13,200. In 1977, NATO had about 12,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehi-

cles and the Warsaw Pact had about 19,000. In 1987, NATO had about 14,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, but the Warsaw Pact had 22,000. It is important to note that the Warsaw Pact has recently produced heavily armed infantry fighting vehicles more than nine times faster than NATO.

—The Warsaw Pact advantage in anti-tank guns has increased steadily. In 1967, NATO had about 1,850 anti-tank guns, and the Warsaw Pact had about 1,450. In 1977, NATO had about 700 anti-tank guns and the Warsaw Pact had about 1,800. In 1987, NATO had about 300 anti-tank guns, but the Warsaw Pact had 1,500.

—NATO has lost any meaningful hope of making anti-tank guided missiles into a force multiplier. In 1967, NATO had about 1,100 anti-tank guided missiles, and the Warsaw Pact had about 750. In 1977, NATO had about 3,000 anti-tank guided missiles and the Warsaw Pact had about 4,500. In 1987, NATO had about 7,500 anti-tank guided missiles, but the Warsaw Pact had 11,000.

—The Warsaw Pact has massively increased its advantage in regular tube artillery, while converting to modern self-propelled weapons which are generally superior in range and tube life to the weapons in NATO forces. In 1967, NATO had about 1,800 major artillery weapons, and the Warsaw Pact had about 2,400. In 1977, NATO had about 2,200 major artillery weapons and the Warsaw Pact had about 4,800. In 1987, NATO had about 2,100 major artillery weapons, but the Warsaw Pact had 6,800.

—NATO's efforts to deploy multiple rocket launchers have been more than offset by increases in Warsaw Pact numbers, and the Warsaw Pact has also rapidly modernized its holdings. In 1967, NATO had no multiple rocket launchers, and the Warsaw Pact had about 700. In 1977, NATO had about 140 multiple rocket launchers and the Warsaw Pact had about 900. In 1987, NATO had about 200 multiple rocket launchers, but the Warsaw Pact had 1,100.

—NATO has shifted from superiority to inferiority in short range artillery firepower. In 1967, NATO had 2,000 medium and heavy mortars, and the Warsaw Pact had about 1,800. In 1977, NATO only had about 1,800 medium and heavy mortars and the Warsaw Pact had about 2,000. In 1987, NATO still had 1,800 medium and heavy mortars, but the Warsaw Pact had 2,800.

—NATO has cut its air strength at a time the Warsaw Pact has rapidly begun to catch up in deployed combat aircraft technology, and has caught up in overall mission-relevant range-payload capability. In 1967 NATO had 1,800 combat aircraft, and the Warsaw Pact had about 2,900. In 1977, NATO had dropped to about 1,500 combat aircraft and the Warsaw Pact had dropped slightly to about 2,800. In 1987, NATO only had about 1,400 combat aircraft, but the Warsaw Pact still had 2,800.

—NATO has lost any hope of using attack helicopters as a force multiplier. In 1967, NATO had 50 attack helicopters, and the Warsaw Pact had none. In 1977, NATO had about 400 attack

helicopters and the Warsaw Pact had about 240. In 1987, NATO had about 550 attack helicopters, but the Warsaw Pact had 800.

—In 1967, NATO had 700 air defense guns, and the Warsaw Pact had about 3,800. In 1977, NATO had about 1,700 air defense guns and the Warsaw Pact had about 3,200. In 1987, NATO had about 2,200 air defense guns, and the Warsaw Pact had 3,200.

—The previous trends in air defense guns might seem reassuring, but the reality is very different when one considers surface-to-air missiles. In 1967, NATO had 1,100 medium to heavy surface-to-air missile launchers, and the Warsaw Pact only had about 600. In 1977, NATO had about 1,200 medium to heavy surface-to-air missile launchers, but the Warsaw Pact had taken the lead and had about 1,600. In 1987, NATO had about 1,350 medium to heavy surface-to-air missile launchers, but the Warsaw Pact had 2,100.

—If one looks at total crew served weapons, it is clear that the Warsaw Pact has taken a massive new lead, while it has also caught up in many areas of quality. In 1967, NATO had 27,400 crew served weapons, and the Warsaw Pact had about 39,900. In 1977, NATO had about 29,740 crew served weapons and the Warsaw Pact had about 56,640. In 1987, NATO had about 36,100 crew served weapons, and the Warsaw Pact had 71,000—nearly twice as many.

—If one looks at the shifts in total crew served weapons weight by an effectiveness score and combined into armored division equivalents, it is clear that the Warsaw Pact has still taken a massive new lead when weapons quality is fully taken into account. In 1967, NATO had a ratio of 1 armored division equivalent to 1.5 for the Warsaw Pact. In 1977, NATO had a ratio of 1 armored division equivalent to 1.8 for the Warsaw Pact. In 1987, NATO had a ratio of 1 armored division equivalent to 2.2 for the Warsaw Pact.

These trends are summarized in statistical and graphic terms in the attached tables. The resulting Warsaw Pact superiority is not great enough to offer the Warsaw Pact the kind of confidence it would need to attack NATO. Nevertheless, the balance has clearly shifted against NATO in spite of decades of rhetoric about "flexible response," and it will clearly continue to do so unless a major supplement is added to the fiscal year 1989 budget and the current Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).

Virtually all of the experts we have heard to date have agreed that the Warsaw Pact is catching up in most areas of deployed conventional technology, and has caught up or surpassed the average level of deployed tactical technology in NATO in a number of key areas. Let's consider what this really means given the trends in total military production of NATO and the Warsaw Pact during 1984–1986.

These trends in equipment production and modernization are as shown in the last three attached tables, as compiled from recent reporting by the Department of Defense. These tables have been informally reviewed by the Department of Defense, and show that NATO only produced about 40 percent of the tanks of the Warsaw

Pact, 55 percent of the other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 20 percent of the towed artillery, 19 percent of the self-propelled artillery, and 24 percent of the AA artillery. NATO also lagged behind in combat aircraft, although far less significantly. The only areas where NATO led were in transport and naval construction.

THE IMBALANCE IN THE CENTRAL REGION:
TRENDS IN NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA [1]

Category	1967			1977			1987		
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Ratio	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Ratio	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Ratio
Main Battle Tanks	5,500	12,500	2.27	5,600	16,000	2.86	6,500	16,900	2.6
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	11,500	13,200	1.15	12,000	19,000	1.58	14,000	22,000	1.57
Anti-Tank Guns (90 mm+)	1,850	1,450	1.28	700	1,800	2.57	300	1,500	5.0
ATGM Launchers	1,100	750	0.68	3,000	4,500	1.5	7,500	11,000	1.47
Artillery (100 mm+)	1,800	2,400	1.33	2,200	4,800	2.18	2,100	6,800	3.24
Multiple Rocket Launchers	0	700	(700:0)	140	900	6.43	200	1,100	5.5
Total Mortars[2]	2,000	1,800	0.9	1,800	2,000	1.11	1,800	2,800	1.56
Combat Aircraft[3]	1,800	2,900	1.61	1,500	2,800	1.87	1,400	2,800	1.56
Attack Helicopters	50	0	(0:50)	400	240	1.67	550	800	1.45
Air Defense Guns	700	3,800	5.43	1,200	3,200	2.67	2,200	3,200	1.45
Medium/Heavy Surface to Air Missile Launchers	1,100	600	0.55	1,200	1,600	1.33	1,350	2,100	1.56
Total Crew Served Weapons	27,400	39,900	1.46	29,740	56,640	1.9	36,100	71,000	1.97
Armored Division Equivalents[4]			1:1.5			1:1.8			1:2.2

Source: Phillip A. Karber, BDM
Ratio is Warsaw Pact total divided by NATO total, and is ratio of Warsaw Pact superiority to NATO. All numbers used the standard MBFR counting rules used for the last decade, and only include the equipment in active forces and formations. Stored, war reserve, and inoperable equipment are not included.
1. Includes all NATO Forces in Belgium, FRG, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and all Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia, GDR, and Poland.
2. All mortars, including 60 mm and other light weapons.
3. Includes Other Combat Unit (OCU) and all other combat aircraft.
4. Weighted total score based on weapons numbers and their lethality, protection, and mobility using WEI/WUV values. Counts only infantry weapons in infantry squads.

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Changes in the Ratio of Warsaw Pact Superiority to NATO in Number of Land Forces Weapons Systems in the NATO Guidelines Area During 1967, 1977, 1987.*



* Uses standard MBFR counting rules. Includes only equipment in the TOE of active and reserve forces.

Chart – Senate Republican Conference

Changes in the Ratio of Warsaw Pact Superiority to NATO in Weapons Numbers in theNATO Guidelines Area During 1967, 1977, 1987.*



* Uses standard MBFR counting rules. Includes only equipment in the TOE of active and reserve forces.

Chart – Senate Republican Conference

RECENT TRENDS IN NATO VERSUS WARSAW PACT COMBAT EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION

Category	1984-1986 Total Production		1984-1986 Average Annual Production		NATO as a % of
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Warsaw Pact
LAND WEAPONS					
Tanks	4,400	11,050	1,467	3,863	40%
OAFVs	7,600	13,900	2,533	4,633	55%
Towed Field Artillery	1,225	5,800	408	1,933	21%
SP Artillery	775	4,150	258	1,383	19%
MRLs	650	2,375	217	792	27%
SP AA Artillery	75	310	25	103	24%
Towed AA Artillery	25	650	8.3	217	4%
NAVAL WEAPONS					
Submarines	27	25	9	8.3	108%
Major Surface Combatants	46	26	15.3	8.6	177%
Minor Combatants	89	150	30	50	59%
Auxiliaries	21	16	7	5.3	131%
AIR FORCE WEAPONS					
Bombers	27	150	9	50	18%
Fighters	1,650	2,100	550	700	79%
Transports	850	700	28	23	121%
ASW Aircraft	20	15	6.7	5	121%
Military Helicopters	1,595	1,700	532	567	94%
NUCLEAR WEAPONS					
ICBMS	10	300	3.3	100	3.3%
LRINF Missiles	380	275	127	92	138%
SRBMs	0	1,350	0	450	NA
SLBMs	170	250	57	83	68%

Source: Adapted from reporting by the Department of Defense, and Soviet Military Power, 1987, p. 122.

LONG TERM TRENDS IN NATO VERSUS WARSAW PACT COMBAT EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION

A. UNITED STATES VERSUS THE USSR

Category	Equipment Production: 1978-1987 U.S.	Soviet Union	U.S. as a Percent of USSR	Ratio of Soviet Superiority
Tanks	7,580	24,300	31%	3.2:1
Artillery, MRLS, and Mortars	3,149	27,300	12%	8.7:1
Other Armored Vehicles	10,800	46,000	23%	4.3:1
Tactical Combat and Interceptor Aircraft	3,600	7,700	47%	2.1:1
Fighters	3,453	6,900	50%	2.0:1
Military Helicopters	2,081	4,450	47%	2.1:1
Surface to Air Missiles	17,881	95,000	19%	5.3:1
Major Surface Combatants	87	83	105%	0.95:1
Submarines	41	84	48%	1.8:1
Attack Submarines	33	65	39%	2:1

B. NATO VERSUS THE WARSAW PACT

Category	Equipment Production: 1978-1987 NATO.	Warsaw Pact	NATO as a Percent of Pact	Ratio of Pact Superiority
Tanks	11,600	30,100	39%	2.6:1
Artillery, MRLs, and Mortars	6,100	33,000	18%	5.4:1
Other Armored Vehicles	20,100	53,600	38%	2.7:1
Tactical Combat and Interceptor Aircraft	6,600	9,000	73%	1.4:1
Major Surface Combatants	108	108	100%	1:1
Attack Submarines	62	67	93%	1.1:1

Source: The Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence, Washington, GPO, January, 1988, p. 28; and Frank Carlucci, Annual Report, FY1989, Washington, GPO, 1987, p. 29.

The Arsenal of Inferiority:
Ratio of Total NATO & Warsaw Pact Military Equipment Production: 1984-1986

(Total Warsaw Pact Production Divided by Total NATO Production)



Production 1984 -1986

Warsaw Pact	11,050	13,900	5,800	4,150	2,375	310	650	150	2,100	1,700	1,350
NATO	4,400	7,600	1,225	775	650	75	25	27	1,650	1,595	0

Source: Department of Defense and Soviet Military Power, 1987

The Overall Nuclear Balance

Like all previous nuclear arms treaties, the INF Treaty does not constrain the Soviet nuclear build-up. To put this in historical perspective, the Department of Defense estimates that the USSR had a little over 2,000 warheads on strategic missile systems in 1972, when SALT I was signed. It had a little under 6,000 warheads when SALT II was signed. It now has close to 10,000 nuclear warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs.

The Soviet Union has continued to build-up ICBM and SLBM forces that can be used to substitute for the SS–12 and SS–20. In spite of all of Gorbachev's talk about arms control and Glasnost, the USSR produced 300 new ICBMs during 1984–1986. All of NATO, including our British and French allies, produced 10. The USSR produced 250 SLBMs, and NATO produced 170. As for the short range (less than 500 kilometers) missiles not covered by the INF Treaty, the USSR produced 1,350 missiles and NATO produced none.

After the INF Reductions
The New Theater Nuclear Balance in Europe

NATO-Warsaw Pact INF Aircraft
Europe



NATO-Warsaw Pact
Short-Range Nuclear Force
Europe



*US LANCE 8-inch, 155mm

Non-US NATO LANCE, HONEST JOHN, 8-inch 155mm

**Soviet SCUD, SS-21, FROG 203mm, 240mm, 152mm systems

Non-Soviet Warsaw PAct SCUD, SS-21, FROG, 152mm

Bombing Capabilities of
Soviet Tactical Ground-Attack Aircraft



Adapted from OJCS, Military Posture FY 1989 pp 52 and 53, and Soviet Military Power 1987, p 77. Estimates for 1994 are by the Office of Senator John McCain

These trends are reflected in the total nuclear stockpile, or killing power, available to each side. The USSR has made a great many claims about a build-up in U.S. nuclear strength under the Reagan Administration. The truth is that the U.S. has concentrated on making its forces survivable and on improving their accuracy and command and control. It has steadily cut its stockpile since 1975, and has 12% fewer weapons than it had then. The USSR has increased its number of nuclear weapons by 37% during the same period, and now has a 30% lead over the U.S.

All of these trends can continue in spite of the INF Treaty. The USSR can increase its number of strike aircraft, ALCMs, and SLCMs. It can target more of its ICBMs and SLBMs on Europe. It can increase its number of land based missiles with ranges under 500 kilometers and use them to reach many of the targets that were covered by the SS–4, SS–12, SS–23, and SS–20. Iraq, for example, has recently fired its Scud B missiles at ranges of 600 kilometers by using all their propellant and reducing warhead weight to levels that would still allow the use of very high yield nuclear warheads.

U.S. vs. Soviet Nuclear Weapons



Source: Discriminate Deterrence, Jan. 1988
*Relative Scale: U.S. 1972 = 1.00

JOHN MCCAIN.

MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. HUMPHREY

I believe the Committee has acted unwisely by recommending ratification of the INF Treaty. Of the 38 witnesses called by the Armed Services Committee, 30 testified that from a military point of view the Treaty is disadvantageous to the U.S. and NATO. For example, General Bernard Rogers stated the case plainly, "It [NATO] would be stronger if it [the Treaty] were not ratified." Rogers said, "I spent 8 years as NATO Commander and this Treaty is wrong. We should not have this Treaty, in my opinion."

The Committee believes the Treaty can make a "modest, but useful contribution to NATO security". This is hardly a ringing endorsement. Such hesitancy is not surprising, however, given the damning testimony on the military effects of the Treaty. That the Committee can muster no more than faint praise, even in the midst of the current treaty-mania, bears looking into.

The Treaty should not be ratified for these reasons:

1. The Treaty will heighten the risk of general nuclear war. The Committee acknowledges the elimination of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) will leave a gap in the spectrum of NATO's flexible response capability. As former NATO commander, General Bernard Rogers put it, "And what does NATO give up? The very weapon system the Soviets fear the most—the Pershing II—which . . . keeps high the credibility of NATO's deterrent."

The gap in flexible response will increase the possibility that war in Europe would leap-frog to a strategic exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger testified, "The INF agreement and the pressures it generates against the remaining nuclear systems places the predominant burden of nuclear defense on weapons based in the United States or at sea." Indeed, one of the remedies proposed to treat the problems induced by the Treaty, is to rely more heavily on strategic weapons, such as submarine-launched missiles, for theater use. Could there be a more dangerous or more provocative use of strategic weapons?

As NATO Commander, General John Galvin testified, "In initial use, it would be very awkward to consider a strategic weapon for use as a theater weapon. The advantage of a theater nuclear weapon, if it ever came to use in war, is that it very clearly shows that it is a theater decision, not simply a United States decision . . ." The increased reliance on strategic weapons forced by the Treaty must be its worst feature.

2. The Treaty fails to reduce the nuclear threat against our allies. To compensate for vehicles destroyed under the Treaty, the Soviets will retarget other nuclear delivery vehicles, equally swift, equally accurate and equally lethal, against NATO. Defense Secretary Carlucci pointed out that, "it is certainly realistic to antici-

pate that the Soviets might retarget some SS–25s . . ." Indeed, the Soviets have already redeployed from our Atlantic Coast to European waters Yankee-class submarines carrying SS–N–6 missiles now retargeted against NATO.

General Rogers, stated it this way: "For NATO, the name of the game is to deter . . . what the Soviets are eliminating comprises only about three percent of their stockpile of nuclear warheads. Nearly all of the remaining 97 percent can be targetted onto those same installations in NATO's rear area, thereby keeping the risk high and on the backs of the West European people."

3. The Treaty exacerbates the dangers of the imbalance in conventional forces, an imbalance which is already alarming and growing worse. As the Committee report states, "the INF Treaty, while succeeding in the removal of a number of nuclear weapons in the middle of NATO's deterrent spectrum, leaves a serious imbalance in conventional and theater nuclear forces on one side of this spectrum, and a strategic balance that is in rough parity on the other side."

On the conventional imbalance, General Rogers, said, "Every year that passes the gap between the force capabilities of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact get wider, to NATO's detriment. . . . My major concern for the past decade has been . . . this gap might widen to the point where the military situation for NATO would get beyond restoration and the Soviets would accomplish their objective in Western Europe: against the backdrop of massive conventional forces, which can threaten to seize and hold territory, to achieve the capability to intimidate, coerce and eventually neutralize the West European nations without firing a shot. I also believe that the INF Treaty has the potential to accelerate the Soviet's achievement of that objective."

General Galvin testified, "the conventional balance gap is becoming a somewhat more unfavorable balance to us over the last few years. The reason for that is that the Soviet Union has moved toward a higher technology level on a number of their production capabilities. I am talking about aircraft, communication and other things." And General Vuono, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, stated that while we have made great improvements in our conventional capabilities, the trend in the conventional balance (in comparison to the Soviet Union) for Army ground forces has become worse since 1967. No witness more dramatically underscored the precarious state of NATO's conventional forces than Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff when he testified that NATO has not met their minimum goal of having a 7-day supply of fuel and ammunition.

Instead of urging defeat of the Treaty for exacerbating the dangers arising from conventional force imbalances, the Committee skirts the issue by calling for an expansion of NATO's conventional forces and a modernization of its theater nuclear weapons. Does anyone really think such increases are realistically possible? Ironically, by proclaiming (falsely) the success of the INF negotiations, we encourage the public to believe that greater defense expenditures are unnecessary. The fact is, in the post-INF period, we and our NATO partners will face even more resistance to defense spending.

The likelihood of the defense increases necessitated by the Treaty seems low. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe, noted "the United States will need to spend more money to correct weaknesses in conventional forces in NATO, but, "I also believe we are not going to do that." Former Defense Secretary, Dr. Harold Brown, put it this way, when asked about the probability of increases in NATO defense spending: "I would assess the probability as low . . . if U.S. defense budgets continue to drop by a couple of percent a year, the Europeans will have lots of excuses and significant justification for not increasing theirs at all."

Had the Committee based its recommendation on the testimony relative to the military effects of the Treaty, I believe members would have had to recommend against ratification. Instead, the Committee departed from its charter and focused on the purported political ramifications in Europe were the Treaty to fail of ratification. The Committee recommends ratification, not on the basis of military benefits, but on the conventional wisdom that refusal to ratify would cause political problems in Europe.

There are grounds to challenge the conventional wisdom. When the SALT II Treaty was pending, contemporary witnesses warned that failure to ratify would be politically disastrous for NATO. Then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told the Foreign Relations Committee that the rejection of the SALT II Treaty would have a potentially debilitating effect on the Alliance, "It would be a terribly severe blow to NATO and members of the Alliance should this treaty fail of ratification. They have made this clear in statements through the heads of most of the governments of the NATO countries . . ."

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown told the Foreign Relations Committee, "The Europeans do believe that if SALT fails approval, it greatly increases the probability of an all-out arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union . . . they [Europeans] certainly would examine various alternatives to the Alliance—their own nuclear capability, a separate alliance, neutrality. I am sure all those would be raised as possibilities." SALT II was not ratified, despite the conventional wisdom and doom-saying in high places. NATO survived in good order and continued to deter attack.

It is an understatement to say the concept of arms reduction is as politically popular in Europe as in the U.S. In fact, there seems to be a strong tide of pacifism running in Europe. As former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger pointed out, more than 50% of the people in Germany favor unilateral disarmament. All this might be so, but it does not follow we should coddle pacifism and endorse the politics of feeling good at the expense of our own security and that of NATO.

The net of the Treaty is this: The United States will have to destroy the two types of missiles best suited to partially offset the substantial Soviet advantage in conventional forces and which are best suited to deter a Soviet attack on Europe, Pershing II, and ground launched cruise missiles. We will be forced to rely on less suitable weapons such as cruise missiles air-launched from considerable distances, weapons launched from penetrating aircraft, provocative weapons launched from strategic platforms—and on new battlefield missiles, if the allies can agree to produce and deploy

them, which is highly problematical. Meanwhile, our NATO allies will remain fully threatened and intimidated by nuclear weapons—different ones to be sure, but weapons just as swift, accurate and lethal as those eliminated under the Treaty.

A number of other serious problems which Treaty implementation will create are written off as matters that can be addressed within the START negotiations. This is buck passing. If the INF Treaty has faults, they should be addressed during Treaty debate. Hoping the faults will be corrected sometime in the future in negotiations which might or might not succeed is an irresponsible approach to safeguarding national security and that of our allies. If anything, such buck passing suggests that the strategic reductions and conventional arms reductions should have come first.

For example, there is the question of what defines a missile covered by the Treaty. During the hearings, Senators expressed the concern that the Soviets without violating the Treaty could deploy a "new type" missile to replace the SS–20. If a missile were tested the first time at a range in excess of 5500 km, even if every subsequent test were at INF ranges, that missile would not be covered by the Treaty. The Committee failed to resolve the dilemma. Given the Soviet penchant for exploiting ambiguities and loopholes, the Treaty language is not only asking for trouble, it begs for trouble.

There are other important concerns. Late in the INF negotiations, the United States reversed its position and agreed to ban conventionally-armed ground launch cruise missiles (GLCM) of INF range. Our negotiators now dismiss the need for GLCMs in Europe, but the fact is NATO was on the verge of establishing a need for such weapons when the United States did an about face. In a closed hearing, the Committee learned that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was, in fact, on the verge of announcing a need for GLCMs. The Committee was told that SACEUR's position was overridden by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, too, is concerned about the loss of the GLCM option, saying, ". . . but I will tell you that is my gravest concern, concerning weapons and the Treaty." Dr. Schlesinger used the same phraseology, ". . . immensely concerned, and that [the ban on conventionally armed GLCMs] is my gravest reservation about this INF treaty." Grave reservations are in order, for the Treaty throws away the most valuable and promising non-nuclear weapon we have to deal with the Soviet superiority in conventional weapons.

Arms reduction is a worthy pursuit. But we have put the horse before the cart. We deployed nuclear weapons in Europe to offset the massive Soviet superiority in conventional forces. There are nuclear weapons in Europe which no longer make sense, and they ought to be removed. But before we remove those very weapons that are the most effective against today's threat, first the Soviet conventional superiority must be eliminated, or at least significantly reduced.

It would have made more sense to secure an agreement to reduce the imbalance in conventional forces, before dealing with nuclear weapons deployed to offset that imbalance. Ambassador Kirkpatrick agrees. Responding to the Chairman's question about whether the current sequence is not proper, "I whole heartedly agree with

that position, Senator Nunn." If we implement the INF Treaty first, we will have thrown away the leverage to secure reductions in conventional forces. These reductions will have to be heavily asymetrical in our favor if they are to truly reduce the potential for conflict in Europe. As Dr. Harold Brown noted, "The Rand study says conventional arms reductions would have to be unequal and rather deep. And they would have to be made in the key fire power elements, tanks and artillery."

The INF Treaty verges on fraud. The Treaty will not destory nuclear warheads. It will destroy delivery vehicles, in our case the very vehicles which best fulfill the necessary nuclear role in NATO. The Treaty will not reduce the threat of nuclear war in Europe. It will heighten it by creating a dangerous gap in flexible response, such that escalation is likely to leap-frog to strategic weapons. The Treaty will not relieve our allies of the intimidation of being targeted by Soviet missiles. Moscow is already retargeting NATO with other nuclear weapons equally swift, accurate, deadly and intimidating. The Treaty will not reduce the dangers of the Soviet superiority in conventional forces. The conventional balance is growing worse, and the Treaty will eliminate the very best weapons for dealing with that danger. Further, by eliminating Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, we are throwing away the best bargaining chips we have to deal with the root cause of tensions in Europe, the substantial Soviet superiority in conventional weapons. For these compelling reasons, the Senate should not assent to ratification of the INF treaty.

GORDON J. HUMPHREY.

MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. SYMMS

Is The Proposed INF Treaty Equal and Verifiable?

The Soviet nuclear blackmail threat, as manifested by the recent Soviet first strike ICBM target practice aimed at Pearl Harbor, remains a grave concern to this Senator. The Soviet 6 to 1 first strike advantage deployed in direct violation of SALT I and II is especially damaging to the credibility of the American strategic nuclear deterrent when coupled with the mounting evidence of Soviet break out from the ABM Treaty by deploying a prohibited nationwide ABM defense. Classical arms control theory requires that arms control treaties be stabilizing, reduce the risk of war, actually reduce nuclear weapons, and reduce defense spending. There is great question whether the proposed INF Treaty meets any of these criteria. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the INF Treaty is diametrically opposed to each of these classical arms control criteria. Moreover, it seems reasonable not to ratify any new arms control treaty until the Soviets come into compliance with all existing arms control treaties.

These additional views will focus first upon the principles of equality and verifiability, and the stability and credibility of deterrence. At the Annex to these views will be found a critique of Senate reports on the verifiability of the INF Treaty, a summary history of officially confirmed Soviet violations of international security treaties, and finally an analysis of new evidence of Soviet nationwide ABM break out.

INTRODUCTION

Secretary of State Shultz wrote recently that: "Two of the fundamental principles that should form the basis of all arms control negotiations are *equality* and *verifiability.*"

These two fundamental arms control principles have long been mandated by both the President and Congress. And various public opinion polls indicate clearly that an overwhelming majority of the American public correctly disapproves signing of any new arms treaty that can not be effectively verified.

But has either principle been achieved in the proposed INF Treaty? If the Senate can not be fully assured on the closely related issues of equality and verifiability, we may not have a satisfactory INF Treaty.

After two months of hearings, I am still troubled by some fundamental questions:

I. Does the INF Treaty achieve quality and still maintain the credibility of deterrence?

A. Did the folding of the U.S. intercontinental "nuclear umbrella" already weaken deterrence?

B. Did previous U.S. unilateral nuclear disarmament in NATO also further weaken deterrence?

C. Can deterrence be bolstered by replacing SACEUR Pershing Two's, GLCMs, and Poseidons with stockpiled Minuteman IIIs, new SLCMs, and additional INF aircraft?

II. Will it be possible to establish valid, inspected baselines for reductions, and to achieve effective verification?

A. Will Soviet Maskirovka impede effective verification?

B. Are the Soviets deeply committed to retaining their LR/SRINF mobile missile forces covertly?

C. Will U.S. National Technical Means of verification need augmentation?

D. Will the Soviets resist effective verification, including effective on-site inspection?

E. Are Soviet SALT violations an obstacle to ratifying an INF Treaty, and is compliance an "essential prerequisite?"

F. Will it be possible to enforce Soviet INF compliance?

Summary of Answers to These INF Questions

The proposed INF Treaty may fail to achieve both equality and verifiability. The reasons are simple. Past and existing arms treaties have given the Soviets important superiorities within their unequal terms. Soviet negotiating practice is to achieve important unilateral advantages, and their Marxist-Leninist ideology requires them to reject the very concept of true equality. The grim history of Soviet diplomacy suggests that the Soviet Union will never honestly negotiate or give up its overwhelming strategic nuclear superiority, which it has duplicitously acquired through clever arms control negotiating deception, massive camouflage and concealment aimed at defeating our verification capabilities, and even outright violation of all existing unequal arms control treaties. Moreover, the Soviets have paid a huge economic price for their relentlessly pursued strategic superiority. This huge price is a measure of Soviet determination to maintain their superiority. Finally, arms control can only effectively "control" what we can effectively monitor and verify. Equality is impossible without effective verifiability, but effective monitoring and verifiability have proven extremely difficult. Most importantly, after arduously monitoring, sometimes fortuitously detecting, and then at long last verifying Soviet violations of all existing arms treaties, the United States has not been capable of enforcing Soviet compliance.

But beyond the difficulty of achieving effective verifiability, the issue of potential U.S.-Soviet equality in arms control treaties is closely related to the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability. We should remember that the United States has traditionally relied heavily on nuclear *superiority* for intercontinental and theater deterrence. This reliance has traditionally been termed the U.S. "nuclear umbrella." But our umbrella has long been perceived as full of holes and as folding as Soviet strategic superiority grew. Thus American agreement even to an effectively verified U.S.-Soviet LR/SRINF equality, especially at "global double zero," is already a significant and dangerous American concession.

Indeed, the credibility of the U.S. capability to continue to deter the Soviets on several levels of potential conflict is a real issue in the INF debate now taking shape. The INF Treaty may weaken the credibility of the U.S. deterrent capability, which in turn will jeopardize world peace.

Given existing Soviet overwhelming advantages of: About 10 to 1 in ICBM capability; about 14 to 1 in IRBM warheads; about 12 to 1 in SR/INF warheads; and about 4 to 1 in conventional forces; how can equality ever be negotiated and deterrence maintained? Have we considered the likelihood that while the Soviets may ostensibly agree to asymmetrical INF reductions, they may do so because they believe the United States could not detect and effectively verify their nonreduction violations or covert circumventions? They already have long experience with the fact that the United States had difficulty detecting and verifying their failures to reduce precisely and in a timely fashion under previous treaties, and above all they know the United States can not enforce their compliance with important qualitative as well as quantitative provisions of existing treaties after all.

Indeed, we ought to ask ourselves: why would the Soviets ever agree to an arms treaty appearing so greatly disadvantageous to themselves, after repeatedly seeking unilateral advantage for themselves in all past treaties? Should we not be suspicious that the proposed INF terms appear too good to be true? Are we prepared to base the security of NATO and indeed our own future security on the mere hope that Gorbachev is somehow different from all past Soviet leaders?

On the basis of confirmed cheating on all existing arms treaties, if an INF Treaty is ever ratified, the Soviets may pretend to give up their detected INF and SRINF launchers and missiles, under the guise of grudgingly dismantling only some. The Intelligence Community, including even the CIA, reportedly believes that it will be impossible to effectively verify Soviet compliance with INF Treaty constraints on mobile missiles. The uncertainties of monitoring and verification will be too great. Finally, it will certainly be impossible to enforce Soviet compliance even if cheating is ever detected and verified.

But there is evidence that the Soviets already could have a duplicate set of these LR/SRINF mobile missile forces, comprised of a huge number of refire missiles secretly stockpiled together with compatible launchers. The past Soviet record of clever deception, and stubborn circumvention and violation, suggests that they will try to keep their duplicate covert set of LR/SRINF forces. The Soviet advantages of about 14 to 1 with detected forces in these categories would even allow them to give up some of their overwhelming advantages, in order to wipe out all U.S. Pershing IIs and GLCMs. Thus, taking account of the secretly stockpiled duplicate set of covert forces, the Soviet advantages could even increase to 12 to *zero* under an INF Treaty.

According to *Soviet Military Power* 1987: "In the Soviet view, their preponderance of power in conventional forces means the West must rely to a significant extent on nuclear weapons to deter a major conventional attack." A longstanding Soviet foreign policy goal has thus been to diminish NATO's nuclear capability to deter

the Warsaw Pact's conventional attack potential. Therefore, even if an INF Treaty truly abolishing *all* INF and SRINF missiles on both sides can be negotiated, signed, ratified, effectively verified, and enforced, NATO would still require some means of U.S. deterrence of Soviet intercontinental nuclear forces that are excess to their intercontinental mission requirements, and of the Soviet 4 to 1 armored strike force conventional superiority.

Moreover, there needs to be some means to deter the even more important Soviet superiority in Chemical and Biological Warfare capabilities, both offensive and defensive. As President Reagan stated in his March 1987 Report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations: "Neither NATO retaliatory nor defensive programs can begin to match the Soviet effort . . . in the production, transfer, and use of chemical and toxic substances for hostile purposes . . . and [in] maintaining an offensive biological warfare program and capability." Thus U.S. intercontinental strategic forces would clearly have to be strongly bolstered in the event of the ratification of an INF Treaty. Fortunately, intercontinental strategic forces have the advantages of traditionally having been the cheapest forces to procure, maintain, and operate. Non-constrained INF forces would also have to be bolstered.

THE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING EQUALITY AND MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE

U.S.-Soviet LR/SRINF equality—equal levels of forces and rights—is harmful if overall deterrence is to be maintained, but even such equality may be impossible to achieve. This is mainly because equality does not now exist, and the Soviets are not known for their willingness to reduce their advantages. Instead, they are known for achieving and expanding their advantages.

There are several reasons why even equality itself as a goal in INF forces could be questioned. The U.S. NATO strategy has traditionally depended upon U.S. intercontinental and theater nuclear *superiority* for deterrence of Soviet aggression against NATO to be assured. But today in intercontinental strategic forces, the Soviets have an overwhelming 6 or even 10 to 1 advantage in offensive first strike capability, and an emerging monopoly on nationwide ABM defenses. These advantages severely weaken the credibility of U.S. retaliatory deterrence at all levels—intercontinental, theater nuclear, and conventional. The U.S. "nuclear umbrella" thus no longer exists.

U.S. agreement even to LR/SRINF nuclear *equality* at "global double zero" for NATO against the Soviet Union is itself already a significant concession. Moreover, while the Soviets only need intercontinental nuclear parity to checkmate the U.S. intercontinental nuclear umbrella, they have already achieved intercontinental and threater nuclear superiority as well, and they have always been trying to decouple, denuclearize, and dissolve NATO. But now both the Soviet's intercontinental and theater nuclear superiorities are even greater than their traditional postwar 4 to 1 conventional superiority, which U.S. intercontinental and theater nuclear superiority was originally designed to deter. Thus given U.S. strategic intercontinental and NATO conventional inferiorities, the United

States and NATO could still be at a grave disadvantage even with INF equality, especially if equality is at level zero.

The credibility of deterrence is what is at stake in an INF Treaty.

FOLDING THE U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA WEAKENS DETERRENCE

The United States and the NATO nations have been grossly inferior to Soviet conventional forces for 42 years—ever since the Western Democracies demobilized as World War II ended. This Western conventional inferiority is now well over 4 to 1 in Soviet favor. Because of this longstanding Western conventional inferiority, Henry Kissinger correctly told NATO in 1979 that: "The United States throughout the postwar period has been more dependent on its strategic forces than the Soviet Union has been on its own." As noted, the Soviets have only needed intercontinental and theater nuclear parity to checkmate the deterrent effect of the U.S. intercontinental nuclear umbrella against the Soviet conventional superiority. But as the United States allowed the Soviet intercontinental strategic superiority to grow relentlessly and to eventually reach supremacy, the United States was in effect folding its nuclear umbrella under which our allies were to be sheltered.

This U.S. nuclear dependence stems from the inability of the Western Democracies to compete with the Soviet Union in conventional forces, which are much more expensive than nuclear forces. The Soviets have always realized this NATO dependence on the U.S. intercontinental nuclear umbrella, so the Soviets have long tried to *decouple* both the U.S. intercontinental and theater nuclear umbrellas from the NATO alliance since its inception in 1949. They have also long tried to *denuclearize* NATO, and to *dissolve* it by stimulating division. The INF Treaty may weaken deterrence and realize these Soviet foreign policy goals.

For these reasons, French Defense Minister Andre Giraud has termed an INF Treaty a "European nuclear Munich." Outgoing SACEUR General Bernard Rogers, former President Nixon, and former Presidential national security advisors Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, are all opposed to an INF Treaty for the same reasons—it tends to decouple the U.S. intercontinental and theater nuclear deterrents from NATO, and it tends to denuclearize NATO, when U.S. nuclear "flexible response" forces are the main deterrent to the overwhelming Soviet 4 to 1 conventional superiority. These Statesmen are worried that the INF Treaty will weaken the credibility of U.S. deterrence.

Further questions and answers:

Will the INF Treaty tend to decouple the U.S. intercontinental and theater nuclear deterrents from NATO, tend to denuclearize NATO, and cause division within NATO? I believe that it will.

Are these fundamental Soviet foreign policy objectives? Yes, the INF Treaty may actually serve to further Soviet foreign policy objectives.

How do Soviet intercontinental offensive and defensive superiorities affect NATO security already, absent an INF Treaty? The Soviet strategic superiority over the United States means that the

U.S. strategic deterrent is not credible as a deterrent to Soviet aggression against NATO.

How can deterrence of Soviet intercontinental and conventional superiorities be maintained with an INF Treaty? Deterrence will be severely weakened by the INF Treaty.

PREVIOUS U.S. UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT IN NATO WEAKENS DETERRENCE

For every tactical nuclear warhead the United States recently has unilaterally withdrawn from NATO since the beginning of the Reagan Administration, the Soviets have deployed *two* new ones. Under the current NATO "Montebello" plan, the United States will have unilaterally withdrawn 2,500 nuclear warheads, or almost 5 warheads withdrawn for every one of the 572 U.S. Pershing II and GLCM warheads planned to be deployed. Thus the total number of U.S. warheads in Europe is at the lowest level in 20 years—reportedly about 4,000.

The INF Treaty could thus actually *increase* the Soviet military threat to NATO, by accentuating the longstanding U.S. unilateral nuclear disarmament trend in NATO. The Soviets already have an overwhelming 14 to 1 advantage in LRINF SS-20-type IRBM warheads, and a 12 to 1 advantage in SRINF missiles. Even if these forces were ever actually reduced to equal low levels or to zero, *the Soviets could still retain a 5 to 1 advantage in INF aircraft and a 10 to 1 advantage in nuclear delivery artillery.* If the Soviets were to fully comply with the INF Treaty, they could maintain about a 7 to 1 advantage in non-constrained INF forces, dual-capable aircraft and artillery. But if the Soviets were to maintain a covert force of LR/SRINF missiles, their IRBM warhead advantage might increase from 14 to 1 to 10 to 0. With no U.S. LRINF or SRINF forces to deter the Soviets' 4 to 1 conventional advantage, the overall Soviet military threat to NATO would actually increase, making Europe safe for conventional war. In addition, the overwhelming Soviet intercontinental 10 to 1 offensive first strike advantage and the emerging Soviet monopoly on nationwide ABM defenses would remain. As former ACDA Director Eugene Rostow ominously asked recently: "Is the West under the pressure of *nuclear blackmail*?" The clear answer is yes.

The NATO allies could have only one of two choices after the INF Treaty: further accommodation with the Soviets leading to further Finlandization; or a massive NATO conventional force buildup. Due to the enormous expense of conventional weapons, NATO is more likely to prefer continued appeasement.

Further questions:

Will the INF Treaty increase the overall Soviet military threat to NATO, by reducing the U.S. theater nuclear deterrent still further at a time when the United States is also seriously inferior to the Soviets in intercontinental nuclear forces? Unfortunately, the INF Treaty will increase the military threat to NATO.

How will Soviet conventional and theater nuclear advantages continue to be deterred under an INF Treaty? Deterrence will be severely weakened.

Will the comparative Soviet intercontinental nuclear and conventional advantages be greater after such a treaty? Yes, if the Soviet maintain covert INF forces, of which there is strong evidence already.

If the treaty did not increase Soviet advantages, then what would be the Soviet incentive to agree to such a treaty, especially one containing obligations for grossly asymmetrical 4 to 1 reductions on their part, or to comply with it once it went into force? The only reason the Soviets agreed to the INF Treaty was to increase their military advantages, by almost totally wiping out the U.S. INF deterrent, while they maintained covert INF forces.

The INF Treaty Requires Conventional Parity To Preserve Deterrence

The United States and NATO must maintain a strong nuclear deterrent, in order to preserve deterrence against Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional force advantages. We need our nuclear deterrent, unless we can achieve negotiated parity in NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Because the proposed INF Treaty removes the main U.S. nuclear deterrent, it can only be acceptable if accompanied by negotiated Soviet/Warsaw Pact reductions to parity in conventional forces. That is why I would support an amendment to the INF Treaty calling for negotiated reductions to conventional parity.

DETERRING SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY

In conventional forces, the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact have an overall conventional advantage over NATO of at least 3 to 1. The specific comparisons, as computed from unclassified Defense Department estimates, are as follows:

1. Soviet/Warsaw Pact 2 to 1 advantage in Main Battle Tanks;
2. Soviet/Warsaw Pact 2.3 to 1 advantage in Heavy Artillery;
3. Soviet/Warsaw Pact 1.3 to 1 advantage in Armored Personnel Carriers;
4. Soviet/Warsaw Pact 1.2 to 1 advantage in Tactical Aircraft;
5. Soviet/Warsaw Pact 2.4 to 1 advantage in Interceptor Aircraft;
6. Soviet/Warsaw Pact 6 to 1 advantage in Intermediate Range Bombers;
7. Soviet/Warsaw Pact 25 to 1 advantage in Chemical Decontamination Equipment;
8. Soviet/Warsaw Pact advantage of 700,000 tons to 0 in Modern Deliverable Chemical Munitions.

The Pershing II nuclear deterrent was the shield that prevented these conventional force imbalances from becoming decisive. Instead of massive spending for more conventional arms to try to counterbalance these huge Soviet/Warsaw Pact advantages, the United States and NATO deployed the Pershing II and GLCM INF in late 1983.

Soviet Military Power 1987 states: "In the Soviet view, their preponderance of power in conventional forces means the West must rely to a significant extent on *nuclear* weapons to deter a major conventional attack." This means that if the INF Treaty deprives

us of our nuclear deterrent, we can only deter aggression if NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces are equal.

THE U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA IS NOT CREDIBLE

As noted, Dr. Henry Kissinger correctly told a NATO audience in 1979 that: "The United States throughout the postwar period has been *more dependent* on its strategic forces than the Soviet Union has been on its own." This U.S. strategic force dependence is called the U.S. "nuclear umbrella." But in the overall strategic nuclear intercontinental comparison, the Soviets have about 3,000 more nuclear warheads than the United States, counting the military effects of their many SALT violations. More significantly, the Soviets have about a 6 or even 10 to 1 advantage over the United States in ICBM capability, giving them an offensive first strike capability. The Soviets also have an emerging nationwide ABM capability prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Thus in the overall strategic nuclear intercontinental comparison, the balance has shifted strongly against the United States, making the so-called U.S. "nuclear umbrella" strategy to deter Soviet/Warsaw Pact aggression against NATO a non-credible strategy.

The Pershing II is the principal U.S. deterrent weapon, because only this weapon has the speed, accuracy, and yield to attack targets of great value to the Soviet leadership—themselves—in the Kremlin and the leadership underground command bunkers near Moscow. By eliminating the Pershing II, the INF Treaty makes impossible U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Soviet conventional force supremacy. Hence we need negotiated conventional force parity if the INF Treaty is going to be acceptable.

PERSHING ALSO DETERS SOVIET CBW THREAT

President Reagan stated to Congress in March, 1987, that: "Neither NATO *retaliatory* nor defensive programs can begin to match the Soviet effort . . . in the production, transfer, and use of chemical and toxic substances for hostile purposes . . . and in maintaining an offensive biological warfare program and capability."

The Soviets will develop genetic engineering weapons as an asymmetrical response to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, a Soviet official stated recently.

The principal NATO deterrent to Soviet Chemical-Biological-Warfare capabilities is also the U.S. nuclear capability in NATO—especially the Pershing II. As noted, the Pershing II is the principal U.S. deterrent weapon in NATO, but this weapon will be eliminated by the INF Treaty. The Pershing II is the only system that will meet the NATO deterrent guidelines, by being able to strike key targets quickly and accurately deep inside the Soviet Union. What is the effect on the credibility of deterrence of the required removal under the INF Treaty of the Pershing IIs if no remaining systems can replace their capability? By eliminating the Pershing II, the INF Treaty also cripples the NATO ability to deter Soviet CBW capabilities.

SOVIET/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY CANNOT BE DETERRED WITHOUT PERSHING II

In NATO exercises and war games, SACEUR has to seek nuclear release authority within two weeks after a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on NATO. What nuclear forces would SACEUR have to deter Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional aggression after the INF Treaty wipes out our Pershing IIs and GLCM INF forces?

Here is an unclassified listing of NATO nuclear warheads *remaining* after the Montebello decision to reduce NATO nuclear warheads from 7,000 to 4,600, and after the INF Treaty requiring the further reduction to 4,000 warheads:

1. Nuclear artillery rounds (source—IISS), about 2,100.
2. Lance missiles, about 80.
3. Land and sea mines, probably about 1,000.
4. Dual-capable aircraft, about 620.
5. F-111 fighter-bombers, about 200.

Total, about 4,000.

But none of the above systems have the range, swiftness, accuracy, and megatonnage of the key NATO nuclear deterrent system, the Pershing II. Only the F-111 could possibly substitute for the Pershing II to strike key Command, Control, and Leadership targets deep inside the Soviet Union, but it has a radius of only 300 miles unrefueled, and 1,000 miles refueled. Moreover, Soviet-Warsaw Pact air defense capability has increased greatly since the NATO "dual track" decision of 1979, when the decision was made to supplement the F-111s with the Pershing IIs. Under the INF Treaty, what does NATO have that can go past 300 miles range, unless we can refuel F-111s in conflict, and it can penetrate?

Are these 4,000 NATO warheads left, most of which have either no range, or very short range, a credible deterrent to the Soviets? Was the Montebello reduction of about 2,400 warheads reciprocated by the Soviets? Did it represent unilateral reduction, and already contribute to denuclearization of NATO?

It is clear that the Pershing II is the only system that will meet the NATO deterrent guidelines, by being able to strike key targets quickly and accurately deep inside the Soviet Union. What is the effect on the credibility of deterrence of the removal of the Pershing IIs, when no remaining system can replace their capability?

There are grave dangers in relying on 400 SLBMs dedicated to SACEUR for NATO deterrence of the Warsaw Pact. The use of strategic intercontinental weapons for theater deterrence purposes is extremely dangerous for the United States, and not credible to the Soviets. Such reliance also dangerously increases the already severe U.S. strategic intercontinental inferiority to the Soviets.

INF TREATY MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY CONVENTIONAL PARITY

In sum, Germany, both East and West, could become a conventional and nuclear "free fire zone" under the INF Treaty.

If the Pershing II is the main NATO deterrent weapon, the INF Treaty by removing this weapon takes away the very basis of deterrence. The INF Treaty puts NATO on a slippery slope leading toward the denuclearization of Western Europe, which has been a fundamental objective of Soviet foreign policy since 1945. The denu-

clearization of Western Europe would make the region safe for Soviet conventional aggression, and result in the neutralization of Western Europe due to the threat of Warsaw Pact conventional might. Under the INF Treaty, NATO sacrifices the credibility of its deterrent.

The only way that the INF Treaty can be made acceptable and deterrence maintained is for it to be accompanied by negotiations requiring NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional force parity.

BOLSTERING DETERRENCE BY REPLACING THE SACEUR PERSHING IIS AND POSEIDONS WITH STOCKPILED MINUTEMAN IIIS, SLCMS, AND INF AIRCRAFT

The United States will have to dismantle all Pershing II MRBMs and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles under the INF Treaty. This reduction should be compensated for, in order to preserve deterrence. Moreover, the INF Treaty will clearly make the United States and NATO even more reliant on the 400 Poseidon SLBM warheads long dedicated to SACEUR. If the INF Treaty is ever ratified, these 400 Poseidon warheads should be taken out of the intercontinental force count. These Poseidon warheads never should have been counted in the United States intercontinental forces in the first place. Thus,we may need to replace them.

Perhaps the 200 net additional Minuteman III warheads deployed from the retrofit of the 100 stockpiled Minuteman III into Minuteman II silos might help to compensate. Additional U.S. intercontinental nuclear force capabilities will surely be required under the INF Treaty. Moreover, we may need to augment our unconstrained offshore Submarine Launched Cruise Missile forces, and also our INF air forces in NATO.

Further question:

What proposals are being prepared for added U.S. intercontinental unconstrained theater, and offshore strategic forces in the event of ratification of the INF Treaty? This should be a topic of highest priority for our defense leaders to address. Unfortunately, there is little to suggest that such proposals are being seriously considered.

ESTABLISHING REDUCTION BASELINES AND VERIFIABILITY MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE

Effective INF verifiability will be even more difficult to achieve than equality and deterrence. But effective verification is the only way to achieve equality. *Thus equality and verifiability are integrally linked principles.* One of our main problems is that we do not even confidently know the INF and SRINF baselines from which reductions would begin. Soviet deception is the main cause of our baseline and verification problems.

SOVIET MASKIROVKA

The Soviets term their massive, nationwide program of camouflage, concealment, and deception "Maskirovka." A world renowned verification expert, William R. Harris, has written recently that unlimited Soviet Maskirovka is "an act of war."

The CIA reportedly believes that reduction constraints on SS-20 IRBMs are "impossible" to verify confidently, because the launch-

ers are mobile, and heavily camouflaged and concealed. Indeed, 36 out of 441 detected SS–20 launchers are known to exist but are currently *"unlocated."* At least 9 more SS–20 launchers are estimated for future deployment but are also undetected. Some SS–20 bases and launchers have reportedly only been detected fortuitously, after long delays from initial deployment, due to the effectiveness of Soviet "Maskirovka"—camouflage, concealment, and deception. CIA uncertainties are great.

Further questions:

How well can SS–20 reduction constraints be verified, with Soviet Maskirovka allowed? Monitoring will be extremely difficult, and verifiability will reportedly be 1 chance in 10 of detecting Soviet covert INF missiles.

Given the encryption of almost all SS–20 electronic telemetry during all of its flight-testing and the reported active Soviet jamming of U.S. National Technical Means of verification, how confident can we be of the SS–20's characteristics and the characteristics of its follow-on? Not very confident at all.

Will the Soviets agree to a complete ban on Maskirovka? Instead of banning Maskirovka, the INF Treaty actually fully legitimizes Maskirovka.

SOVIET COMMITMENT TO NEW LR/SRINF MOBILE MISSILE FORCE STRUCTURES

The Soviets will be very reluctant to actually ever dismantle *any* of their declared 1,752 new SS–12, SS–20, SS–23, and SS–C–4 mobile missile forces. The Soviets may ostensibly agree to such dismantling, but it is doubtful that they would ever actually accomplish such dismantling either completely or on time.

This is because *the Soviets have out-produced the United States 5 to 1 over the last ten years in IRBMs and MRBMs.* These new missiles, together with their extensive production and support infrastructures, represent a huge investment. An even newer, more accurate version of the SS–20 has even now completed its flight-testing, and is reportedly being mass produced and deployed. These factors strongly suggest a long term Soviet commitment to retain a substantial SS–20 force, probably in a clandestine or covert deployment mode.

Moreover, we have actual experience with Soviet ICBM dismantlement practices under SALT I. Between March, 1976, and 1981, the Soviets were always well behind schedule in their required ICBM dismantling. They also *falsified* the status of this dismantling continuously. Their purpose was undoubtedly to calibrate the timeliness and accuracy of U.S. Intelligence monitoring capabilities, as well as to test American political will to enforce their compliance. Both U.S. NTMs and political will were seen to be weak.

Each of the 441 detected SS–20 launchers is believed to be equipped with at least 1 refire missile. Even the State Department has stated that: *"In addition* to the approximately 440 SS–20 missiles now deployed, there may be as many as *200–400 (or more)* such *missiles* in the U.S.S.R.'s inventory."

There is also public evidence that as many as *5 refire SS–20 missiles* were planned and actually produced for each SS–20 launcher. This would make a total of about 2,250 SS–20 missiles.

Moreover, press reports indicate that CIA estimates that there will eventually be about 450 mobile SS–25 ICBM launchers. These mobile launchers are reportedly capable of also launching SS–16 ICBMs, as well as the SS–20 IRBM, which is the first two stages of the SS–16. Thus the SS–25 mobile launcher is a triple threat launcher—it can launch two kinds of ICBMs, as well as the lighter SS–20 IRBM. By merely moving the possible 1,800 plus SS–20 refire missiles to SS–25 bases, where they could easily be fired by SS–25 mobile launchers, the Soviets could covertly reconstitute their ostensibly banned SS–20 force.

In fact, at least two mobile missile complexes which originally contained SS–20s, Yurya and Verkhnyaya Salda, have reportedly been converted to SS–25 complexes. Between 1984 and 1986, *both* SS–20s and SS–25 mobile launchers were reportedly present simultaneously at these and other complexes, a mixing of mobile IRBM and ICBM systems. *So the clear potential exists for a very substantial covert SS–20 force to be retained.* And the SS–20 follow-on missile has reportedly just finished its flight-testing program, and is being mass produced and deployed, indicating an intent to retain the SS–20 force.

Further questions:

How strong is the Soviet commitment to their new LRINF and SRINF missile forces? All the evidence indicates a strong Soviet commitment to retain their INF forces covertly.

Can U.S. Intelligence now confidently determine the baseline of existing, produced, or even deployed Soviet LRINF and SRINF missile forces, both launchers and missiles? No.

Why will the U.S. not gain on-site access to the 6 SS–25 bases capable of covertly launching SS–20s? Because the Soviet commitment to retain covert INF forces prevented Soviet agreement to "suspect site" inspections.

If 170 SS–4 MRBMs, some in silos, are to be dismantled, what will happen to the 2,300 SS–4s reportedly produced? These may be retained covertly.

What will happen to the 320 older SS–5s reportedly produced? These too may be retained covertly.

What will happen to the 200 SS–16s (the first two stages of the SS–20), and the variable-range, reportedly railmobile 2,200 SS–11s produced? These too may be retained covertly.

If the Soviets have already invested large resources in the procurement and deployment of these new and older missiles, and would have to spend even more to move and dismantle them, how strong would their incentive be to comply with any reductions, or especially with asymmetrical reductions? The Soviets appear to have a strong incentive to cheat by retaining covert INF forces.

The SRINF baseline problem is even more difficult. The U.S. claims that the Soviets have agreed that SRINF mobile missiles with ranges between 500 and 1000 kilometers will be abolished under the "global double zero." While the Soviet SS–12 Scaleboard (previously mistakenly designated SS–22 by the U.S.) has a range of about 900 kms., we have detected only about 120 of these launch-

ers deployed. But reportedly as many as 1,800 Scaleboard missiles have been produced.

The SS–23 problem is even more complex. While its range of 500 kms. would clearly cause it to be included in the SRINF forces to be dismantled, only about 20 have reportedly been detected as deployed. This is due to the fact that while the SS–23 was reportedly assessed to have been operational since 1981, its first operational deployment was not detected and confirmed until four years later, in 1985. This detection lag was largely due to its small size, and to massive Soviet camouflage and concealment. Finally, as many as 250 SS–23s have reportedly been produced.

SRINF reductions would be even more difficult to verify, because these systems are even smaller, more mobile, and thus easier to hide.

Further questions:

How well will we be able to verify reduction constraints on SRINF missiles, especially if Maskirovka is allowed? These constraints will be even more difficult to verify, because of the small size and ground forces associations of these missiles.

Can we confidently determine SRINF deployment, refire, and production baselines? No.

How do we evaluate Soviet incentive to comply with SRINF reduction constraints? Again, the Soviets have a strong incentive to cheat, and they have demonstrated their intention to cheat. The recent Soviet withdrawal of some SS–12 launchers and missiles from East Germany was a fraud, because when observers reportedly looked under the canvas over the railcars, there were no missiles being withdrawn.

NEED TO AUGMENT U.S. NTMS

Existing U.S. National Technical Means alone will not be sufficient to verify the proposed INF Treaty.

First, the U.S. Space Shuttle and other military space launch disasters have caused an on-going three-year stand-down in U.S. strategic reconnaissance launches, reportedly *accentuating existing U.S. deficiencies in search and spot capabilities.* There are even press reports that Soviet sabotage contributed to the U.S. space launch stand-down. Moreover, there are press reports that the "Indigo-Lacrosse" SAR satellite reconnaissance system was specifically designed to monitor mobile missiles. Yet because this system reportedly requires the now stood-down Space Shuttle for its launch, its reported first launch scheduled for October, 1986 has now been slipped past 1988, when Space Shuttle launches may resume. Thus the INF Treaty may be ratified without having in place the one NTM system specifically designed to monitor mobile missiles.

More significantly, strict co-operative verification measures should have been an agreed and specific part of the INF Treaty, such as: total prohibition of all Maskirovka measures like camouflage, concealment, and deception; "suspect site" on-site inspections on demand; missile "keep-out" zones; factory, storage, maintenance, and deployment complex "choke point" inspections on demand; missile "finger printing;" and a total prohibition on all te-

lemetry encryption and jamming. We especially needed on-site inspection the baseline Data Exchange even before the President signed the INF Treaty.

These intrusive and cooperation measures will certainly be necessary in synergism with *augmented* U.S. National Technical Means of verification, if we are to have any chance of effective verification and therefore equality in the INF Treaty.

Further questions:

What confidence building and co-operative verification measures need to be added to the Treaty? Some kind of limited suspect site inspections are being negotiated for START, and they are clearly also needed in the INF Treaty.

What are the prospects for Soviet agreement to these measures? The Soviets will never agree to even limited suspect site inspections, for fear that their covert INF forces will be seen.

What augmentations in U.S. National Technical Means will be required? Clearly, at least several billion a year for several years will be required for NTM augmentation.

What are our plans for augmented NTMs and instrusive verification measures? I will support Senator Boren's NTM supplemental package.

Are reports that Soviet sabotage contributed to the Shuttle and other space-launch disasters correct? There is reportedly evidence of Soviet sabotage in the many U.S. space disasters.

Are reports that these disasters have prevented planned augmentations of U.S. NTMs correct? There are press reports to this effect.

SOVIET RESISTANCE TO VERIFICATION

The Soviets did not agree to "suspect site" verification provisions, hoping to stampede the United States into accepting inadequate verification provisions at the last stage of the negotiation. But verification is crucial to achieving equality.

Further questions:

Did such a high pressure, last minute scenario on verification occur? Yes.

Could failure to achieve effective verification provisions make the treaty unacceptable? Yes.

SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS ARE AN OBSTACLE TO INF TREATY RATIFICATION

Finally, the Senate voted overwhelmingly in February, 1987, that existing Soviet SALT violations are "an important obstacle" to any new arms treaty, and the President informed Congress on March 10, 1987, that Soviet compliance with existing arms treaties was "an essential prerequisite" to any new arms treaty. The House of Representatives voted 418 to 0, and the Senate voted 93 to 0 that the Soviet Krasnoyarsk ABM radar was a clear violation of the ABM Treaty.

But Soviet SALT violations continue to expand. The Soviets have *not* corrected a *single one* of their confirmed SALT violations. There are reports that some new Soviet SALT violations are about to be confirmed. There is a serious question among Senators about the wisdom of the ratification of any new arms control treaties

with the Soviets if all their confirmed violations with existing arms control treaties remain uncorrected and in fact are even continuing to expand. Such ratification would be seen by the world and certainly by the Soviets as abject American appeasement. It would invite further Soviet nuclear blackmail.

I agree with the Senate and the President that expanding Soviet violations of existing treaties are an obstacle to ratification of the INF Treaty. Further, I am deeply concerned about the problem of the expanding pattern Soviet violations of existing treaties. I believe it would be an act of appeasement for the President to ratify a new arms control treaty with the Soviets, such as the proposed INF Treaty, while their violations of existing treaties remain uncorrected and continue to expand.

DIFFICULTY OF ENFORCING SOVIET COMPLIANCE

Even agreed, ironclad verification provisions will not ensure U.S. ability to enforce Soviet reduction compliance. If the Soviets think they can agree to sham reductions and then get away with even verified and confirmed violations, as they have in the past with the SALT Treaties, then the ratification of the proposed INF Treaty will become dangerous appeasement. Indeed, this whole exercise of negotiating an INF Treaty from such a position of extreme Western intercontinental nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional weakness can only invite further Soviet nuclear blackmail and intimidation designed to split NATO. And given the huge Soviet superiorities at every level, a crisis or even war could result if we ever could catch them cheating and tried to enforce their compliance.

In sum, there is an almost irresistable political and diplomatic momentum developing to sweep aside overwhelming Soviet intercontinental, theater nuclear, and conventional superiorities by merely agreeing to imaginary equalities and sham reductions. These sham reductions and imaginary equalities can never be verifiable, and the West will have a positive disincentive against ever trying to enforce Soviet compliance with the required reductions.

Further questions:

How likely is the possibility of Soviet agreement again to sham reductions, with which they again have no intention of ever complying? I believe that the INF Treaty represents Soviet agreement to sham reductions, while they maintain covert INF forces.

How could we ever verify and enforce Soviet INF compliance, if we can not even now enforce their SALT compliance? We could never enforce Soviet INF compliance, and the Soviets know this.

The Annex contains the following further sections of my additional views:

1. Critique of the Intelligence and Armed Services Committee Chairmen's Unclassified Reports on the Verifiability of the INF Treaty;

2. Summary History of Officially Confirmed Soviet Violations of International Security Treaties Since 1917;

3. New and Conclusive Evidence of Soviet Nationwide ABM Break Out.

ANNEX SECTION I

SUMMARY HISTORY OF OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY TREATIES SINCE 1917—BROKEN PIE CRUSTS

President Reagan stated correctly in his March 10, 1987 sixth Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements that:

> Compliance with past arms control commitments is an *essential prerequisite* for *future* arms control agreements.

Then on December 1, 1987, President Reagan in his seventh Report to Congress confirmed a serious *new* Soviet ABM Treaty violation to Congress. In this seventh report, President Reagan also stated that:

> Compliance with treaty obligations is a cornerstone of international law . . .

But in direct contrast to President Reagan's profoundly important emphasis on the requirement for compliance, Soviet leader Lenin himself once succinctly summed up Soviet diplomacy and the Bolshevik approach to treaties, when in 1918 he stated that: "Promises are like pie crusts, made to be broken."

Because President Reagan and another Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, have now signed a new arms control treaty, perhaps we should take both Reagan and Lenin at their word.

COMPLIANCE AND THE INF TREATY

The fundamental issue in the impending Senate advice and consent debate over the proposed treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces therefore boils down to a very simple question:

Should two-thirds of the United States Senate give its advice and consent for the President to ratify any new treaty with the Soviet Union, when the grim facts of Soviet diplomatic history suggest that the Soviets will not, and are never going to, comply with all the old treaties?

Was President Reagan correctly predicting the Senate's deliberations when he stated that there can be no new arms treaty until the Soviets comply with the old treaties? Is it likely that two-thirds of the Senate will give its advice and consent to a new arms treaty while the Soviets are increasing their violations of all the existing ones? Lenin also seems correct when he predicted that the Soviet Union would never comply with treaties.

Thus the Senate must directly confront the fundamental issue—what good are arms control treaties if they are not complied with by the Soviets? Do Soviet-violated arms treaties inevitably become exercises in U.S. unilateral disarmament? Does the history of the unilateral disarmament of the Western democracies in the 1920s and 1930s demonstrate that unilateral disarmament inevitably becomes appeasement, and appeasement of totalitarian dictators leads only to instability, aggression, and eventually either to enslavement or war?

Like the arms control treaty violations of Hitler's Nazis, the record of Soviet violations of international security treaties since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 is long, grisly, and tragic.

The historical record shows that the Soviet Union has violated virtually every single international security treaty it has ever signed, except one—the Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 23, 1939. But the Hitler-Stalin Pact, with which the Soviet Union complied scrupulously, was the catalyst for World War Two.

Later I will examine in detail the grim history of international security treaties signed by the Soviets and later broken by the Soviets. But before I begin this grim litany of Soviet treaty violations, I can summarize from these cumulative facts of diplomatic history and from careful case studies of the Soviet approach to treaties the fact that the Soviets usually sign treaties fully intending to violate them from the very moment of their signature. The Marxist-Leninist ideology which motivates the Communist Party elite and attempts to legitimize the Soviet dictatorship requires this approach to treaties.

There are alarming press reports that President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev have signed an INF Treaty that Gorbachev has *already violated*, by failing to provide required verification data, by forging several required photographs of their INF missiles, by providing false verification data on the numbers and locations of their INF missiles, and by covertly mixing the banned SS–20 mobile IRBMs with the almost identical SS–25 mobile ICBMs that are outside of the Treaty. In fact, there is unclassified evidence that all of these negotiating deceptions and violations have already occurred.

Here is what President Reagan said about the credibility of Soviet diplomacy just after the Soviets brutally shot down Korean Airlines Flight 007 murdering 269 innocent passengers, including the Honorable Congressman Larry MacDonald:

> What can be said about Soviet credibility when they so flagrantly lie? What can be the scope of legitimate mutual discourse with a state whose values permit such atrocities? And what are we to think of a regime which establishes one set of standards for itself and another for the rest of mankind?

In addition to reciting the litany of official U.S. Government findings of Soviet treaty violations since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, I would like to call attention to two documents. The first is *The President's December 1, 1987, Unclassified Report On Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements,* and the second is the Dissenting Views to the Report by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives entitled "Intelligence Support To Arms Control." These two most recent documents merely provide current and official support for the proposition that it is dangerous to sign new treaties with the Soviets, because they have not complied with any of the old ones.

It may not matter what the terms of an agreement are if the Soviet Union will not be held to comply with them by either the United States or the world community. The fact that the Soviet Union will not be held to comply with the new INF Treaty may be

clearly signaled by the fact that President Reagan signed this new treaty despite repeated and uncorrected Soviet violations to all prior treaties. This fact may have been driven home to the Soviets by the signing of the new INF Treaty only seven days after President Reagan delivered his newest, seventh report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations, which stated: "The Soviet Union to date has not corrected its noncompliance activity. Indeed, since the last report [as recent as March 10, 1987], there has been an *additional case* of Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty . . ."

The best summation of the Soviet attitude toward treaties was given by Soviet leaders themselves. As noted, Lenin stated that "Promises are like pie crusts, made to be broken." Lenin also coldly admitted shortly after the March, 1918 Soviet-German peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk that: "Yes, of course we are violating the treaty. We have already violated it 30 or 40 times." But Joseph Stalin most succinctly summarized Soviet diplomacy, when he made the famous statement that:

> Words have no relation to actions—otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.

If Soviet leader Gorbachev's "glasnost" and "perestroika" policies made him a different kind of Soviet leader, perhaps the Soviet Union would not be increasing its violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty on the very eve of the Pearl Harbor Summit, as President Reagan has just confirmed to Congress.

Indeed, there is evidence that Gorbachev is no different from all the rest of the Soviet leaders before him. Not only did he have a long career in the KGB, but he resorted to murder to destroy his rivals and become Soviet General Secretary. Gorbachev's so-called reformist policies have only one fundamental objective—to make the Soviet Union more effective in its quest for domination over the United States.

OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTATION OF SOVIET TREATY VIOLATIONS

Thirty three years ago, on August 1, 1955, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary filed an important official report on Soviet treaty violations. This report was followed by similar Senate Judiciary Committee reports on January 1, 1959, and January 1, 1964. The Department of Defense made a similar official report on Soviet treaty violations on November 5, 1962.

These four official reports covered more than 150 Soviet international security treaty violations from 1917 through 1964.

But then, *for the next 20 years, there was total, complete official blackout of the news of Soviet treaty violations.*

On January 23, 1984, that official, U.S. Government cover-up ended with President Reagan's first report to Congress on Soviet SALT Violations. That first report established Ronald Reagan as the first President to have the courage to officially and publicly accuse the Soviet Union of violating SALT treaties.

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It was a historic report, because it broke the 20 year silence from official Washington on Soviet violations of international security treaties.

Since that January 23, 1984, historic Presidential Report to Congress on Soviet SALT Violations, there have been six more, for a total of seven official reports to Congress on Soviet SALT cheating. These reports establish a still-expanding pattern of over 50 Soviet violations of SALT and other arms control treaties.

These *seven* Reagan Administration reports, together with the previous *four* 1955–1964 reports from both the legislative and the executive branches, are of real significance for U.S. security and world peace. Without Soviet compliance with arms control and international security treaties, there can be no order in international relations and no reliable security arrangements not wholly based on military might.

In sum, now there is a total of *eleven* official U.S. Government reports to Congress confirming over *200* Soviet international security treaty violations. These official reports establish the fact that the Soviets *always* have cheated on their solemn legal commitments to comply with international security treaties.

Soviet noncompliance with treaties will inevitably increase the risk of war. That is why the chief American arms control negotiator in Geneva, our distinguished Ambassador Max Kampelman, himself stated recently that:

> It is essential in our negotiations in Geneva that we highlight the issue of Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements, even though they will yell like stuck pigs.

But as Lenin stated in 1916,

> Every peace program is a deception . . . unless its principal object is . . . the revolutionary struggle.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS 1920 THROUGH 1960

Now there is need to recite the chronological history of these officially confirmed Soviet treaty violations, which is appropriate now that President Reagan and Gorbachev have signed a new treaty. Here is a list of the most important Soviet violations of international security treaties between 1920 and 1960, as summarized from the official 1962 Defense Department report:

1. On May 7, 1920, the new Soviet regime signed a treaty with the independent Georgian Republic, pledging no interference in Georgia's internal affairs. The Soviet violation: On February 11 and 12, 1921, Soviet troops invaded Georgia, in a step leading to the absorption of the Republic into the USSR.

2. On March 16, 1921, in a trade agreement with Britain, the Soviet Union pledged not to engage in propaganda in Britain. The Soviet violation: On May 26, 1927, Britain ended the agreement because of Soviet violations, including Soviet failure to stop propaganda inside Britain as promised.

3. On June 5, 1922, the Soviet Union concluded a friendship agreement with Czechoslovakia. The Soviet violation: On June 29,

1945, the USSR compelled Czechoslovakia to cede the Carpatho-Ukraine to the Soviet Union.

4. On December 12, 1943, the USSR and the Czech Government-in-exile signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. The Soviet violation: On February 25, 1948, the Czechoslovakian Government was forced to accept a Communist ultimatum as the Soviet Union completed arrangements to force the country into its satellite empire. The Soviet ultimatum compelled the appointment of a cabinet of Moscow followers, and it climaxed the Soviet post-war drive to absorb the once-independent Czechoslovakia.

5. On December 17, 1925, the USSR signed a nonaggression and neutrality pact with Turkey. The Soviet violation: On March 20, 1945, the USSR denounced this pact, and began a campaign to secure control of the Black Sea straits.

6. On August 31, 1926, the Soviet Union concluded a nonaggression pact with Afghanistan. The Soviet violation: On June 14, 1946, the USSR forced Afghanistan to cede the border territory of Kishka.

7. On September 28, 1926, the Soviet Union made a nonaggression pact with Lithuania, later extending the agreement through 1945. The Soviet violation: On June 15, 1940, Soviet troops invaded Lithuania. On August 8, 1940, Lithuania was annexed by the Soviet Union.

8. On September 27, 1928, the Soviet Union adhered to the Kellog-Briand pact for the renunciation of war. The Soviet violation: The Soviet Union violated this pledge by their 1939–40 invasions of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, and Finland.

9. On January 21, 1932, the USSR agreed to a nonaggression pact with Finland. The Soviet violation: On November 30, 1939, Soviet military forces invaded Finland.

10. On February 5, 1932, the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Latvia. The Soviet violation: On June 16, 1940, Soviet troops invaded Latvia.

11. On May 4, 1932, the Soviet Union pledged nonaggression in an agreement with Estonia. The Soviet violation: On June 16, 1940, Soviet military forces invaded and occupied Estonia.

12. On July 25, 1932, the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Poland. The Soviet violation: On September 17, 1939, Soviet troops invaded Poland.

13. On May 8, 1934, the USSR and Poland extended their nonaggression pact for ten years. The Soviet violation: On September 29, 1939, the USSR signed an agreement with Nazi Germany to partition Poland.

14. On June 9, 1934, the USSR agreed to recognize Romania, and to guarantee her sovereignty. The Soviet violation: On June 27, 1940, the Soviet army invaded and occupied the Romanian provinces of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

15. On September 15, 1934, the USSR entered the League of Nations, pledging thereby "the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another." The Soviet violation: On August 23, 1939, the USSR made a treaty with Nazi Germany, termed "a joint conspiracy" to deprive Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Romania of their independence and territorial integrity.

16. On August 31, 1937, the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with the Republic of China. The Soviet violation: On October 2, 1940, the USSR broke relations with the Republic of China, after recognizing the Communist Chinese regime it helped to eventually gain power in 1948.

17. On July 30, 1941, the USSR concluded an agreement with the Polish Government-in-exile, pledging mutual aid and cooperation. The Soviet violation: On April 28, 1943, the USSR broke its relations with the Polish Government-in-exile, on the pretext of the Polish request for a Red Cross investigation of the Katyn Forest Massacre.

18. On September 24, 1941, the Soviet Union pledged adherence to the Atlantic Charter, which provided that agreeing countries seek no aggrandizement, that the countries desired no territorial changes not made with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned, and that they respected the right of all peoples to choose their own government. The Soviet violation: Against these promises stands the Soviet Union's record of occupation and domination of Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Tannu Tuva, Afghanistan territory, Hungary, East Germany, Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, North Korea, and Mongolia.

19. On January 29, 1942, the Soviet Union, with Iran and Britain, signed a treaty of alliance, providing for the military use of Iranian territory only until the end of military operations against Germany. The Soviet violation: The Soviet Union refused to withdraw its troops from Iran at the end of World War Two.

20. On February 4–11, 1945, at the Yalta Conference, the USSR agreed on various postwar measures, including adoption of a resolution that the liberated peoples of Europe should have the opportunity to solve their economic problems by democratic means. The Soviet violation: In violation of this agreement stands the USSR's record of domination in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and other countries which were forced into postwar roles as satellites of the Soviet Union.

21. On February 11, 1945, the USSR at the Yalta Conference, agreed to a declaration that the Polish provisional government "shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot." The Soviet violation: On January 5, 1947, the Soviet Union refused to participate in the meeting with the United States and Britain to secure compliance with the 1945 agreement pledging free elections in Poland.

22. On April 11, 1945, the USSR signed a 20 year treaty of friendship, mutual aid, and cooperation with Yugoslavia. The Soviet violation: On September 29, 1949, the USSR denounced this agreement.

23. On June 14–18, 1945, President Truman and Premier Stalin agreed, in an exchange of letters, to "free access by air, road, and rail, from Frankfurt and Bremen to Berlin for U.S. forces." The Soviet violation: From April 1, 1948, to May 12, 1949, the Soviet Union imposed the Berlin Blockade by severing all land and water routes between Berlin and West Germany. The Western Allies supplied Berlin by airlift. In March, 1962, the Soviet Union harassed flights by Allied airplanes between Berlin and West Germany.

24. On July 17 to August 2, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, the USSR agreed that there should be uniform treatment of the German people throughout Germany. The Soviet violation: East Germany today continues to be a rigidly controlled Soviet satellite. Its people have been denied free elections, have been isolated from the people of West Germany, and have been victimized by the same kind of regimentation, police rule, and economic restrictions imposed on the people of the Soviet Bloc states in Europe.

25. On August 14, 1945, the Soviet Union entered into the treaty with the Republic of China, containing these pledges: "Each high contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take any part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party . . . the treaty comes into force immediately . . . and shall remain in force for a term of 30 years." The Soviet violation: On February 14, 1950, these pledges were broken when the USSR made a new agreement with the Communist Chinese regime it had helped to create. The Soviets did not even bother to change the basic wording. The new treaty also pledges: "Both high contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliance against the other high contracting party and not to take part in any coalition or actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party . . . The present treaty will be valid for 30 years."

26. On March 10, 1947, the Soviet Council of Ministers, meeting in Moscow, agreed that all German prisoners of war should be repatriated by December 31, 1948. The Soviet violation: On August 3, 1955, the Soviets furnished the West German Red Cross with data on the health and whereabouts of only 20 of the approximately 14,000 Germans known to be still held in the USSR.

27. On May 4 and June 20, 1949, Four Power Agreements of New York and Paris guarantee the United States, British, French, and Soviet joint control of Berlin, all access routes to and from the city, and freedom of movement within the city. The Soviet violation: On September 20, 1955, the USSR unilaterally transferred Soviet control over all access routes to and from Berlin to the East German regime.

28. On July 27, 1956, the military armistice was established between the United Nations command and opposing Communist forces of North Korea and China, assisted by the USSR. The Armistice Agreement pledged signers to "cease introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel." The Soviet violation: On July 11, 1956, the United Nations command detailed a long list of armistice agreement violations by Communist parties. On May 6, 1957, the U.N. command, in another series of official complaints, charged that the Communists had sent troops into Korea's demilitarized zone six times in a period of less than 4 months.

29. On January 14, 1956, the USSR signed an agreement with Yugoslavia, pledging $110 million in credits for industrial construction. On August 4, 1956, the USSR pledged an additional grant of $175 million, bringing the total to $285 million. The Soviet violation: On May 28, 1958, Yugoslav sources disclosed that the Soviet Union had postponed for five years the grant to Yugoslavia amounting to $285 million. This represented an attempt to retaliate against Yugoslavia for its refusal to accept the Soviet Communist Party's ideological leadership.

30. On October 19, 1956, the USSR-Japanese joint declaration pledged the Soviet Union to refrain from interference in Japan's internal affairs. The Soviet violation: In 1958, during the weeks preceding the Japanese elections of May 22, the Soviets beamed radio propaganda at Japan violently opposing the election of Premier Kishi's government. Between 1959 and 1960, the USSR threatened Japan with the possibility of nuclear war if Japan ratified the U.S.-Japan security treaty, signed January 19, 1960.

As noted, the above Soviet violations of international security treaties occurred during the 40 years between 1920 and 1960, and they were officially confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee and by the Department of Defense in 1962 and 1964. But there was a long, 20 year hiatus from 1964 until 1984, when there were no official U.S. Government reports on Soviet treaty violations. Then on January 23, 1984, President Reagan made his first report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations. There have now been seven such reports to Congress, confirming the following numerical tabulation of Soviet violations of SALT and other arms control treaties:

1. SALT I ABM Treaty—now 10 confirmed violations;
2. SALT I Interim Agreement—5 confirmed violations;
3. SALT II Treaty—now 25 confirmed violations;
4. Limited Test Ban Treaty—over 100 confirmed violations;
5. Threshold Test Ban Treaty—over 24 probable violations;
6. Biological Warfare Convention—multiple confirmed violations;
7. Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons—multiple confirmed violations;
8. Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement—multiple confirmed violations.

In addition, long before SALT began in 1969, the Soviets violated two significant arms control treaties, one in the 1920s, which even entailed on-site inspection (the Soviets colaborated with the Germans in violating the Versailles Treaty), and another in the late 1940s (on demobilization in Eastern Europe). Soviet authorities on international law have candidly stated their view of treaty compliance: "Those institutions of international law which can facilitate the accomplishment of the stated tasks of Soviet [i.e. Marxist-Leninist] foreign policy are recognized and applied in the USSR; those which contradict these aims in any way are rejected.

According to an official U.S. State Department Soviet Affairs Note dated August 10, 1959:

> Few nations can match the USSR in vociferous protestations of loyalty to international obligations! However, such declarations which are typical of Soviet propagandists and scholars alike—diverge widely from Soviet practice. In the years since the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet government, while consistently accusing others of bad faith in international dealings, has not hesitated to violate its own treaty obligations when such actions appeared to be in its interest. The history of the last 40 years provides numerous examples of deliberate treaty violation by the Soviet regime . . . The USSR has disregarded treaty provisions inconvenient to itself, has unilaterally denounced conventions to which it is a party, has threatened abrogation as a

means of intimidation, and has on several occasions attacked fellow signatories to treaties of friendship and nonaggression.

The implications of Soviet noncompliance were stated by President Reagan in his June 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet SALT violations. The President stated: ". . . this pattern of Soviet noncompliance raises fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that—if not corrected—undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world." The President continued: ". . . we have made it absolutely clear that we expect the Soviet Union to take positive steps to correct their noncompliance and to resolve our compliance concerns in order to maintain the integrity of existing agreements and to establish the positive environment necessary for the successful negotiation of new agreements."

On March 10, 1987, the President stated in his sixth report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations that: "If we are to enter agreements of this magnitude and significance . . . cheating is simply not acceptable." And the President added in a speech on October 28, 1987, that: "As you know, the Soviets have an extensive record of violating past arms control agreements . . ." President Reagan added in a speech on November 18, 1987: "I cherish no illusions about the Soviets . . . for them, past arms control treaties were like diets. The second day was always the best, for that's when they broke them."

SOVIET SALT AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL TREATY VIOLATIONS

I must finally turn to a summary of Presidentially confirmed Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty violations.

A. Presidentially Confirmed Expanding Pattern of Soviet SALT II Break-out Violations—Total of 25

President Reagan recently reported to Congress that: "A number of [Soviet] activities involving SALT II constituted violations of the core or *central provisions* of the Treaty frequently cited by proponents of SALT II as the primary reason for supporting the agreement . . . In no case where we determined that the Soviet Union was in violation [i.e. of SALT II and SALT I] did they take corrective action."

I. SS–25 Mobile ICBM—Prohibited Second New Type ICBM

1. Development since about 1975;
2. Flight-testing (irreversible) since February, 1983;
3. Deployment since 1985—over one hundred concealed mobile launchers, "*direct violation;*"
4. Prohibited rapid-refire capability—doubles force;
5. RV-to-Throw-Weight Ratio (and doubling of throw-weight over old SS–13 ICBM)—probable covert SS–25 2 or 3 MIRV capability—"*direct violation*", plus reported testing of 3 MIRV SS–25;
6. Total encryption of SS–25 telemetry, "direct violation."

II. SNDVs

7. *De facto* Strategic Nuclear Delivery limit of 2,504—the Soviets have long been at least 75 to over 600 SNDVs over even the 2,504 number only they had when SALT II was signed in 1979, thus illustrating the fundamental inequality of SALT II. The Reagan Administration stated in September, 1987: "The Soviet Union *continues to exceed* the *de facto* SALT II overall Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDVs) ceiling of 2,504. Their ongoing deployments of SS–25 ICBM launchers, TU–95 Bear H Bombers, and SLBM launchers carried by Delta IV and Typhoon submarines, plus the presence of SALT II-accountable SS–X–24 ICBM launchers and Blackjack bombers results in the Soviets exceeding the SNDV limit by about 25. The Soviets have not compensated adequately for these new weapons, primarily because insufficient numbers of older Bison bombers and SS–11 ICBM silos have been dismantled." The CIA and ACDA also stated in October, 1987, that the number of Soviet SNDVs *"remains greater* than the 2,504 SNDVs recognized as permitted by SALT II."

III. SS–N–23 SLBM

8. Heavy throw-weight prohibited (conclusive evidence);
9. Development since about 1975;
10. Flight-testing (irreversible);
11. Development of Delta IV and III Class submarines;
12. Total encryption of telemetry.

IV. Backfire Intercontinental Bomber

13. Arctic basing, increasing already intercontinental operating capability;
14. Probable refueling probe, actually widely detected, increasing intercontinental operating capability;
15. Production of more than thirty Backfire bombers per year, for an estimated five years, making at least more than an estimated 12 extra illegal Backfires produced.

V. CCD

16. Expanding pattern of camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (Maskirovka), deliberately impeding verification.

VI. Encryption

17. Total encryption of ICBM, SLBM, and all other missile telemetry.

VII. Launcher-ICBM Missile Relationship

18. Reported probable concealment of the relationship between the SS–24 missile and its mobile ICBM launchers, and confirmed concealment of the relationship between the SS–25 missile and its mobile ICBM launchers.

VIII. SS–16

19. Confirm concealed deployment of 50 to 200 banned SS–16 mobile ICBM launchers at the Plesetsk test range, now reportedly probably being replaced by a similar number of banned SS–25

mobile ICBM launchers. SS–16s replaced at Plesetsk are unlocated, and are now probably deployed covertly.

IX. Falsification of SALT II Data Exchange

20. Operationally deployed, concealed SS–16 launchers not declared;

21. AS–3 Kangaroo long-range air launched cruise missile range falsely declared to be less than the 600 kilometer range limit and therefore was not counted, even though its range was at least 650 kilometers.

X. Excess MIRV Fractionation

22. According to press reports, the current National Intelligence Estimate states that the 308 SS–18 super-heavy ICBMs are deployed with 14 warheads each, adding 1,232 Soviet warheads.

23. According to press reports, the Soviet *Super*-super-heavy SS–X–26 (the follow-on to the SS–18) is now being flight-tested on polar trajectories simulating first strike attacks aimed at Pearl Harbor—sovereign U.S. territory, and its deployment is being *accelerated* in coverted SS–18 silos. This Soviet flight-testing and accelerated deployment of the even heavier throw-weight follow-on to the super heavy SS–18 ICBM violates the SALT II absolute ceiling on SS–18 throw-weight. This new super-super heavy ICBM, the SS–26, is also being tested with more RVs than the number carried on the SS–18. This development certainly will result in further excess MIRVing of the SS–18 class of missiles.

Additionally, the Soviets have now probably deployed more than 50 concealed SS–24 rail-mobile MIRVed ICBM launchers. First deployment of this missile was actually confirmed to President Reagan at the Iceland Summit on October, 1986, by Soviet Leaders Gorbachev himself.

The Reagan Administration confirmed on August 7, 1987, that: "The Soviet Union has *exceeded* the SALT II sublimit of 1,200 permitted MIRVed ICBMs amd MIRVed SLBMs when the fifth Typhoon submarine recently began sea trials. Moreover, some SS–X–24 MIRVed ICBM rail-mobile launchers should now be accountable under the SALT II sublimit on MIRVed ICBMs. It appears that the Soviets have not yet compensated for any of the SALT II-accountable SS–X–24 launchers. Therefore, the Soviets may also have *exceeded* the SALT II sublimit of 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers."

The Reagan Administration later in September, 1987 also confirmed the following statement to be accurate and unclassified at that time: "The fact that the Soviet Union has *exceeded* the SALT II sublimit of 820 MIRVed ICBMs with their SS–24 development is now clear. Moreover, the Soviets have clearly *exceeded* the SALT II sublimit of 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs. The Soviet Union has not compensated for their SS–24 deployment or for their Typhoon and Delta IV submarine deployment or for their Typhoon and Delta IV submarine deployments exceeding the SALT II sublimits."

The Reagan Administration also confirmed the following statement to be accurate and unclassified as of October, 1987: "Current information indicates that the Soviets are *still over* the 1,200 subli-

mit of SALT II, although the same information indicates that the Soviets could come into compliance at any time."

This confirmed Soviet MIRV missile deployment above the 1,200 MIRV missile sublimit is the 23rd confirmed Soviet SALT II violation.

And the 24th confirmed Soviet SALT II violation is the Soviet deployment of now over 50 SS–24 rail-mobile MIRVed ICBMs in violation of the 820 MIRV ICBM sublimit.

Finally, the CIA has publicly warned that, in the event that Soviet SALT II "Break Out" could be confirmed, the U.S. should consider that the Soviets are also violating the third SALT II sublimit—1,320 MIRVed missiles and heavy bombers equipped with long range cruise missiles. Thus, because the 24 confirmed Soviet SALT II violations clearly constitute Soviet Break Out from SALT II, the Soviets must also be considered to be violating the 1,320 sublimit.

This would make the total of confirmed Soviet SALT II violations *25.*

The Soviets reportedly told the U.S. arms negotiators in Geneva in late 1983 that they intended to exceed the SALT II sublimits of 820, 1,200, and 1,320, which they are now confirmed to be doing.

B. Presidentially Confirmed Expanding Pattern of Soviet Violations of the SALT I Interim Agreement—5 Violations

1. Soviet deployment of the heavy SS–19 ICBM and the medium SS–17 ICBM to replace the light SS–11 ICBM was a circumvention defeating the object and purpose of the SALT I Interim Agreement. Article II of the Interim Agreement prohibited heavy ICBMs from replacing light ICBMs. This violation alone increased the Soviet first strike threat by a factor of six.

2. Soviet deployment of modern SLBM submarines exceeding the limit of 740 SLBM launchers, without dismantling other older ICBM or SLBM launchers, which in March, 1976, the Soviets actually *admitted* was a violation.

3. Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception deliberately impeded verification.

4. Circumvention of SALT I by deploying SS–N–21 and SS–NX–24 long-range cruise missiles on converted Y Class SLBM submarines, which "is a threat to United States and allied security similar to that of the original SSBNs."

5. "The United States judges that Soviet use of former SS–7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS–25 mobile ICBM is a *violation* of the SALT I Interim Agreement."

As Defense Secretary Weinberger stated on December 11, 1986: "SALT I and SALT II have been largely irrelevant to the Soviet military buildup. Both agreements merely codified and authorized large increases."

C. Presidentially Confirmed Expanding Pattern of Soviet SALT I ABM Treaty Break Out Violations—10 Violations

1. "The U.S. Government *reaffirms* the conclusion in the March 1987 Report that the new large phases-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a *violation* of legal obligations

under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Construction continued in 1987. The absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory." This judgment is "based on *conclusive evidence,*" and this is the clearest evidence of Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty. Thus the siting, orientation, and capabilities of the Soviet Krasnoyarsk ABM Battle Management Radar "directly violates" three provisions of the SALT I ABM Treaty. The Soviets have even privately admitted this violation to themselves. The CIA has stated recently that "The United States is aware that, over the last several years, Soviet officials have indicated that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of the ABM Treaty." During 1987, both Houses of the Congress, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, have each voted overwhelmingly and almost unanimously in agreement with President Reagan that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. The Senate also voted 93 to 2 that the Krasnoyarsk violation was *"an important obstacle"* the Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the new INF Treaty. The Soviets have conceded in diplomatic channels that a radar identical to the Krasnoyarsk radar is an early warning radar.

2. "The U.S. Government finds that the USSR's activities with respect to moving a Flat Twin ABM radar and a Pawn Shop van, a component of an ABM system, from a test range and initiating deployment at a location [i.e. Gomel] outside of an ABM deployment area or ABM test range constitutes a *violation* of the ABM Treaty . . . This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory." In his December 1, 1987, seventh report to Congress on Soviet SALT Violations, President Reagan referred for the first time to *"the new violation* in the deployment of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop observed at Gomel . . ." The Soviets have admitted in diplomatic channels that the Gomel radar is an ABM radar, and further, that if such an ABM Radar were located outside a test range or allowed deployment area, it would constitute a prohibited base for a prohibited nationwide ABM defense, thereby violating the most important provision of the ABM Treaty, Article I. But the Soviets have more recently lied to the United States on their Gomel activity claiming it is not a violation and that Flat Twin was sent to Gomel to be dismantled.

3. Over 100 ABM-mode tests of Soviet SAM–5, SAM–10, and SAM–12 surface-to-air missiles and radars are *"highly probable" violations* of the SALT I ABM Treaty. Two high Soviet officials have even admitted that their SAMs have been designed, tested, and deployed with a prohibited ABM capability. "The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 Report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty . . . In recent years, we have gathered *an increased amount of evidence* on activities that could be associated with Soviet concurrent operations . . . the Soviet Union has con-

ducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases, this may be highly probable. This and other such ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory."

4. There is *strong evidence* that Soviets may be developing and deploying a territorial, and especially a nationwide, ABM defense, which violates the ABM Treaty ban on developing even a *base* for a nationwide ABM defense. "The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the March 1987 Report that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload, ABM mobility, and deployment of ABM components to Gomel) suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Our concern continues . . . The redundancy in coverage provided by these new radars [i.e. the 9 Pechora-Krasnoyarsk Class radars] and the disposition of these radars *closely resembles the design of the U.S. Safeguard ABM program.*" The U.S. Safeguard program was designed to be a 12 site, *nationwide* ABM defense. President Reagan has also stated that "this is a *serious* cause for concern." The Secretary of Defense has testified to the Senate that the "Soviets have some nationwide ABM capability" already. In his December, 1985 report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations, President Reagan stated that a unilateral Soviet ABM defense: "Would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility." The CIA has recently stated that: "In totality, these [Soviet ABM] activities provide a strong basis for concern that the USSR might have an *integrated plan* for an ABM defense of its national territory, and might be working toward it." Finally, as the Defense and State Department's White Paper on Soviet strategic defense programs of October 1985 confirmed: "The aggregate of current Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory—*precisely what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent.*"

5. The mobility of the Soviet ABM–3 system is a *violation* of the ABM Treaty's prohibition on mobile ABMs.

6. Continuing Soviet development of mobile Flat Twin ABM radars from 1975 to the present, is a *violation* of the prohibition on developing and testing mobile ABMs. The Soviets evidently are now mass producing the mobile ABM–3 system for rapid nationwide deployment.

7. Soviet ABM rapid reload capability for ABM launchers is a serious cause for concern. The State and Defense Departments state that the Soviets "may" have a prohibited reloadable ABM system.

8. Soviet deliberate camouflage, concealment, and deception activity impedes verification.

9. Confirmed Soviet falsification of the deactivation of ABM test range launchers is a violation of the ABM Treaty dismantling procedures.

10. Soviet rapid relocation *without the required prior notification* of a Flat Twin ABM radar, creating the additional Kamchatka ABM test range, not only confirms the illegal mobility of the Flat Twin radar and ABM–3 system, but is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

As Defense Secretary Weinberger stated on December 11, 1986: "There has been the recent discovery of three new Soviet large phased-array radars of this type [i.e. the Pechora-Krasnoyarsk Class]—a 50 percent increase in the number of such radars. These radars are the essential components of any large ABM deployment. The deployment of such a large number of radars [i.e. nine], and the pattern of their deployment, together with other Soviet ABM-related activities, suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing a nationwide ABM defense in violation of the ABM Treaty. Such a development would have the *gravest implications* on the United States-Soviet strategic balance. *Nothing could be more dangerous* to the security of the West and global stability than a unilateral Soviet deployment of a nationwide ABM system combined with its massive offensive missile capabilities."

D. Presidentially Confirmed Expanding Pattern of Soviet Violations of Nuclear Test Bans—Over 70 Violations

1. About 20 atmospheric nuclear weapon tests, August through September 1961, were conducted by the Soviets in violation of the 1959 Mutual Test Ban Moratorium. One of these tests reached a yield of 58 megatons.

2. There have been over 30 conclusively confirmed cases of Soviet venting of nuclear radioactive debris beyond their borders from underground nuclear weapons tests, in violation of the 1963 Limited [i.e., Atmospheric] Test Ban Treaty. "The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 Report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in *violation* of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action. This practice has continued. Since the resumption of Soviet underground testing in February 1987, the United States has presented demarches to the Soviet Union on two separate occasions when unambiguously attributable venting has occurred . . . and received completely unacceptable explanations . . . our repeated attempts to discuss these occurrences with Soviet authorities have been rebuffed . . . Soviet refusal to discuss this matter *calls into question their sincerity on the whole range of arms control agreements.*" (Emphasis added.)

3. There have been over 24 cases of Soviet underground nuclear weapons tests over the 150 kiloton threshold in probable violation of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

E. Presidentially Confirmed Expanding Pattern of Soviet Violations of Biological and Chemical Weapons Bans

1. "Soviet involvement in the production, transfer, and use of chemical and toxic substances for hostile purposes in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan are *direct violations* of the 1925 Geneva Protocol." Tens of thousands of innocent men, women, and children suffered horrible deaths from these Soviet atrocities, which are also violations of the Genocide Convention.

2. "The Soviets have maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in *direct violation* of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention." The United States has absolutely no defenses against this capability. The Sverdlovsk anthrax explosion of April 1979, killing several thousand Soviet soldiers and civilians, is direct evidence of the existance of this illegal capability. "After reports of the events at Sverdlovsk reached the West, the U.S. repeatedly and explicitly approached the Soviet Union for consultation under Article V of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. These efforts were initiated in March of 1980 and continued through the 1986 Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention. *The Soviets have consistently refused to engage in consultations, despite their obligation under Article V* . . . The U.S. Government judges that continued activity during 1987 at suspect biological and toxin weapon facilities in the Soviet Union, and reports that a Soviet BW program may now include investigation of new classes of BW agents, *reaffirm* the conclusion of the March 1987 Report that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in *violation* of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 . . . We are particularly concerned because it may include advanced biological agents about which we have little knowledge and against which we have *no defense.* The Soviets continue to expand their chemical and toxin warfare capabilities. *Neither NATO retaliatory nor defensive programs can begin to match the Soviet effort* . . . There have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemicals or toxins in Cambodia, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1987 according to our strict standards of evidence. Nonetheless, there is no basis for amending the March 1987 Report conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972."

F. Soviet Violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement of 1962

"The Soviets *breached* a unilateral commitment by sending offensive weapons—intercontinental nuclear-delivery-capable bombers, nuclear-delivery-capable fighter-bombers, and various kinds of nuclear missile submarines to Cuba, beginning in 1969." The Soviets are thus violating the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement prohibiting Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba because of the reported presence of 12 or more TU-95 Bear intercontinental bombers, more than 55 nuclear-delivery-capable MIG-27 Flogger fighter-bombers, several types of strategic submarines (Golf, Echo, Victor, Yankee,

and Foxtrot Classes), over 200 nuclear-delivery-capable MIG–21 fighter-bombers, a nuclear weapons handling and storage facility, a Chemical and Biological Weapons production and storage facility, and the Soviet Combat Brigade. On September 14, 1983, President Reagan for a *second* time confirmed that the Soviet Union had violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement, when he stated: "That Agreement has been *abrogated* many times by the Soviet Union and Cuba in the bringing of what can only be described as offensives weapons, not defensive there." That statement and an earlier one by President Reagan has been backed up by similar public statements by the CIA Director, the JCS Chairman, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, all charging that the Soviets are violating the Agreement. And even the State Department concedes that the Soviets are violating the "spirit" of the Agreement.

CONCLUSION

As President Reagan stated in his seventh Report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations, dated December 1, 1987: "When taken as a whole, this series [i.e. of seven] reports provides a clear picture of continuing Soviet violations . . . there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance . . . The compliance concerns enumerated in this Report are not unfamiliar to the Soviet Union. I expressed my personal interest in these issues directly to Soviet General Gorbachev during my meetings with him, both in 1985 in Geneva and then again in Reykjavik in October 1986. In addition, the Standing Consultative Commission discusses compliance concerns in detail during its biannual sessions . . . Most recently, Secretary of State Shultz raised U.S. concerns about Soviet noncompliance during his October 1987 visit to Moscow . . . the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliant activities . . . strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental . . . Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence *essential* to an effective arms control process *in the future* . . . it will be achieved *only* if effective verification and *total compliance* are integral elements of the process both with respect to existing arms control agreements *and possible new ones.*" (Emphasis added.)

In his March 10, 1987 Report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations, President Reagan added: "Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less . . . If we are to enter agreements of this magnitude and significance, effective verification is indispensable and cheating is simply not acceptable."

Finally, in his June 1985 Report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations, President Reagan stated: ". . . this pattern of Soviet noncompliance raises fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that—if not corrected—undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world . . . we have made it absolutely clear that we expect the Soviet Union to take positive steps to correct their noncompliance and to resolve our compliance concerns in order to maintain the integrity of existing agreements

and to establish the positive environment necessary for the successful negotiation of new agreements." But as President Reagan conceded in his March 1987 Report in regard to all Soviet violations of SALT I and SALT II: "In no case where we determined that the Soviet Union was in violation did they take corrective action."

In a letter to the Congress transmitting his December 1, 1987 violations report, President Reagan stated: "Correcting their violations will be a true test of Soviet willingness to enter a more constructive relationship . . . on security matters."

Thus by President Reagan's own 1985 and 1987 standards, there may be a lack of integrity to the arms control process and there may be a lack of the positive environment necessary for the negotiation of new agreements. In sum, there is a question whether arms control treaties have served as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world.

In sum, I would like to recapitulate some examples of Soviet negotiating deception.

SOVIETS SIGNED SALT II FULLY INTENDING TO VIOLATE IT

The late Soviet leader Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty on June 18, 1979, with the *secret knowledge:*

1. That their now-deployed SS–25 ICBM (then under development) was a *second* "new type" ICBM prohibited by SALT II;
2. That their about-to-be-deployed SS–X–26 super-super heavy ICBM (then under development) would violate the SALT II prohibitions on heavy ICBM;
3. That their now-deployed illegally encrypted SS–24 ICBM (then under development) would also violate the prohibitions on heavy ICBMs;
4. And that their mobile SS–16 ICBM explicitly banned by SALT II was already illegally deployed.

In addition, at the June 18, 1979 SALT II Summit, the late Soviet leader Brezhnev gave the United States a Statement on the Soviet Backfire bomber, which was an integral part of the Treaty. But Brezhnev claimed falsely that the Backfire bomber did *not* have either a refueling capability or an intercontinental operational radius, just when U.S. Intelligence had strong evidence that the Backfire bomber clearly had both capabilities.

In sum, the demonstrated facts of history clearly show that the Soviets signed the SALT II Treaty fully intending to violate the Treaty from the start, and after giving the U.S. falsified data denying their illegal SS–16 deployment and Backfire bomber capabilities. As President Reagan reported to Congress on March 10, 1987:

> A number of [Soviet] activities involving SALT II constituted violations of the *core or central provisions* of the Treaty frequently cited by proponents of SALT II as the primary reasons for supporting the agreement . . . In no case where we determined that the Soviet Union was in violation (i.e. of SALT II and SALT I) did they take corrective action.

SOVIETS SIGNED SALT I FULLY INTENDING TO VIOLATE IT

In the SALT I Interim Agreement signed on May 26, 1972, Soviet leader Brezhnev negotiated deceptively to successfully deploy the Soviet then-secret SS–19 heavy ICBM, when U.S. Intelligence had estimated that a missile as heavy as the SS–19 would be deployed on a large scale to replace their light SS–11 ICBMs. The Soviets thereafter replaced 360 light SS–11 ICBMs with 360 heavy SS–19 ICBMs, despite the prohibition in Article II on replacing light ICBMs with heavy ICBMs. This Soviet negotiating deception and deployment action circumvented the SALT I Interim Agreement, and defeated its object and purpose. U.S. Intelligence had dramatic direct evidence that Brezhnev and the late Soviet Marshal Grechko deliberately intended the deception, carefully planned the circumvention, and clearly aimed to defeat the object and purpose of the Agreement. This deception and circumvention increased the Soviet first strike capability by *six fold,* because each heavy SS–19 carried six highly accurate, large yield MIRVed warheads in place of each single warhead SS–11. There were several other Soviet negotiating deceptions in SALT I.

Finally, the Soviets signed the SALT I ABM Treaty and the Biological Warfare Convention of 1972 also fully intending to violate these treaties. In the case of the ABM Treaty, the Soviets were planning the internetted, integrated 10 LPAR ABM Battle Management Radar network, including Krasnoyarsk, at the very time they signed the treaty in 1972. The 8 Soviet Biological Warfare Plants continued to expand in size after the 1972 signing, in violation of the BW Convention.

ANNEX SECTION II

Critique of the Intelligence and Armed Services Committee Chairmen's Unclassified Reports on the Verifiability of the INF Treaty

Senator Boren, the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, made an unclassified report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the verifiability of the proposed INF Treaty on March 22, 1988.

In addition, on the same day, Senator Nunn, the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, made a similar report on the verifiability of the INF Treaty. I would like to make some unclassified comments on these unclassified reports.

My critique will show that there is already a compliance controversy surrounding the proposed INF Treaty, during its ratification process. The Senate is being asked to give its advice and consent to a new treaty, in the face of an expanding pattern of Soviet violations of all existing arms treaties, and the likelihood that the INF compliance controversy will continue in the future and eventually result in a confirmed Soviet violation of the proposed INF Treaty.

COMMENTS ON THE BOREN REPORT

1. The Boren Report states that: "The burden of detecting banned activities at undeclared sites, where they are most likely to occur, will fall on National Technical Means of verification."

Comment: This statement is absolutely correct. It means that the United States will have to rely upon its NTMs only in order to detect a covert SS–20 force of at least 300 missiles, which according to press reports the NIEs have estimated in majority assessments.

However, it fails to point out that the U.S. chances of detecting Soviet covert SS–20 missiles by NTMs are very low, reportedly 1 chance out of 10. Thus the INF Treaty is essentially unverifiable.

2. The Boren Report seems to concede that the INF Treaty will be unverifiable, when it states further that: "Soviet compliance with some of the treaty's provisions will be difficult to monitor."

Comment: This statement is also absolutely correct. And this assessment applies especially to the Soviet covert SS–20 force. Again, there is reportedly only a 1 out of 10 chance of detecting a single covert SS–20.

3. The Boren Report also states that: "This problem is exemplified by the unresolved controversy between DIA and other intelligence agencies over the number of SS–20s in the Soviet inventory. In any event, the Treaty's ban on flight-testing, will over time limit the military utility of any SS–20s that the Soviet Union might covertly maintain."

Comment: Here the Boren Report is in serious error. The controversy over the number of SS–20s in the Soviet covert SS–20 force is not simply a dispute between the DIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community. The controversy is between the majority of the Intelligence Community—the Director of Central Intelligence, DIA, Air Force Intelligence, and NSA, pitted against two agencies whose estimates have been discredited because they were lower than the Soviet MOU data—CIA and State Department INR. According to many press reports, the best estimate of the majority of the Intelligence Community, including the Director of Central Intelligence, is 950 SS–20s produced, leaving a covert force of at least 300 after the Soviet-declared force of 650 is eliminated.

Moreover, the INF ban on SS–20 flight-testing can easily be circumvented by the Soviets. First, the Soviets are allowed under the INF Treaty 100 launches of the SS–20 for elimination. If the Soviets use encapsulated telemetry, this could easily be 100 troop training and reliability tests. Indeed, 100 such launches is about 10 years' worth of such tests. And the SS–20 is a mature, fully tested system, with reportedly already 150 test launches accomplished since 1974.

In addition, there is a precedent for Soviet deployment of a mobile missile system without launches of the missile. From 1976 to about 1985, according to unclassified Presidential reports to Congress on Soviet SALT violations, the Soviets probably deployed 50 to 200 SS–16 mobile ICBMs at the Plesetsk test range. The last SS–16 flight test was reportedly in 1976. Thus the SS–16 was probably deployed for 10 years in violation of SALT I and SALT II *without* flight-testing.

How was system reliability maintained? Probably through SS–20 flight testing. The SS–16 and the SS–20 have in common their first two stages, and most system reliability errors come from the first two stages. Thus some SS–20 launches were probably used for SS–16 troop training and reliability testing for ten years. Similarly this also could easily be done with the SS–20 and the SS–25. The

SS–20 and the SS–25 also share the same first stage, and have nearly identical second stages. Thus the SS–25, completely outside the INF Treaty, could be used for troop training and reliability tests of the similar SS–20, much as the SS–20 was used similarly for SS–16 tests over ten years.

4. The Boren Report adds that: "The flight-test ban . . . is effective in limiting the military reliability of a covert SS–20 force."

Comment: Here again the report is inaccurate. SS–20 reliability and troop training testing could easily be accomplished using legal SS–25s. Indeed, there are agreed intelligence judgments that strongly support my contention.

5. The Boren Report finally states that: "In the absence of a START Agreement, the Soviets have little or no incentive to cheat [on the INF Treaty] . . . [Under START] the Soviet incentive to cheat could increase because of a greater difficulty in meeting targeting requirements."

Comment: This statement incorrectly assumes that the Soviets have no incentive or intentions for achieving strategic superiority. But Soviet military doctrine, which the SSCI is surely familiar with, indicates a Soviet intention to achieve strategic superiority, and to cheat on arms control treaties if necessary to achieve superiority. Moreover, this statement ignores the confirmed facts that the Soviets have already cheated in SALT I and SALT II, and often for only marginal or small military gain, and at a great risk of detection. Thus the Boren Report incorrectly "mirror-images" U.S. static intentions in the strategic competition, and it incorrectly assumes that the Soviets have limited targeting requirements and do not want superiority.

COMMENTS ON THE NUNN REPORT

My distinguished colleague, Senator Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, also issued an important unclassified report to the Committee on Foreign Relations on March 22. The Nunn Report had this very important comment on the verifiability of the INF Treaty:

> ". . . The Treaty's verification regime *can not* provide *guarantees* that no banned missiles are covertly maintained. Rather, the Treaty depends on a *Soviet calculation* that either 1) such systems would not be militarily viable due to the ban on flight-testing, training, infrastructure, etc; or 2) that the political risks of cheating outweigh the military gain. *Whether these assumptions are valid is the central issue before the Senate with regard to the verifiability of the Treaty.*"

Comment: Senator Nunn's Report, like the Boren Report, raises some of the right questions. Here are some comments on the Nunn Report.

(A) The Soviets have calculated in the past that cheating was worthwhile, even for only marginal military advantages with strong risk of detection, such as for the mobile SS–16 ICBM deployment in violation of SALT I and SALT II.

(B) The military effectiveness of the SS–20 could easily be maintained through SS–25 flight-testing outside the INF Treaty. More-

over, there are conclusions in the NIEs that SS–20 and SS–25 infrastructure could be used to maintain and support an SS–20 covert force.

(C) The Soviets could easily have already concluded that there are no political risks or penalties for their cheating. After all, President Reagan signed the INF Treaty despite his policy of not concluding any new arms control treaties until the Soviets stopped violating the existing ones. The Soviets have failed to correct any of their arms control treaty violations, according to President Reagan's latest December 1, 1987 Report to Congress on Soviet SALT Violations, and the pattern of Soviet violations and their seriousness keeps expanding. Thus in effect, President Reagan has condoned all confirmed Soviet violations of all existing treaties, by signing the INF Treaty without requiring the Soviets to come into compliance with existing treaties.

I can therefore answer the central issue of INF verifiability. The Soviets have probably already made the calculation that a covert SS–20 force is both militarily useful to them, and poses no political risk even if detected. An SS–20 covert force probably exists, and it could be maintained, and the Soviets could cheat without detection, without our ability to enforce their compliance, for a significant military and political advantage. The ten-year covert deployment of 50 to 200 SS–16 mobile ICBMs, without flight-testing, is a good precedent of what the Soviets probably intend to do under the INF Treaty.

ANNEX SECTION III

UNCLASSIFIED

New and Conclusive Evidence of Soviet Nationwide ABM Break Out

There is now conclusive, clearcut evidence that the Soviet Union has broken out of the ABM Treaty by deploying the prohibited base for an illegal nationwide ABM defense.

President Reagan himself stated on October 13, 1985, that: "For some years now we have been aware that the Soviets have been developing a nationwide defense" in violation of the ABM Treaty. President Reagan was correct.

The CIA made the same correct prediction in a declassified National Intelligence Estimate on June 26, 1985:

> The Soviets will significantly improve the capabilities of their strategic defenses [by the early 1990s]. We are particularly concerned that the Soviets' continuing development efforts give them the potential for widespread ABM deployments. The Soviets have the major components for an ABM system that could be used for widespread ABM deployments well in excess of ABM Treaty limits. The components include radars, an aboveground launcher, and the high acceleration missile that will be deployed around Moscow. The potential exists for the production lines associated with the upgrade of the Moscow ABM system to be used to support a widespread deployment.

SUMMARY

I would like to summarize why President Reagan's and CIA's estimates from 1985 are now coming true. The Soviet ABM break out is in addition to the confirmed Krasnoyarsk and Gomel radar clear-cut violations of the ABM Treaty.

The Administration has made a new assessment that *each* of the now 10 Large Phased Array Radars (LPARs) in the Krasnoyarsk-Pechora-Sevastopol Class should be considered to be violations of the Treaty, because each is an ABM Battle Management radar. As such, these radars can only be legally located at Moscow or Sary Shagan. This is evidence that 9 of the 10 LPARs, all but the Sary Shagan LPAR, are each illegal ABM Battle Management radars.

Secondly and even more significantly, the Sary Shagan LPAR is an ABM Battle Management radar. While the Sary Shagan ABM LPAR is itself legally sited, the implication of this new conclusion is that 5 other LPARs which are identical to it clearly must also be categorized as ABM Battle Management radars.

Thus two bodies of evidence—the inherent ABM capabilities of the 10 LPARs themselves, and the configuration of 5 as identical to the confirmed Sary Shagan ABM radar—point to the conclusion that 9 of the 10 LPARs are illegal ABM Battle Management radars. Moreover, all 10 are internetted and form the prohibited base for an illegal nationwide ABM defense. Thus even the Sary Shagan ABM LPAR is illegal because it is part of an illegal network forming the base for a prohibited nationwide ABM defense. This is conclusive evidence of Soviet nationwide ABM defense break out.

In sum, the 10 LPARs now nearing completion form a prohibited base for an illegal nationwide ABM defense, in clear violation of the fundamental provision of the Treaty.

Finally, the required third five year review of the ABM Treaty is now five months overdue, and must be conducted as soon as possible. The main reason that the State Department has delayed conducting this legally required third five year review is that it would force the U.S. to confront the Soviets on their break out violations. The multiple Soviet ABM break out violations are material breaches of the Treaty under international law. The U.S. has only two main options in this third required five year review—either to withdraw from the Treaty, or cover-up and condone the conclusive Soviet break out violations.

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY?

On September 12, 1987, President Reagan himself argued publicly that because of confirmed, conclusive Soviet "break out" violations of the ABM Treaty:

"We should look realistically" at whether the United States should withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

President Reagan added, however, that additional Soviet ABM violations make the Soviets "much more prepared to take advantage" of withdrawal than we are.

I agree. But the problem is not Soviet withdrawal from the ABM Treaty—it is Soviet break out into a prohibited nationwide ABM defense, while the United States remains in full compliance even

with its own even more restrictive "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The United States is totally unprepared for a Soviet ABM break out. This U.S. unpreparedness for Soviet ABM break out does not reflect well upon the realism and effectiveness of American defense planning.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly believe that as bad as the clearcut Soviet break out violations of the ABM Treaty are for American national security, the United States must not only remain within the Treaty, but the United States must also remain within its own unilateral "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This JCS judgment is based on the thin hope that somehow the ABM Treaty restrains, albeit even only slightly, Soviet ABM defenses. But if the ABM Treaty restrains only American defenses and not Soviet, then the ABM Treaty may be contrary to fundamental U.S. national security interests. U.S. reluctance to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in response to Soviet break out violations can be described as appeasement.

KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENT ALSO DOES NOT CONSTRAIN THE SOVIETS

The Secretary of State similarly reassured the Senate in 1983 regarding the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement. Secretary Shultz stated that while the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement was difficult to enforce, depending as it does on demonstrating American political will to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, the Agreement was better than nothing because the Soviets would be prevented from increasing the number of their MIG–23 nuclear-delivery-capable fighter-bombers in Cuba.

But since the Secretary made this statement, the number of Soviet MIG–23s in Cuba has *doubled,* from 36 MIG–23s to over 55, in further violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement.

Likewise, given proof of the Soviet exploitation of the American lack of political will to enforce the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement, we should not be deluded into believing that the ABM Treaty will restrain Soviet nationwide ABM defenses.

SOVIET NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND AMERICAN APPEASEMENT

Most ominously, President Reagan stated on March 18, 1985, that:

> They [the Soviets] already outnumber us greatly in offensive weapons, and if they alone developed a defensive weapon before us, then they wouldn't have to worry about our deterrent—a retaliatory strike. Then they could issue an ultimatum to the world.

In addition, it is shocking that top American leaders are saying privately that America is not in the political mood to penalize the Soviets for their arms control treaty violations. Some top American leaders are actually conceding that America lacks the political will to deter the Soviets from their ongoing military buildup in violation of all SALT Treaties or from their aggressive foreign policy. These leaders are saying that we do not have the political will to do what we need to do in our own defense; they are in effect saying

that American appeasement is our only alternative to relentlessly increasing Soviet power.

SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET ABM RADARS

I now want to address some new Administration assessments pointing to new Soviet nationwide ABM break out violations of the ABM Treaty. These assessments are all *unclassified*, and they are new—they have just been received from the Administration.

The new assessments demonstrate clearly that the Administration has concluded that *each* of the 10 Pechora-Krasnoyarsk-Sevastopol class radars is itself an ABM Battle Management Radar, and thus each of the 10 radars itself is a separate violation of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the new assessments mean that the Soviets have established an illegal *base* for a prohibited nationwide ABM defense. These new assessments in turn provide conclusive evidence that the Soviets have broken out of the ABM Treaty by deploying the base for a nationwide ABM defense, as well as the nationwide defense itself.

The question of Soviet ABM break out is not whether, but when. And the when is—*now*. According to a book published in 1986 by the authoritative Mr. Bill Lee of the DIA:

> [The Soviet air, space, and ABM defense organization] PVO also developed the flat twin transportable missile-engagement radar designed for use in conjunction with the Pechora-class radars and with the SH-8 high acceleration intercepter . . . The new Moscow ABM defenses and the second generation of large phased array radars will probably be completed during the period 1986-1988. *The Soviets would then appear to be in an excellent position to break out of the ABM Treaty by deploying their ABM-X-3 system.* Completion of the Moscow defenses will require that most, or perhaps all, of the major components already be in *series production* . . . Past testing of SAMs in an ABM environment, and the ABM potential of the new SA-X-12, heighten concerns of a Soviet breakout . . . these [Pechora class] battle-management radars make possible some degree of national ABM defenses as the SA-10 and SA-X-12 systems are deployed, because both of them "have capabilities to intercept some types of U.S. ballistic strategic missile RVs" . . . by about the time PVO deploys large numbers of its new SAMs in the mid-1980s, the USSR will probably have the capability to install the kind of ABGM defenses the U.S. started to deploy in the late 1960s . . . *There are many indications that the Soviets will break out before the end of the 1980s* . . . The USSR already has high-acceleration, low-altitude interceptor technology, small phased array radar and computer technology that is comparable to or better than similar U.S. technology of a decade ago . . . The Soviets will soon have sufficiently large ABM battle-management radars in operation to make *nationwise deployments* a reality . . . Recent intelligence assessments of ABM capabilities for the SA-10 and the SA-X-12 also could mean that *nationwide deploy-*

ment of at least limited ABM defenses may be underway . . . [everything indicates that the Soviets] are following a breakout scenario.

The ABM-capable SAM–12B system is reported about to be deployed. The Soviets reportedly now have several ABM break out options for deployment of mobile SH–04 and SH–08 interceptors that can be taken "off the shelf," which means these interceptors may already have been produced. SH–08s may have already been covertly deployed. There are 2,000 SAM–5 ABM-capable interceptors deployed nationwide, together with 4,000 SAM–10 ABM-capable interceptors. There are about 5,000 small ABM-capable engagement radars associated with these two systems. Given the near completion of the long-lead-time LPAR network, lack of evidence of SH–08 ABM interceptor deployment to go with the network could itself be evidence of covert interceptor deployment.

Indeed, we should be deeply worried that because the long-lead-time component of a nationwide ABM defense—the LPAR network—is almost completed, already produced but covertly deployed ABM interceptors that go with these LPARs probably already exist, but they are not detected. Given also the high degree of Soviet efforts at data denial, indeed, we should assume that undetected interceptors are already produced and are deployed covertly nationwide.

But as shall be seen, there is also much other additional new unclassified evidence of a Soviet nationwide ABM defense break out. There are now two Soviet "material breach" violations of the ABM Treaty confirmed by conclusive intelligence evidence, Soviet admission, and by the President and the Congress. Both of these confirmed Soviet "material breaches" of the ABM Treaty help provide an illegal base for a Soviet nationwide ABM defense, which is prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Together, these two violations themselves constitute Soviet nationwide ABM break out, especially when combined with over six other bodies of evidence of Soviet ABM break out with interceptor missile deployment.

In sum, the Soviets have not been prevented by the ABM Treaty from constructing the illegal base for an illegal nationwide ABM defense. They are constructing a nationwide ABM defense itself, in full break out.

Beyond another five bodies of evidence of Soviet nationwide ABM break out, I will review first all the *unclassified* evidence of Soviet nationwide ABM break out.

NEW ADMINISTRATION NATIONWIDE ABM BREAK OUT ASSESSMENTS

The Administration has recently provided to the Senate the following new unclassified judgments:

1. "All LPARs (Large Phased Array Radars), such as the Pechora-Krasnoyarsk class radars . . . also have *the inherent capability* . . . of contributing to *ABM battle management.* Taken together, the Pechora-Krasnoyarsk class radars and other Soviet ABM-related activities give us concern that *the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.*"

This Administration assessment means that each of the 10 LPARs must be considered an ABM Battle Management radar, just

as the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in 1980, and thus each radar is a separate, distinct violation of the ABM Treaty. CIA also has stated that: "These radars will be technically capable of providing battle management support to a widespread ABM system."

2. "LPARs have always been considered to be the long lead-time elements of a possible *territorial defense.* A standard role for the Pechora class LPARs is acquisition of attack characterization data *that could aid in planning the battle for Soviet defensive forces and deciding timely offensive responses* . . . Thus, LPARs also have the *inherent capability of contributing to ABM battle management."*

Here again, each of the 10 LPARs must be considered to be ABM Battle Management radars, and therefore separate violations of the ABM Treaty.

3. "The Pechora-Krasnoyarsk class radars are the world's most powerful radars."

These 10 radars are each reportedly many times more powerful than each of the 12 U.S. ABM radars planned in 1972. Clearly, this high power gives them ABM Battle Management capabilities.

4. "The Pechora-Krasnoyarsk class radars can track large numbers of objects very accurately, and the data from these radars can be used for any number of purposes to include early warning, attack assessments, *battle management,* and other kinds of ABM-related functions."

This, too, is further evidence that each of the 10 LPARs are ABM Battle Management radars.

5. "The redundant, overlapping, internetted coverage that the Pechora-Krasnoyarsk class radars provide by virtue of the size and the phased array nature of the radars is *much better* than you need for early warning."

This finally is further evidence that each of the 10 LPARs are intended for ABM Battle Management.

6. "Even radars in the Moscow area that are acknowledged by the Soviets to be ABM radars are not hardened."

This statement is evidence, therefore, that LPARs need not be hardened in order to be for ABM Battle Management.

7. Finally, "The introduction of Soviet mobile ICBMs certainly complicate the *dividing line* between the *allowed* Soviet National Command Authority defense, and a *prohibited* ICBM defense."

This means that all Soviet SS–24 and SS–25 mobile ICBMs deployed near Moscow can be defended by the Moscow ABM system. In addition, a large proportion of Soviet fixed, MIRVed ICBM silos are located near Moscow, also within range of the Moscow ABM defenses. Indeed, probably about 30 percent of the Soviet ICBM force can be defended by the Moscow ABM.

In sum, the following conclusions can be drawn, based upon the new Administration assessments:

First, the internetted network of 10 Pechora-Krasnoyarsk-Sevastopol Class LPARs indeed does contribute key capabilities useful for a base for a nationwide ABM defense. In fact, the entire 10 LPAR network clearly constitutes a prohibited base for an illegal nationwide ABM defense.

Second, the Krasnoyarsk radar's siting is ideal for enabling it to provide accurate RV impact predictions for nearby ICBM fields. This sting is thus ideal for Battle Management.

Third, given this ideal siting for ABM Battle Management for the Krasnoyarsk radar, this siting is therefore further evidence that the Krasnoyarsk radar is an ABM Battle Management radar. The 9 other LPARs are all very similar to Krasnoyarsk, and Krasnoyarsk is a Battle Management radar.

Fourth, the similarity of each of the other 9 LPARs to the Krasnoyarsk ABM Battle Management radar means that in fact all 10 LPARs are ABM Battle Management radars.

Fifth, in addition to the *entire LPAR network* being a violation of the ABM Treaty by being the prohibited base for a nationwide ABM defense, *each* individual LPAR is a violation because it is an ABM Battle Management radar.

Sixth, U.S. Intelligence should therefore expect to detect ABM interceptors near Krasnoyarsk, which would be positioned to receive hand-off data from Krasnoyarsk for their engagement radars. We should also expect to detect interceptors near all the others, and nationwide. Indeed, there are already SAM-5s and SAM-10s deployed near Krasnoyarsk.

Seventh, given the evidence that the network of 10 LPARs is a base for a nationwide ABM defense, and given the further evidence that each of the 10 LPARs is an ABM Battle Management radar, it would be prudent for U.S. Intelligence to predict ABM interceptors nationwide. The evidence of an LPAR network base for nationwide ABM defense, the long-lead-time component, together with 10 individual ABM Battle Management radars, indicates clearly that the Soviets are breaking out of the ABM Treaty. Indeed, there are already about 6,000 ABM-capable SAM-5s and SAM-10s deployed nationwide.

CORRECT CATEGORIZATION OF SARY SHAGAN LPAR—EITHER CONFIRMATION OF NATIONWIDE ABM DEFENSE BREAK OUT OR ANOTHER KRASNOYARSK SMOKING GUN

The correct categorization of the Pechora-Krasnoyarsk-Sevastopol Class LPAR at Sary Shagan is the final key piece of evidence of the Soviet break out into a nationwide defense.

The President has reported that the Krasnoyarsk LPAR was identical to the Sary Shagan LPAR, but the President added *incorrectly* that the Sary Shagan LPAR was *exempted* from the requirements of Article VI on early warning radar location because it was located at a test range. Article VI states that each Party undertakes "not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward."

But Article IV is the provision on test range exemptions, and Article IV states: "The limitations provided for in *Article III* [i.e. on allowed ABM deployments] shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. . ." This means that test ranges are exempted from constraints only on ABM radar deployments, but test ranges are clearly *not* exempted from the restrictions on early warning radars embodied in Article VI. Therefore, if an LPAR is at a test range, it can legally be only one thing—it can only be an ABM Battle Management radar. If it is an

ABM Battle Management radar, it is exempted by Article IV on test range exemptions, but only from the restrictions on ABM deployments in Article III.

As noted, the President reported to Congress on January 23, 1984, that the Sary Shagan LPAR was an early warning radar. The President incorrectly reported further that an early warning radar could be located at a test range, thus exempting it from the requirements of Article VI on early warning radars. But the only exemption for radars at test ranges, however, pertain to Article II limitations.

In sum, the LPAR at Sary Shagan is either an ABM Battle Management radar, in which case it is legal if located at Sary Shagan under the Article IV test range exemption, or it is an early warning radar. Five of the other LPARs are identical to the Sary Shagan LPAR, so if it is an ABM Battle Management radar, so are all five of the others. If, on the other hand, it is an early warning radar, it can not be located at a test range, and further, it must be on the periphery and oriented outward. But the Sary Shagan LPAR is several hundreds of kilometers into the interior of the USSR, and further, it is oriented obliquely across the further interior of the USSR in the direction of the Indian Ocean.

Thus there are only two choices on how to categorize the Sary Shagan LPAR correctly—either it is itself a legally located ABM Battle Management radar at a test range, but it is identical to 5 of the other 10 LPARs, each of which also must be considered to be ABM Battle Management radars, and they therefore constitute an illegal base for an illegal nationwide ABM defense. And since the Sary Shagan ABM radar is part of the prohibited base for the illegal nationwide ABM defense, it too would be illegal. Or alternatively, the Sary Shagan LPAR is an early warning radar, and as such it must be on the periphery and oriented outward, according to Article VI. But it is not, so it must be regarded as another Krasnoyarsk, clearcut violation. In either case, the Sary Shagan LPAR's correct categorization increases the evidence that the Soviets are breaking out of the ABM Treaty.

The strongest evidence supports the conclusion that the Sary Shagan LPAR is an ABM Battle Management radar, and that it and the other 5 LPARs identical to it form the illegal base for a prohibited nationwide ABM defense.

OTHER EVIDENCE OF SOVIET NATIONWIDE ABM DEFENSE BREAK OUT

I would like to emphasize a very important judgment made in President Reagan's December 1, 1987 seventh report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations:

> In no case where we determined that the Soviet Union was in violation of SALT I and SALT II did the Soviets take corrective action.

This means that the Soviets have not corrected any of their ABM Treaty violations. Indeed, there is an *expanding pattern* of Soviet ABM Treaty violations.

The Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty, which the President has reported is "based on *conclusive evidence.*" Moreover, in diplomatic channels, the Soviets have con-

ceded that the Pechora radar is an early warning radar, and this radar is identical to the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviet claim that Krasnoyarsk is a space-tracking radar is contradicted by these facts.

Thus the Soviets have in effect admitted in diplomatic channels that Krasnoyarsk is a violation.

The CIA has also recently provided the following declassified additional judgment:

> The United States is aware that, over the last several years, Soviet officials have indicated that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

This means that the Soviets have admitted privately to themselves that Krasnoyarsk is a violation. Soviet scientists are also privately admitting that Krasnoyarsk is a violation, according to open testimony from expert witnesses before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. There are press reports of Soviet admissions that Soviet Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov deliberately planned the Krasnoyarsk radar violation in 1972, precisely when the SALT I ABM Treaty was signed, and when Ustinov was Party Secretary and Politburo member in charge of the Defense Industries. This further evidence confirms that the Soviet Leaders knew from the early 1970s, when they first planned its construction, that Krasnoyarsk was a clear violation.

During 1987, both the Senate and the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly in agreement with the President that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. On May 7, 1987, the House voted unanimously, 418 to 0. The Senate voted overwhelmingly, 93 to 5, in September 1987, and on February 23, 1987 the Senate also voted 93 to 2 that the Krasnoyarsk radar was an "*important obstacle*" to the advice and consent of two thirds of the Senate to the ratification of the proposed INF Treaty. Krasnoyarsk thus constitutes a "material breach" of the ABM Treaty.

Moreover, in his December report President Reagan referred for the first time to "*the new violation* in the deployment of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop observed at Gomel." The President added that:

> The U.S. Government finds that the USSR's activities with respect to moving a Flat Twin ABM radar and a Pawn Shop van, a component of an ABM system, from a test range and initiating deployment at a location [i.e. Gomel] outside of an ABM deployment area or ABM test range constitutes a *violation* of the ABM Treaty . . . This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

The Soviets have admitted in diplomatic channels that precisely the very same Flat Twin/Pawn Shop radars now deployed at Gomel are ABM radars. They have admitted further that if such ABM radars were ever located outside a test range or the allowed Moscow deployment area, *this deployment would constitute a prohibited base for a prohibited nationwide ABM defense,* thereby vio-

lating the most important provision of the ABM Treaty, Article I. But more recently, the Soviets have lied to the United States about their Gomel ABM violations, now claiming falsely that this activity is not a violation. Moreover, the Soviets have recently falsely claimed that the Flat Twin/Pawn Shop ABM radars were sent to Gomel to be dismantled, when the United States knows that this was not accurate. Gomel thus also constitutes a "material breach."

There is other strong evidence that the Soviets are deploying a nationwide ABM defense, which violates the ABM Treaty's ban on developing even a *base* for a nationwide ABM defense.

President Reagan also stated that *over 100* ABM-mode tests of Soviet SAM-5, SAM-10, and SAM-12 surface-to-air missiles and radars are *"highly probable" violations* of the ABM Treaty. In fact, he added that: "In recent years, we have gathered *an increased amount of evidence"* on Soviet ABM-mode tests of SAM systems.

Indeed, two top Soviet officials have actually *admitted* that the Soviet SAM-5/10/12 were *originally designed* to have ABM capabilities.

The Soviets have already deployed over 2,000 SAM-5 ABM-capable engagement radars nationwide, and over 2,000 SAM-5 ABM-capable interceptors, 2,000 to 4,000 SAM-10 ABM-capable interceptors, and about 1,000 SAM-12A interceptors, plus reportedly about 500 SH-08 mobile ABM interceptors (with 3,000 planned, and already in series production).

The President has reported further that the mobility of the Soviet ABM-3 system is a *violation* of the ABM Treaty's prohibition on mobile ABMs. The Soviets reportedly are now mass producing the mobile ABM-3 system—SH-04 and SH-08 interceptors and Flat Twin radars—for rapid nationwide deployment.

The Soviet rapid reload capability for ABM launchers is a serious cause for concern. The State and Defense Departments state that the Soviets "may" have a prohibited rapidly reloadable ABM system.

President Reagan said in December:

> The U.S. Government *reaffirms* the judgment of the March 1987 Report that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., LPAR radar construction, concurrent SAM-ABM mode testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload, ABM mobility, and deployment of ABM components to Gomel) suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Our concern continues . . . The redundancy in coverage provided by these new radars [the 10 Pechora-Krasnoyarsk-Sevastopol Class radars] and the disposition of these radars *closely resembles the design of the U.S. Safeguard ABM program.*

The U.S. Safeguard program was designed to be a 12 site, *nationwide* ABM system.

Reportedly, radar internetting, calibration, and "hand-off" exercises have already been detected between some of the LPARs, the Moscow Pill Box, and the smaller ABM-capable engagement radars. The internetting of ABM-capable SAM radars with LPARs obviates the search for incoming RVs by smaller engagement

radars. Indeed, *Soviet writings* have discussed the integration and internetting of ABM and ABM-capable SAM radar systems, including hand-off operations.

The Secretary of Defense testified to the Senate in 1985 that the "Soviets have some nationwide ABM capability" already. In his December, 1985 report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations, President Reagan has also stated that a unilateral Soviet ABM defense: "would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility."

Finally, the CIA has recently declassified the following important statement:

> In totality, these Soviet ABM activities provide a *strong* basis for concern that the USSR might have an *integrated plan* for an ABM defense of its national territory, and might be working toward it.

Thus even the CIA seems to believe that the Soviets are achieving a nationwide ABM defense break out.

Further, as the Administration stated in October, 1985: "The aggregate of current Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory—*precisely what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent.*"

As the Secretary of Defense has warned:

> The deployment of such a large number of radars, and the pattern of their deployment, together with other Soviet ABM-related activities, suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing a nationwide ABM defense in violation of the ABM Treaty. Such a development would have the *gravest implications* on the United States-Soviet strategic balance. *Nothing could be more dangerous to the security of the West* and global stability than a unilateral Soviet deployment of a nationwide ABM system combined with its massive offensive missile capabilities.

ABM TREATY NEGOTIATING RECORD INDICATES SOVIET INTENTION TO DEPLOY NATIONWIDE DEFENSE

Finally, several other important new facts emerge from an unclassified review of the ABM Treaty negotiating record provided by a leading defense expert. The Soviet ABM network allowed under the terms of the ABM Treaty indicates a deliberate Soviet plan to use this network as a base for a nationwide ABM defense in direct contravention of Article I of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets have gained a huge advantage over the United States by constructing a large and extensive network of long-lead time radars.

First, during the 1969–1972 negotiations on the ABM Treaty, the United States argued that Soviet construction of a large network of LPARs would be the crucial part of a Soviet nationwide ABM defense. The United States negotiated unsuccessfully to try to ban this possibility. But Soviet deployment of the base for a nationwide ABM defense is exactly what has been deployed. With this LPAR network now in place, the Soviets could clandestinely assemble

short-lead time and transportable items such as interceptors, launchers, and smaller engagement radars necessary to complete a nationwide network.

The allowable Soviet LPARs agreed to under the terms of the ABM Treaty are far more numerous than the low number in the original American position. "Agreed Statement F" ostensibly on radar limits does not apply to the LPARs that the United States was most interested in controlling in SALT from the outset of the SALT negotiations.

When the Krasnoyarsk radar violation is seen in the context of the original concerns and intentions of U.S. SALT negotiators in limiting LPARs, the Krasnoyarsk radar is extremely significant militarily, and it reveals Soviet preparations that could support a nationwide ABM defense.

It is undeniable that that the location, power level, size, type, orientation, and signal characteristics of Soviet LPARs give them the capability to identify, track, discriminate, and predict the impact points of re-entry vehicles.

In sum, the Soviets have not been forbidden by the ABM Treaty from constructing what must be considered the base for a nationwide ABM defense. The U.S. negotiating position on LPARs shifted from a complete prohibition, to the acceptance of existing Soviet LPARs such as Hen House radars but with a ban on future complexes, and finally to no restrictions on LPAR deployment except for location and orientation. And even that constraint was subsequently ignored with the Krasnoyarsk radar. Agreed Interpretation F together with Articles II, III, and VI, supposedly regulated LPARs, but in actuality these provisions allowed an expansion rather than a constraint on the peripheral Soviet network of LPARs. The Soviets chose to exploit a right to deploy, without numerical limit, LPARs on the periphery of their territory, even when those LPAR deployments defeated the key purpose of the ABM Treaty.

The decision by Soviet leaders to build Pechora Class radars on the periphery of the Soviet Union occurred in the *mid-1960s*, and the decision to build the Krasnoyarsk LPAR away from the periphery occurred in the *early 1970s*. The process of building these radars began before SALT began, and continued during and after negotiations on the ABM Treaty. It was widely acknowledged by experts that without restrictions on LPARs, the integrity of the ABM Treaty would be in doubt.

AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY

Last Fall the Senate unanimously passed a Helms' amendment to the State Department Authorization Bill requiring a report on U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It was simple and straight forward. It merely requires the President to report on whether U.S. supreme national security interests have been jeopardized by the failure to achieve permanent constraints on offensive weapons, the ongoing Soviet strategic offensive and defensive buildups, and whether the U.S. should therefore withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Such a report would be only logical and reasonable. The President has already done most of what is required.

Here is what the Helms' amendment said:

> "SEC. 568. Report on Soviet Violations of ABM Treaty. Within thirty days of the enactment of this section, the President shall report to Congress (1) whether Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty and the complete failure after the ratification of such treaty to reduce or limit the increase of Soviet offensive intercontinental nuclear weapons systems jeopardize the supreme interest of the United States and (2) whether the United States should accordingly withdraw from such treaty.

The disposition of this amendment in Conference was as follows:

> Statement of Managers—The conference substitute deletes the Senate provision on the failure to achieve permanent constraints on Soviet strategic offensive forces which could threaten the survivability of U.S. strategic offensive forces, and U.S. intentions regarding possible withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. *The Senate conferees expect that the President will address the issues raised by the Senate provision in the context of the annual report required under Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended.*

The Helms' amendment was thus incorporated into the Section 52 "Pell Amendment" report, which was due on January 31, 1988. The Pell Amendment report should address the question of whether U.S. supreme interests are jeopardized by Soviet nationwide ABM defense break out.

In order to understand the full significance of Soviet nationwide ABM defense break out, the Senate needs to be reminded of certain basic facts about arms control and its history.

First, on May 9, 1972, the United States in an official statement to Congress announced its intentions on withdrawing from the SALT I ABM Treaty as follows:

> The United States [SALT I] Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the *survivability* of our respective strategic retaliatory forces . . . If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within *five* years, United States supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Second, fifteen years after the United States made the policy declaration of May 9, 1972, the United States has still not yet achieved the objective of "an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations."

Third, President Reagan reported to Congress on June 3, 1986, that there was a "growing strategic imbalance between the United States and the USSR." President Reagan added that the Soviet Union now has a *"first strike capability"* which was "seriously eroding the stability of the strategic balance," and which has re-

sulted in a "loss in the survivability of United States strategic forces."

Fourth, I would point out that Article XV of the SALT I ABM Treaty, which was ratified on October 3, 1987, states:

> Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

Fifth, President Reagan reported further to Congress that the siting, orientation, and capabilities of the Soviet Krasnoyarsk ABM Battle Management Radar "directly violates" three provisions of the SALT I ABM Treaty. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have now each voted unanimously that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a "violation" of the SALT I ABM Treaty.

Sixth, President Reagan has also reported further to Congress that it is highly probable that the Soviet Union has conducted multiple tests of surface-to-air missile interceptors and radars in a prohibited ABM mode, and has developed a prohibited mobile ABM system. The President has also reported to Congress that "all Soviet Large Phased Array Radars . . . have the inherent capability . . . of contributing to ABM battle management, . . . and LPARs have always been considered the long lead time elements of a possible territorial defense." President Reagan himself added that the Soviet Union "may be developing a nationwide ABM defense" in direct contravention of Article I of the ABM Treaty, the most important provision of the Treaty.

I believe that the failure to achieve permanent constraints on offensive weapons and the Soviet strategic offensive and defensive buildups have placed the supreme interests of the United States in jeopardy. I believe further that the President is required to report to the Senate on an urgent basis whether the United States should withdraw from the SALT I ABM Treaty.

The Helms amendment, as incorporated into the Pell Amendment, merely provides that the President of the United States should make such a report. The report is overdue.

Senator Helms has also introduced another amendment on the U.S. violation of the ABM Treaty, by failing to conduct the third five year review. I also agreed with that amendment.

STEVEN D. SYMMS.

APPENDIX A

Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings on NATO Defense and the INF Treaty

1. Strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, including the implications of the INF Treaty.

Date: January 25, 1988 (morning and afternoon);

Witnesses: The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense; Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, including the implications of the INF Treaty.

Date: January 26, 1988 (morning);

Witness: Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of Central Intelligence.

3. NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance, NATO military strategy, and NATO force improvements.

Date: January 27, 1988 (morning);

Witnesses: Ambassador David M. Abshire, Former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO; Mr. Phillip A. Karber, Vice President and General Manager for National Security Programs, The BDM Corporation.

4. NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance, NATO military strategy, and NATO force improvements.

Date: January 27, 1988 (afternoon);

Witnesses: Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense; Senator Dan Quayle, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense.

5. Strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, including the implications of the INF Treaty.

Date: January 29, 1988 (morning);

Witness: Dr. Harold Brown, Former Secretary of Defense.

6. Strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, including the implications of the INF Treaty.

Date: January 29, 1988 (afternoon);

Witness: Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Former U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

7. NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance, NATO military strategy, and NATO force improvements.

Date: February 1, 1988 (afternoon);

Witness: General Bernard W. Rogers, USA (Retired), Former Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command.

8. NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance, NATO military strategy, and NATO force improvements.

Date: February 2, 1988 (morning);

Witness: General John R. Galvin, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command.

9. European perspectives on NATO's security posture, including the implications of the INF Treaty.

Date: February 2, 1988 (afternoon);

Witness: Ambassador Richard R. Burt, U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.

10. NATO force deficiencies and improvements.

Date: February 3, 1988 (morning);

Witnesses: General Carl E. Vuono, USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps; and General Larry D. Welch, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

11. Intelligence Community's assessment of Treaty monitoring and verification capabilities (Executive Session of the Select Intelligence Committee to which Armed Services Committee members were invited).

Date: February 3, 1988 (afternoon).

12. NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance, NATO military strategy, and NATO force improvements.

Date: February 4, 1988 (morning);

Witness: Mr. Richard N. Perle, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

13. NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance (Executive Session).

Date: February 4, 1988 (afternoon);

Witnesses: Mr. Andrew W. Marshall, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense; and Lieutenant Colonel Jeff S. McKitrick, USA, Military Assistant, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

14. Allied perspectives on NATO's security posture, including the implications of the INF Treaty.

Date: February 16, 1988 (morning);

Witnesses: The Honorable Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs; Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman II, Chief Negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms; and Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters.

15. Strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, with emphasis on European perspectives.

Date: February 16, 1988 (afternoon);

Witness: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

16. Meeting with Dr. Willem van Eekelen, Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Chairman of the Eurogroup Defense Ministers (Executive Session).

Date: February 17, 1988 (morning).

17. Conventional arms control and confidence-building measures in Europe.

Date: February 17, 1988 (afternoon);

Witnesses: Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, Former Chief Negotiator and Head of the U.S. Delegation, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations; Professor Karl Kaiser, Director, Research Institute, German Council on Foreign Relations; and Mr. Phillip A.

Karber, Vice President and General Manager for National Security Programs, The BDM Corporation.

18. Conventional arms control and confidence-building measures in Europe.

Date: February 18, 1988 (morning);

Witnesses: Dr. James A. Thomson, Vice President, The RAND Corporation; and Mr. Charles H. Thomas, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs and U.S. Representative to NATO's High Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control.

19. Soviet incentives and intentions to comply with the INF Treaty (Executive Session of the Select Intelligence Committee to which Armed Services Committee Members were invited);

Date: February 18, 1988 (afternoon).

20. Implications of the INF Treaty for negotiating the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) Treaty (Joint Executive Session of the Armed Services Committee and Select Intelligence Committee).

Date: February 19, 1988 (morning).

21. INF Treaty.

Date: February 22, 1988 (afternoon);

Witness: Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman, Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.

22. INF Treaty.

Date: February 23, 1988 (morning);

Witness: Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman, Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.

23. Implications of the INF Treaty.

Date: February 24, 1988 (morning);

Witnesses: Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy; Dr. William R. Van Cleave, University Professor and Director of the Center of Defense and Strategic Studies, Southwest Missouri State University; and Ambassador Evan G. Galbraith, Former U.S. Ambassador to France.

24. Strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, including the implications of the INF Treaty.

Date: February 24, 1988 (afternoon);

Witness: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Former Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

25. Resource policies for NATO force improvements.

Date: February 25, 1988 (morning);

Witnesses: Ambassador Alton G. Keel, Jr., U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO; and Mr. Dennis Kloske, Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on NATO Armaments.

26. Compliance with, and enforcement of, the INF Treaty.

Date: February 25, 1988 (afternoon);

Witnesses: Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Ambassador at Large and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters; and Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman, Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.

27. Assessment of the INF Treaty's possible impact on the Special Access Programs of the Department of Defense (Executive Session).

Date: March 2, 1988 (morning);

Witnesses: Representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services.

28. INF Treaty, including issues related to the negotiating record (Executive Session).

Date: March 18, 1988 (morning and afternoon);

Witnesses: Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman, Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces; Representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

29. INF Treaty, including issues related to ground-launched cruise missiles as well as DOD Special Access Programs and "future" weapons systems (Executive Session).

Date: March 24, 1988 (morning);

Witnesses: The Honorable Ronald F. Lehman II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; General Robert T. Herres, USAF, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Ambassador John Woodworth, Deputy Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.

APPENDIX B

Summary of the INF Treaty

The INF Treaty eliminates all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched cruise and ballistic intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems tested or deployed for weapon-delivery and permanently bans all systems of these types thereafter. Intermediate-range is defined as between 1000 and 5500 kilometers (600 and 3300 miles); shorter-range is defined as between 500 and 1000 kilometers (300 and 600 miles). The elimination of both deployed and non-deployed missiles and their launchers, as well as designated support structures and equipment for the missiles, is required. The Treaty does not, however, require destruction of the nuclear devices, guidance packages and certain other parts.

The U.S. missiles to be eliminated are the Pershing II, the BGM-109G GLCM and the Pershing 1A missile. All of these missiles carry a single warhead. The Soviet missiles slated for elimination are the SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-23, and SSC-X-4 GLCM. The SS-20 carries three warheads; the other Soviet missiles carry one warhead.

As listed in the November 1987 data exchange, the Parties have declared that the numbers of these missiles and launchers to be eliminated under the Treaty are as indicated below:

	Deployed	Nondeployed	Aggregate	RV [1]
United States				
Intermediate-Range Systems:				
Pershing II	120	127	247	247
GLCM	309	133	442	442
Total missiles	429	260	689	689
Launchers	214	68	282	
Shorter-Range Systems:				
Pershing IA missiles	0	170	170	170
Launchers	0	1	1	
Total missiles and RV's	429	430	859	859
Soviet Union				
Intermediate-Range Systems:				
SS-20	405	245	650	1950
SS-4	65	105	170	170
SS-5	0	6	6	6
SSC-X-4	0	84	84	84
Total missiles	470	440	910	2,210
Launchers	484	124	608	
Shorter-Range Systems:				
SS-23	167	33	200	200
SS-12	220	506	726	726
Total missiles	387	539	926	926

	Deployed	Nondeployed	Aggregate	RV [1]
Launchers	197	40	237	
Total missiles and RV's	857	979	1,836	3,136

[1] Note: Warheads are removed, but not "eliminated." Numbers shown are those which would be associated with the missiles to be eliminated.

As indicated above, the Soviet Union will remove approximately four warheads now deployed on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles eliminated under the Treaty for each U.S. warhead removed (3136 versus 859). The ratio of Soviet missiles eliminated versus U.S. missiles eliminated is about two-to-one (1836 versus 859).

On the date the Treaty enters into force, each side must stop the production of all INF missiles, launchers and stages. Flight-testing must also cease. Two years and 341 days (that is, three years minus fifteen days) after the Treaty enters into force, the United States and the Soviet Union must have completed the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. During the remaining fifteen days in the three-year elimination period, the United States must withdraw to its territory any U.S. reentry vehicles for West German Pershing 1A missiles which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) releases from the existing Program of Cooperation (POC) between the two allies. Although it is not required by the Treaty, the FRG Government has pledged to dismantle its Pershing 1A missiles when the U.S. and Soviet elimination procedures have been completed and to terminate the POC on this system.

The elimination provisions require a periodic updating of the data base contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. Within 30 days of the date the Treaty enters into force, each side must provide revised information on all categories of data found in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This revised submission will supersede the data contained in the November 1987 MOU. Although the United States will have on-site inspection rights at formerly declared INF sites and facilities, it will ultimately have to depend on national technical means to ascertain whether there are any discrepancies and/or omissions in the revised submission. Since national technical means may not be sufficient to this task, the United States may need to seek cooperation from the Soviet Union in clarifying questions which may arise in this context. Subsequent updates are to occur thirty days after the end of each six month period of the three year elimination process.

The key provisions governing the elimination of the undeployed intermediate-range missiles are as follows: within six months after the Treaty enters into force, each side must eliminate all types of intermediate-range (and shorter-range) missiles tested but never deployed. For the Soviet Union, this is the SSC-X-4 GLCM; for the United States, the Pershing 1B. Also within the first six months, each side may eliminate up to 100 of its intermediate-range missiles by launching them.

The first phase of reductions for intermediate-range missiles must be achieved 29 months after the treaty enters into force. In the first phase each side must have reduced its deployed launchers to a number capable of holding missiles carrying no more than 171

warheads and deployed missiles to the number capable of carrying no more than 180 warheads. Each side must also limit its nondeployed launchers and missiles so that the sum of the deployed and nondeployed launchers and missiles does not exceed that capable of carrying 200 warheads.

The provisions governing the elimination of shorter-range missiles require that within 90 days all deployed shorter-range missiles, and all deployed and nondeployed launchers, must be moved to specified elimination facilities; and within twelve months all nondeployed shorter-range missiles must be moved to elimination facilities. Finally, within eighteen months all shorter-range missiles, launchers, and specified support structures and equipment must be eliminated.

APPENDIX C

Letters From Former Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter

26 Federal Plaza,
New York City, NY, February 11, 1988.

Dear Sam and John: As you requested, I have put my views about the proposed Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in writing in the event you believe they may be of interest to your colleagues on the Armed Services Committee.

While I was not a proponent of the zero-zero formula it embodies, I believe the treaty should be ratified by the Senate. Since U.S. INF forces were a key element in the seamless web of nuclear deterrence linking the defense of Western Europe and the United States, I would have preferred a treaty that permitted each side to retain equal INF forces, though at sharply reduced levels of deployment. I expressed these reservations in an article I coauthored with Henry Kissinger on April 26, 1987. We also said that if the Administration did move forward with the zero-zero formula in Europe, it should insist on expanding the formula worldwide, thereby eliminating the 100 Soviet missiles in Asia, and on linking the final phase of INF reductions to substantial progress on negotiations to eliminate Soviet conventional superiority in Europe. Our negotiators succeeded in winning concessions on the first issue but failed to obtain agreement on the second.

The Senate can express its concern on this and other issues by following the precedent of the Jackson Amendment to the proposed SALT I Treaty in 1972, which required future arms control agreements to be based on parity. But the Senate should not add amendments that would require renegotiation of the treaty, since such an action would have a disastrous impact on our European allies.

In considering the treaty, the Senate should bear in mind these caveats:

First, the NATO alliance must take actions to compensate for the treaty. This means both increasing our bomber forces stationed in Europe capable of reaching Soviet territory and also modernizing NATO's short-range nuclear forces. Eliminating Soviet superiority in conventional weapons should have priority over reductions in nuclear weapons. Any strategic arms reduction agreement should be expressly linked to an agreement reducing the Soviet superiority in conventional arms.

Second, the United States must not allow the INF Treaty to usher in a false euphoria about a new dawn in U.S.-Soviet relations. Arms control agreements do not produce peace. Wars are caused not by the existence of arms but by the failure to resolve political differences which lead to their use. As long as Moscow continues its expansionist policies in Asia, Latin America, and

Africa, we must continue to support policies that will enable us to deter and compete with the Kremlin even as we negotiate with its leaders.

Third, the United States must not make the mistake of believing that the INF verification provisions, which are more intrusive than those in any previous agreement, would be adequate for a START accord. While serious concerns have been expressed in the hearings about the possibility of Soviet cheating under the INF Treaty, the strategic impact of such cheating, while important, would not be cataclysmic. But if the United States fails to insist on genuinely ironclad verification provisions in a START agreement, the survival of the West could be at risk.

While the INF debate thus far has primarily centered on the issue of verification, that is not the central question in the START talks. We must keep in mind that the fact a bad agreement can be verified does not make it a good agreement. Our goal in the START talks must be not only an accord that is verifiable but also one that eliminates the present Soviet advantage in counterforce weapons. None of the current Administration proposals that have surfaced in the media meet that test.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

FEBRUARY 19, 1988.

DEAR SENATORS NUNN AND WARNER: In response to your letter of February 10, 1988, on behalf of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, I am pleased to summarize my view on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

I support ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate. However, it is essential that the Members of the Senate are fully assured that the verification provisions are more than sufficient to provide the capability to detect any violations of the agreed terms. The United States must also have in being the technical capability of determining any such violations.

The Warsaw Pact conventional forces are generally recognized as superior to those of NATO. Without some modification in this current conventional arms relationship the four decades of peace in the European continent could be placed in jeopardy.

To remedy this imbalance between conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, I strongly recommend the following. The MBFR or other negotiations achieve an agreement that would reduce and equalize conventional forces on both sides. The MBFR negotiations in Vienna, which have gone on for about two decades, would be the best forum to correct the current Soviet/Warsaw Pact superiority.

However, if the MBFR or comparable negotiations are delayed or unsuccessful it is mandatory that NATO immediately implement actions that will sufficiently strengthen its conventional forces to offset Warsaw Pact superiority.

Most importantly, there should be no further reductions in European theatre nuclear weapons until the issue of balance in conventional arms is resolved.

Members of the U.S. Senate who vote for ratification of the INF Treaty must recognize their commitment to NATO's conventional arms improvements. It would be foolhardy to ratify an INF Treaty and not adequately achieve balance and strength in NATO's conventional capability. We must never forget NATO has been the military force in being that has maintained peace on the European continent for the longest period in the past 200 years.

If you and the other members of the Committee have further questions I will be glad to respond.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

MARCH 3, 1988.

TO SENATORS SAM NUNN AND JOHN WARNER: In response to your letter of February 10, let me outline briefly my opinion about the recently signed Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. I should make it clear that I have not been briefed on the negotiations or the classified details of the agreement.

I understand that the Treaty requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems within three years and bans them thereafter. It also requires the two sides to put into force measures to facilitate effective verification of the terms of the Treaty. A Memorandum of Understanding on Data provides for the exchange of information concerning numbers, characteristics, and locations of missiles on each side. An Inspection Protocol sets forth procedures for on-site inspections and monitoring of compliance with the agreements. A separate Protocol prescribes procedures for the elimination of missiles, launchers, and support facilities, but not warheads or guidance mechanisms. (I understand that the warheads from the 72 Pershing 1As will be destroyed at the end of the three year dismantlement period.) It is my presumption that the terms set forth in these four principal documents either have been or will be carried out honestly and thoroughly by both sides, and that the means to detect violations are adequate.

Since the Soviets will be required to destroy 680 launchers and the United States 364, this is a favorable numerical balance for our Nation. At the same time, however, the Soviets have been successful in reducing a substantial threat to the western portion of their homeland and we will have much less deterrent capability in Europe to discourage any possible intrusion by Warsaw Pact forces into NATO territory.

I do not deplore this reduction in deterrent forces. In effect, the agreement is consistent with the decision made by NATO leaders in December 1979 to meet the Soviet SS–20 threat by deploying our own theater nuclear weapons. At that time, you will remember, the United States agreed to negotiate with the Soviet Union in order to eliminate these missiles on both sides. The deployment of Pershing missiles and ground launched cruise missiles has had the desired result.

There will now be some reduction in nuclear arsenals—about three percent, I understand. If SALT II had been fully implemented, the Soviets would have had to dismantle about ten percent of

their nuclear missiles, consisting primarily of older armaments. Any such reduction is at least symbolically important in that it sends a signal to anxious people around the world that the superpowers are serious in their efforts and can cooperate at least in a limited fashion in nuclear arms control. The INF Treaty does not make any significant change in the strategic military balance. One result is that the removal of intermediate-range and short-range missiles will highlight the Soviet advantage in conventional forces.

Treaty provisions governing communications and verfication can enhance crisis stability through the use of nuclear risk reduction centers. Also, new on-site inspection rights during the next thirteen years can reduce tension between the United States and the Soviet Union by adding substantially to mutual understanding of procedures, policies, and attitudes. It remains to be seen whether ground inspections without aerial inspections will be adequate. (Future agreements involving conventional forces will almost certainly require aerial inspections.) Unnecessary delays in issuing visas, providing inadequate transportation, communication, and requested measurements and photographs, or otherwise inhibiting thorough on-site inspections could be a problem. Again, however, the acceptance of such inspections is a significant advance that bodes well for possible future agreements involving strategic nuclear weapons and conventional military forces.

Looking to the future, any further substantial reductions in nuclear forces should be tied to equalizing the conventional military balance in Europe, and special attention must be paid to the presence of the large Soviet land-based missiles that pose a major threat to strategic stability. In addition to reducing total nuclear arsenals, the warhead:launcher ratio needs to be lowered and remaining launchers should be deployed in relatively invulnerable sites to remove any possible advantage from a pre-emptive strike.

In summary, my recommendation to the Members of the U.S. Senate is that the INF Treaty be ratified despite its limitations. Rejections of the Treaty or substantive amendments or reservations that would require further negotiation would, at this time, be a serious blow to our Nation's prestige and an almost insurmountable obstacle in pursuing more substantive agreements in the future.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER.

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